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c,q,t,=cdbvGoogle

THfS lOOIL

FORMS tAKT OF THE

ORIGINAL LIBRARY

OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

BOUCHTIN EUKOPE

1838 TO IS39

ASA GRAY

6

701
.AiS
1)33

li

b, Google

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?*-2^

7^

TWO TREATISES
THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR;

THE FORMER CONSISTING, OF TEN DOUBTS CON-
CERNING PROVIDENCE, AND A SOLUTION OF
THOSE DOUBTS;

BY VICTOR COUSIN,

THOMAS TAYLOR,

LATO, ahistotle, etc.

" Who tndi not Proiidence all-good ud wIh,

Jl partLat ill ii iinlTersBi good.**

Be truth la dear ; vliatever it, it right."

PRINTED FOR THE TRANSLATOR;
3LD BY WILLI AU PICK EKING, CHANCERY LANB.

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PREFACE.

JN O subjects of discussion are perhaps more in-
teresting or more important tlian those of which
the present volume consists. For what can more
demand our most serious attention, or what can be
more essential to the well-being of our immortal
part, than a scientific elucidation and defence of the
mysterious ways of Providence, and a development
of the nature of Evil ? For as Divinity is good-
ness itself, it is requisite that all the dispensadons
of his providence should be beneficent, and that
perfect evil should have no real existence in the
nature of things. That this is necessary, is de-
monstrated by Proclus in the following Treatises
with his usual acuteness and eloquence, by argu-
ments which are no less admirable for their per-
spicuity, than invincible from their strength.

In praise of Proclus, I have said so much in
most of my other numerous works, that I shall only
summarily observe at present respecting this cory-
phsean philosopher, that his disciple Marinus says
in his Life of him, "thathe was wise in a most trans-
cendent degree"*; and that Ammonius Hermias
calls him his divine preceptor, and says " that he

* Oir tcartt futut Xtytt Tnr tw» gtfHt ii^si/u*iwi, u mu -rm ftmXirrm

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possessed tlie power of unrokling the opinions of
the ancients, and a scienUfic judgement of the na-
ture of things, in the highest perfection possible to
man"*. And with respect to his eloquence, his
before-mentioned disciple Marinus says, "that be
did not appear to be without divine inspiration, for
he produced from his wise mouth words similar to
the most thick-falling snow"; so that his eyes
emitted a bright radiance, and the rest of his
countenance participated of divine illumination"".
Among the moderns also, the sagacious Kepler,
after having made a long extract from the first
book of the Commentaries of Proclus on Euclid,
says of him, " His language flows like a torrent,
inundating its banks, and hiding the dark fortb
and whirlpools of doubts, while his mind, fnll of the
majesty of things o( such a magnitude, stru^les
in the straits of language, and the conclusion never
satisfying him, exceeds by the copia of words, the
simplicity of the propositions"''. Dr. Barrow also,

waX/t4ait iifHifLttj mu rnf irtrvn/t^nunt rnt ft/run rmt Hrttr Mff*tr mfKit*
ffitwrot^ — AmTTton^ in jtristot- 2}6 Ittterpreiatume^

<- Alluding lo what Homer rays irf the eloquunce of Ulysses, in
the third book of the Iliad, v. 232.

' Marini Proclus, cap. SS,

' " Oralio fluitipu torrentis initar, lipu innndaiis, et c»ca du-
Ulatioiiuin lada gurgiteeque occultans, dum mens, plena m^esuii*
tantsrum rerum, luctatur in augustiis lingus, ct conclusio nun-
quamubi ipai verbonun copiiutufadeni, prapositiooum sirnplici.
tatem excedit."— Vid. Barmanicet Mundi, lib. iv. p. US.

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IB bis MaChematical Lectures (p. 8.), quotes Pro-
dins's eulogy of a point, and eays that it is mag-

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Vlll PREFACE.

translation I have endeavoured to give the accurate
meaning of Proclus, and to preserve as much of his
manner as is possible, from an original which, as
Fabricius justly observes, is "all but barbarous"*;
and that the reader will find in these Treatises a
demonstration of those great Platonic dogmas
which Pope has so elegantly celebrated in his
Essay on Man, but without attempting to prove
that ihey are true. The dogmas I allude to are
the following: That '* there must be somewhere, such
arankasMan"*'; that "all partial evil is universal
good"; and that "whatever is, is right." Hence
Proclus proves by incontrovertible arguments, that
evil has no real existence, but has only a shadowy
subsistence, and that Divinity concealed it in the
utility of good.

' ■■ Versio inculta Tateor, et lanttim non barbara, sed ex qua
Griecie lingufe et Philosophim Plato n ic^e periiis pulchrasseatentUs
BurlorlB perepicere, nee diflicili! ut contido erit, nee injueuadum."

' Pope also says of man, in Ihe above-mentioned philosophical
poem, with oo less accuracy than elegance, that he is,
" Flac'd on tliU iMbmus of a middle state,
A being darkly wise and rudely great."— Epi»(. //.
For man is situated between i>eings that eternally abide in the
possession of real good, such as divine natures, and those that per-
petually participate only ot oppaTeni good, such as brutes. Hence,
ranking in the last order of ratianal essences, his wisdom majr justly
be said to be dark, and Ms greatness riute.

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TEN DOUBTS

PROVIDENCE, &c.

1 HE great Plato, in the tenth book of his Laws,
compels us, by adftmantine arguments, as it were,
to confess that Providence has an existence ; and
also elsewhere in many places, as in the Timaeus,
he shows* that the Demiurgus has elaborated the
fabrication of things, by his providential energies,
as far as to the last portion of intelligence, and this
he likewise clearly asserts. But it is requisite that
we should be pei-suaded by what Plato has demon-
strated, and by the most efficacious attestations
^ven by the [Chaldean] oracles to the demon-
strations of Plato. For I conceive that this tra-
dition of the oracles to the worthy auditors of the
Gods, is a most manifest demonstration of the
existence of Providence, in answer to whatever
* In iho TerrioD of Motbeka ouenda ; for which it is necesaaif

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opposes it according to the conceptions of the mul-
titude, and is sufRcieat to repel the phantasms
which prevent them from believing that all things
subsist conformably to the will of Providence, and
to lead them from base garrulity on this subject,
to tlie truth of things. And we say this, not as if
we thought that what has been written on this
subject by those prior to us is not worthy of great
attention, but because the soul, though these things
have been the occasion of donbt, and have been
distinctly considered a thousand times, yet desires
to hear and speak concerning them, to revolve
them, and, as it were, discuss them in herself, and
is not willing to receive information alone about
them from others*. Let us, therefore, interrogate
ourselves, and doubting, in the secret recesses of
the soul, endeavour to exercise ourselves in the
solution of doubts, conddering it as of no conse-
quence whether we discuss, or whether we do not,
what has been said by those prior to usj since as
long as we deliver what we are persuaded is truth,
we shall appear to assert and to write our own
conceptions on this subject. To which may be
added, that we shall have Hermes for bur common
leader, who is said to insert anticipations of common
conceptions in every soul.

1. And prior to everything else, let us invest!*
gate whether Providence extends to all things, to

* The Utter pirt of ihts unteiice in the version of Moibeka ia,
" ct noQ solum de foria redpere do his sermones noknle." But
tot ndetOe I read volenlt.

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wholes and parts, nnd to the mostindividual things
in the heavens, and under the heavens, to eternal
and corruptible natures. But it is requisite that
Providence should either know the desert of the
tilings for which it provides, or that it should not
lead all things according to their desert, in con-
sequence of being ignorant of their worth. We
must also investigate the manner in which Provi-
dence knows all things, both wholes and parts,
and corruptible and eternal natures, and what the
characteristic is of its knowledge. And if we are
able to apprehend this, afterwards something else,
and again another thing will become the subject of
doubt

Considering therefore this in the first place, and
involdng the common leader, Hermes, we must say
that with respect to knowledge, one kind is con-
nascent with irrationality, and is called sense or
phantasy ; it also pertains to things of a partial
nature, and which are not external to body, and
therefore manifests that the cognitions themselves
ore directed to partial essences. But another kind
of knowledge is essentially inherent in the rational
lifct and is called opinion and science ; differing
indeed from irrational cognitions in this, that it
knows universals, they, as we have said, having a
perception of partial qualities alone. These two
kinds of rational knowledge likewise differ from
each other, because the one, viz. opinion, is the
knowledge of mutable natures; but the other, viz.
science, is the knowledge of things permanently

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immutable. Prior to these, however, there is
another knowledge, which is denominated intellec-
tual ; of which one kind apprehends all things at
once and simply, but the other is a knowledge, not
of all things at once, but of one thing at a time*.
And in this they differ, one being the knowledge
of an intellect in every respect perfect, but the
other being the knowledge of partial intellects;
all intellectual essences indeed understanding all
things, and in this transcending rational cognitions,-
but one intellect having a total subsistence, and
intellectually perceiving all things totally ; but
another apprehending all things partially, because
being itself partial, its intellections are also of a
partial nature.

Beyond all these, however, is the knowledge of
Providence, which is above intellect, and exists in
the one alone, according to which every God is es-
sentialized, and is said to attend providentially to
all things, establishing himself in an energy prior
to intellectual perception. By this one, therefore,
according to which also he subsists, he knows all
things. For if we admit that other cognitions
necessarily remain connascent with the essences to
which they pertain, — as, for instance, phantasy and
sense, which, being irrational, belong to the irra-
tional life, and likewise the cognitions prior to
these, which are rational, as pertaining to rational
souls, and the intellectual to intellectual essences, —
it would be absurd not to admit, that the cogni-
* And such ii the knowledge of our intellect.

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tions of the Gods, so far as tbey are Gods, are
defined according to an hyparxis* which is trao-
Bcendently one, since from coninion conceptions we
think that divinity is something better than intel-
lect, and that the knowledge of everything is con- -
fomiable to what the thing is.

l(i therefore, Providence subsists according to the
one, and is that which imparts good to all things,
and the good is the same with the one*', through
being which it provides for all things, in this one
it likewise knows the things which are the subjects
of its providential energies. By the one, therefore,
it possesses the power of knowing all things. To
this one, however, there is no greater knowledge
of wholes than of parts; of things which are accord-
ing to nature, than of such as are preternatural ;
of species, than of things which are without species.
For as of all sensible things, it is necessary that
there should be some impartible organ which forms
a judgement of them, — and likewise of the forms
prior to sensibles, that there should be another judi-
ciary organ by which they are perceived ; since if
the judiciary organ was divisible, and by one part
of itself perceived one thing, and by another part of
itself another thing, it would be just the same as if
I should perceive this thing, but you that; — thus

" Hypaiiis wgnifiea Ihe lummil of the essence 'nf a thing, and
is that Bccordtng to which Ihat thing jirmcipally subsists.

'' The good, according to Plato, is the same with the me. For in
his Republic, be celebrates the principleof all things by iherormcr
. of these appellations, and in the Parmeaidea by the latter.

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also it is requisite that there should be something
prior to forms, which has one knowledge both of
universals and individuals ; or after what manner
could it arrange them, —these indeed as' partici-
pants, but those as things participated ? To these,
however, there is nothing else common than unity.
Prior therefore to forms, there is something gnostic,
which knows all things so far as they are one. But
it is evident that this which knows according to the
one, knows so far as the similar is known by the
similar, I mean so far as that which proceeds from
a cause is known by its cause. For everywhere,
and in all these, there is t/ie one. And, indeed,
every being, of whatever kind it may be, does not
subsist universally ; since that which exists accord-
ing to a part, is different from that which exists as
a whole". Nor is everything species [or form],
since there is something else which is not species ;
nor is everything according to nature, since there
is also that which is preternatural. But every-
thing which can be conceived, whatever it may be,
is one, in consequence of /Ae one existing above all
things. If, however, there is anything which does
not participate of the one, neither will it wholly
participate of being, nor will it be able to partici-
pate of Providence. If, therefore, nothing escapes
the one, that which knows all things from itself,
will possess this knowledge throtigh a transcendency

' i. e. Whole does not subuBl universally, because some things
are paru ; or in other wordB, ererylbing h not a whole, because
a pari, so far ai it is a part, is not a whole.

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of union* ; since it will know all things either by
the one, or by that which is not the one. This
latter mode of knowledge, however, is of a subor-
dinate nature, and foreign from that of the one.
By the one, therefore, Providence knows everything
which is in any respect whatever one. For unity
is common to all things, both to beings, and to non-
beings. [Hence Providence, as we have said) being
defined according to the one and the good, and the
good being prior to intellect (for intellect aspires
after the good, since this is the object of desire to
all beings, but the good does not aspire aitev intel-
lect,] — this being the case, it is necessary that pro-
vidential should be superior to intellectual know-
ledge; and in consequence of this, that Providence
should know all things by its own one, through
which it benefits all things, the intellectual and
the non-intellectual, the vital and the non-vital,
beings and non-beings, inserting iii all things the
one, as a representation of its own one**.] For the

' In Morbeka's Terwon " tmialiler". But this in Ihe originBl
wafl doubtlna itnutn, i, e. (vAta mr ni umtuti vn^CtXtir) accord'
inj to a Irantcertilency of union.

'' The ori^iial of Ihe part within the brackets is to be found in
Philoponua eontra Prod, de Muadi ^ternitale, and is aa fol-
lows i Tm 3n run vjiwsf «, u^iinu mt« ra If iwi n Mymlm ufafi-
ffiimi, nai m myaln Wfi rii riB amt, {run ymf ifi/iTxi TJB ayniiv,
muyMfTM trtm w*m, mu h-x' ru, »« « mymta,) mnym jta. mi
ir{»«ITil»l> ymt't ivif rm ■«{«> u™- »» au™ 1<1 tbf <r;»K>< «>»

■x » /•<, »4VH-«, wu M i*™™') ■■. ™ fii Zmm, mm r. nn hi

* Thia addition, which a <Atiouelj necesurj, is coirobonled bjr
the TBisioD of Moibeka, which has in this place " el mm inMU-
getuia If vnvMia," &c.

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one of it is not like an individual one. For tbis is
the last of beings, and is inferior to that which b
universal, through the participation of which it is
that which it is. The one of Providence, however,
is more excellent than that which is universal : for
the universal is a certain one, but is not the one
itself; because it is many things, and not one atone,
in consequence of possessing the clifFerences of the
things which it contains. But neither is the one
according to which Providence exists such as a
whole; for this indeed is partible ; but that as being
truly one, is also truly impartible.

[In short, therefore, since we assert that this one
of Providence is productive of all things, we mast
also acknowledge that it is the saviour of all things ;
having an hyparxis more true than all essence, and
more manifest than all knowledge ; not being dis-
tributed into parts together with things which are
the objects of its knowledge, nor moved about
them, since these are the peculiarities of psychical*
and intellectual knowledge. For every intellect is
one many, both in its being and its intellectual
perception ; and every soul, since it is essentialized
in modon, perceives intellectually in conjunction
with motion. But the one of Providence abiding
in the one, is at the same time immutable and in-
divisible, and knows all things in a way which is
eternally the same. Nor does it know man alon^
and sun, and everything else of this kind, but also
every particular thing. For nothing escapes thai
one, whether you speak of the being of a thing, or
' 1. 1. Pertaining to (oul.

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conauler it as an object of knowledge*.] And it
is said indeed, and is rightly said, that the whole
circle exists centrally in the centre, since the centre
is the cause, but the circle the thing caused ; and
for the same reason every number subsists ihonadi-
cally in the monad. All things, however, exist in
the one of Providence in a far superior manner,
since it is in a much more transcendent degree one
than a centre and the monad. As, therefore, if the
centre had a knowledge of the circle, it would have
a central knowledge of it, as it likewise has a cen-
tral hypostasis, and woald not distribute itself into
parts with the parts of the circle ; [thus also the
transcendently united knowledge of Providence, Is
a knowledge of all divisible essences in the same
impartible nature, and of each of the most indivi-
dual and most total things ; and as it gave subsis-
tence to everything according to the one, so like-

* The Tollowing is tlie original of the part within the brackets,
and ia to be alone found in the betbre-dted work of Fhiloponua :

um fMfiir- vufnt tvfatt I/^uf^j ij^tv sAfi/trvi^dfr, wu vofiiF yra/^ime
rptrltrtftlw*' tB fup^tfurtr 9Hl ^Wftdit, Hfit inrwfitrtt rtfi aura, rtarair
fi >■( * ^f'vx'im Mm una ymrit ix" ft liurrrac. xai y«( hw tisi

fu^m xintfun- ikuh i< tt r^ in ftnwt (lege ^Mrj-,) MfLentZara k/aa

' Morbeka has here aiunaitioTtm, but erroneously ; for Tfmnr-
rtfKt should be rendered dariarem.
-f' Morbeka aJso has rightly in this place manent.

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wise by /he one it knows everything']. And
neither is its knowledge divided with the things
known; nor are the things that are known con-
founded on account of the profound union of know-
ledge. This knowledge, however, being one, com-
prehends indeed all the infinity of the objects of
knowledge, but is transcendenUy united above all
the union that is in them. Such, tberefore, is the
answer to the first of the doubts concerning Pro-
vidence.

2. If you are willing, however, we will direct
our attention to a second object of inquiry. We
say, then, that Providence knows things of a con-
tingent nature; and by the ancients the protiindity
of this doubt has been sufficiently established : (or
on account of this profundity, some of them, ad-
mitting the existence of Providence, have taken
away from beings the nature of what is contingent;
but others, not at all contradicting the evidence
which presents itself for the subsistence of con-
tingent events, have denied that Providence ex-
tends as far as to these. Both these, however, pre-
assume rightly that Providence exists, that the
thing known is definite to the gnostic nature, and
that the indefiniteness of that which is known arises

* This port also witfaia the brackets, is to be found in the before-
dted work of Pbilopouus, and Che original of it is as follows : lirt,

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from its own nature. We however say*, that Pro-
vidence knows the whole of this, in consequence of
possessing a definite knowledge of the indelintte,
the indefiniteneas being about to be, but not actu-
ally existing, and knowledge antecedently compre-
hending the cause of that which is indefinite. For
Providence knows that something indefinite will
take place, and looking to the cause of this, it
knows the indefinite thing; and as it gave subsist-
ence to, so likewise it knows the indefinite, not by
tbe indefinite, but as it produced the indefinite by
the definite : in like manner it knows the indefinite
definitely, just as it knows incorporeally and with-
out interval, that which is distended into bulk and
is corporeal. And if, indeed, the reason [or pro-
ductive principle] which is in seed, being one and
wholly in each part of the seed, and possessing the
cause of the seed, should know that there would be
a separation of its productive power from itself
existing indeed as the cause of a distribution into
parts to that which is posterior to itself, but being
itself impartible ; — in this case, it would say, I pos-
sess the whole of this partibili^ impartibly; not
existing separately from either, but containing that
which is subordinate in that which is more excel-
lent ; so that neither is the distribution without a
cause, nor does it pre-exist in the cause [distri-
* It appears to me that in this place, immediately afler the words
in Morbeka's version, "et n indeterminatum esie propter i1[ius
naturam," itii requisite to add, Dicimus taoiea ut Proridenda, &c.
For in what rollows, Ptocliu giTts his own opinion, and not that
or Uie ancients.

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1«

butedly], but It subsists there according to caus^
aiid in its participants, according to hyparxis. And
i^ indeed, it should investigate the cause of that
partition, it would find it in itself, because in itself
it is impartible ; but when it becomes situated in
another subject, and not in itself, it is the source to
them of a distribution into parts, in consequence of
which eacb of the parts is not everywhere. After
this manner therefore we say, that Providence being
the cause of all things, knows the things of which
it is the cause, has a definite knowledge both of
that which is definite and of that which is indefinite,
and gives generation to things which will have an
Indefinite subsistence. Nor does anything impos-
sible happen on accomit of this, [the indefiniteness
existing in things posterior to Providence',] in
whose knowledge diey are antecedently compre-
hended, and in such a way as is adapted to causes.
But this is now manifest.

S. In the third place, the doubt consequent to
this deserves to be considered, since it likewise re-
quires much attention; viz. if Providence is the
cause both of things definite and indefinite, whether
it is the cause of both these according to one and
the same thing, or according to different things.
For if according to the same thing, how can it per-
ceive in its knowledge, tliat this tiling which is pro-

' This part vitbin (he brackets is in ibe veraiou of Morbeka, " in
detenninatione in iis quaa post ipsam eiistente." But for in deler-
vunaliime, it ia necesaar; to read iadtterminaliime, confonnal)!}' to
the abOTe truulau'on.

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duced by it will be de(ii]ite,|but that indefinite ? But
if according to dt^rent things, how will it any
longer remain one in hyparxis, if this thing which
pertains to it is one thing, but that another? , In-
voking, therefore. Divinity to illuminate the reason
which perfects our conceptions on this subject, we
must say to ourselves, that Providence is established
in the one [and this is the same with the good]. For
everything which is of a providential nature, if we
believe in common conceptions, always procures
some real or some apparent good for the objects of
its providential care; nor is providential anything
else than beneficent energy. But we have before ob-
served, that to impart good is the same thing as to
impart unity, because the one is good, and the good
is one; and this has been ten thousand times as-
serted. We say, therefore, that Providence is cha-
racterized by the one, or, which is the same thin^
by the good. The one of it, however, as we have
before observed, is neither such as a material one, —
for this is inefficacious and unprolific, because afler
matterthere is nothing, — but ^Aeon^ of Providence
is prolific and most efficacious, because all things
are posterior to Providence. Nor is it one as that
which is an individual; for this presents itself to
the view in the last division of things, and is one in
such a way as to be none of other things. But
Providence is one as containing all thmgs, as pre-
sent to all things of which it is the cause, and as the
salvation of all things ; [not after the same manner
as the universal which subsists in opinion, and

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which some assert to be the otie*Q for this, indeed,
though it comprehends the things which are under
it, and imparts essence to each of them, in con-
sequence of containing their differences causally,
yet it is essentially mie many. 7%f one of Provi-
dence, however, is exempt from all the beings of
which it is the productive and perfective cause,
and is unreceptive of variattoti of every kind. Pro-
vidence, therefore, being no one of these, but esta-
blished above every specific essence^, and neverthe-
less producing all things according to the most pro-
found union, possesses a power un circumscribed,
and incomprehensible by all things ; so that neither
can any one of the natures which subsist from it,
nor alt of them taken collectively, unfold the power
which pre-exists in it, or receive and comprehend
the immensity of it in Its bosom. But all things
being as it were absorbed by Providence, they par-
ticipate of it in some way or other, according to the
natural adaptation of each to this participation.

Hence tke one of Providence, being more pro-
foundly one than every incorporeal and corporeal
union, and being infinitely powerful, possesses this
power in an infinitely greater d^ree than every in-
finite and finite power. For it is not at all wonderiiil

■ Tlie part within the brackets is in the venioa of Morbeka as
follows : •■ nOD quod inopinabile dicere, ut uniienale quidam aiunt
nnurn i " instead of which I read, confonnably to the above trans-
lation, non vt vntBtrtaU ftwt m (^liai'me itAnttit, et quod quidata

C,q,t,=cdbvG00glC

that in infinite powers one should be more infinite
than another. For the infinite according to quan-
tity must not be considered as existing in the one
of Providence; since in quantity there is not |^ia
energy} the infinitely more than the infinite. Ne-
vertheless, everything infinite will be such to the
natures which are under it, according to infinite
power ; but to the natures which are prior to it it will
be finite, in consequence of being bounded by them.
For if it were not comprehended by the natures
prior to it, neither could it be under the dominion
of things more excellent than itself, and therefore
would not be contained by them. If, therefore, it
is contained by them though it is infinite, they pre-
dominate over it; and if they predominate over it,
and it is comprehended by them, it is not infinite
[with reference to them]. Neither, likewise, is it in-
finite to itself. For that which is infinite to itself,
is incomprehensible to itself; and hence it is not
able to contain, and be the saviour of itself. But
every being is according to power preservative of
itselfl It remains, therefore, that each of the things
that are infinite, is alone infinite to the natures pos-
terior to itself. Hence the^ infinite power of Pro-
vidence, being comprehensive of all the powers of
the natures which are the subjects of its providen-
tial energy, generates as well as contains them acr
cording to the most profound union in the infinite
depths of itself; just as it imparts to all things a
union commensurate to each. For neither is the

c,q,t,=cdbvGoogle

one everywhere the same, fur instance, in incorpo-
real natures and in bodies ; nor in perpetual bo-
dies, and in such as are corruptible. For the union
of perpetual is greater than that of corruptible bcH
dies ; or how could the former remain indissoluble*
but unity perish in the other? To which also it
may be added, that an incorporeal nature is more
proximate to the one ; but body, on account of the
infinite separation of its parts, Gills very far short
of the one. Nor must it be doubted whether one
thing is in a greater degree one than another;
^nce we see that everything by diminution always
becomes something different from that which is
prior to itself, till it proceeds to the extremity of the
order to which it belongs.

Providence, therefore, existing according to tran-
scendent union, and possessing inBnite power, some
of the natures which are produced by it and par-
take of its beneficent energy, (though all things
proceed from, and participate of Providence,} sub-
sist according to the one, by which they are con-
nascently bounded; but others subsist according
to the infinite, indefiniteness being connascent with
their essence. For imitations of the infinite which
is with Providence subsist here through ind^nite-
ness ; but the imitations of its unity, through bound.
On this account, the first of the natures in the uni-
verse, and which are unchangeable, subsist accord-
ing to one bound; but the natures that succeed
these tend to indefiniteness, in consequence of pos-

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sessing a second rank. But every infinity subsists
according to the infinity of Providence, and every-
thing definite subsists according to union. The in-
finity likewise which is in primary natures is van-
quished by unity, and largely partakes of the one.
Here too {i. e. in the sublunary region] things na-
turally indefinite, are subservient to such as are
defiinte; and definite natures give an orderly ar-
rangement to such as are borne along indefinitely
according to an all-various transmutation. As pri-
mary natures likewise are to each other according
to their mutual order, thus also such of their reci-
pients as possess a habitude analogous to them,
give completion to the world ; less excellent being
suspended from more excellent beings.

What has been said, however, will become more
evident by assuming that intellect produces both
body and that which is incorporeal, but each of
these incorporeaily, and that it knows and produces
them conformably to its own nature. And as the
productive principle of incorporeal natures is in in-
tellect incorporeal, so likewise the cause of body in
it is incorporeal ; the former assimilating to itself
the things which are produced, but the latter, on
account of diminution ' with respect to intellect, pro-
ducing things more foreign to the incorporeal spe-
cies. Soul itself likewise generates those vital ahd
motive productive powers or forms which are in
other souls ; but of those forms which fall into mat-

' The words in italioi are in Morlieka't lerMon " propter suhmii.
Botuia" i but tliG original wan. I have no doitbr, lis ifui^

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18

ter, some it produces of a gnostic, but others of a
fabricative uature. And it produces indeed all these
vitally, some proceeding through life mto life, but
others proceeding through life into the privation of
vitality. And, in short, everything which generates,
and at the same time knows that which it generates
from different causes, generates and knows the
thing produced by it^ by a knowledge superior to the
object of its knowledge. Of the natures, however,
which are produced by this cause, some are pro-
duced conformably to it, but others according to
diminution. Hence, you may say that Providence,
possessing through the oneof itself the cause of de-
finite natures, but through infinity the cause of such
as are indefinite, knows and generates both of them
definitely; just as intellect knows and produces in-
corporeatly, both that which subsists according to
the form of the incorporeal essence, and that which
subsists according to the form of body. But you
will speak rightly if you say, that of the things pro-
duced, these iiideed are definite on account of the
one, but those are indefinite on account oUtifinity.
For tieiiher are beings which have a necessary ex-
istence without infinity, nor such as are contingent
without bound'. For the latter are entirely termi-
nated in the bound of necessity, and the former,
being eternal essences from a necessity of-natiu'e,

■ Morbeka'ivenion or ihw sentence is, " Namuecesuriis enlibus
eipertibui inBniUle, neque conljngentibus termino." But for
" NamaecessariiV'itisnecesKary toreadiconrormablytollieaboie

translation, tfatn nequt n

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participate of infinite power •. Or whence do they
derive this perpetuity, and an invariable Eamenesa
of subsistence? Here, indeed, the one predomi-
nating, and, on account of this, causing that which
is generated to be necessary, and being the cause of
the coUigation of the infinite ; but there the infinite
predominating, and causing the one to be diminish-
ed, through flying from the infinite, which runs
above it, and comprehends it in its embrace^ Pro-
vidence, however, possesses a knowledge of both
these, though, as we have already said, its know-
ledge is according to that which is more excellent
than the things which it knows'', and antecedently
comprehending in its knowledge a power produc-
tive of the peculiarity of each, and causing this
thing to be characterized by bound, but that by
infinity.

Every bound, therefore, is frOm thence, and every
infinity, whether in incorporeal natures, or in bo-
dies ; and, in like manner, that which consists of
both these is from thence derived. Hence also the
knowledge both of simple and of composite natures
is there. Just as the generations of things simple'
and of things composite proceed from thence.

• This sentence in the version of Morbeka 19, " Etenim h»c p«nU
tUB in eum qui necessimi tenuinum lertainale, et ills propter ipssm

iiecessarutmDatursmaternsentiaparttcipare iaGoitilTirtule." But

' For knonledge Bubsisls according to Ibe nature of that which
knows, and not according to (he nature of Ibat vliicb 19 known.
Thi9 is admirablf illuaCrsted by Proclus in his CorameMary on the
PamenideB et PiMo. — See vol. iii. of mj translation of Plalu,

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20

Because, likewise, the one of Providence produces
every kind of bound, and every kind of infinity, antl
also every whole, which consists of both these;
hence, either from t/ie one prevailing, that which
is produced is necessary, or from ii^nity running
before bound, that which is contingent is eflected.
Because, however, neither here was it lawful for
the infinite to be deserted by the one, hence the
contingent, as we have said, terminates in the na-
ture of that which is necessary: and this is either
in a greater degree detained by ike one, and, passing
into a necessary event, becomes for a longer time
definite; or, in consequence of participating oithe
one in a more debiie degree, becomes necessary in
a less time, but sutlers the same thing, and becomes
definite. The contingent likewise imitates the in-
finite power of the one, but not the power of itself.
For every power is the power of another thing which
possesses it, but not of itself; since everything, of
whatever kind it may be, which is indefinite, in con-
sequence of not yet having a definite existence, pos-
sesses what is said to be contingent, but necessarily
terminates in either being or not being; and this
either prior to a greater, or prior to a less time.
And this is manifested by conjectural divinations.
For they are more verified in a less than in a greater
time, as if the indefiniteness had now passed away.
That it is requisite, however, that there should be
a knowledge of the indefinite in beings superior to
us, if this also ought to have nn allotted order, and
not to be, as it were, adventitious to the universe.

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SI

must be admilted at present, as being elsewhere
demonstrated ; but we now alone investigate after
what manner it is effected. And this likewisie will
become manifest. For the universe would not be
one, nor the government of it according to intellect,
if this government was not definite ; and of those
things of which there is the same order, there is a
certain colligation.

It is necessary, however, to attribute this know-
ledge either to dtemons alone, — for as they are
proximate to things in the sublunary region, they
appear to have a knowledge of, and to preside over
them, — or thb knowledge must be attributed to the
Gods prior to deemons, to whom the Gods commit
the providential inspection of all mundane affairs.
But if we leave to daemons alone the knowledge and
providential inspection of things indefinite, we must
say either that they know them apart from each
other, and also the subjects of their providential
attention, and the natures prior to themselves, as we
do, or that they have a simultaneous knowledge of
both. And if, indeed, they have a knowledge of
these separate from each other, in what do they
difler from our souls? For these are incapable of
paying attention to themselves and their own con-
cerns, and of surveying at the same time the natures
which are above them. But so far as they do not
extend themselves to external objects, and yet pos-
sess a knowledge of these, we must confess that
they tend to a definite knowledge of things indefi-
nite. If, however, at the same time it is necessary

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to admit that their knowledge of the natures over
which they preside is derived from a reasoning pro-
cess, we must also grant that they contain the forma
and exemplu% of things indefinite. For Siavouc (i. e.
the discursive energy of reason) is the knowledge
of these. Or if we assert that this knowledge per-
tains to beings who energise prior to ratiocination,
much more must we refer it to the Gods, from whom
daemons also possess the power of divination, and
the definite foreknowledge of things indefinite. For
if, indeed, they perceive definite things indefinitely,
we must not ascribe to them an impassivi^ which
is adapted to immutable genera. For everything
of thb kind requires phantasy and sense, so that in
consequence of not remembering present circum-
stances, the soul may conjoin the assimilation of
iuture events to the present and the past But if
they perceive ind^nite^ things definitely, why, if
we ascribe this power to dsemons, should we not
admit that this in a much greater degree is possible
to the Gods, so as to grant that they know temporal
concerns untemporally, ind^nite things definitely,
and that they provide for indefinite natures accord-
ing to a definite" mode of knowledge? For if, in-
deed, they are unable to know things indefinite, de-
finilely, — but this is possible to daemons, — then the

* In tlie TeruoD oT Hoibeka In tlu'i place, ■■ 8i autem decenni-
nata," after aulm it u ateanrj ta aid indtlennimta.

*• The word datrrminahm ia eriduitl; vanCiig in thi* place ia
tb* terrion of Horbeka; for he hat Onlj in the latter part of this
wntence, "et proridere indelenninatu secundum cogoilionis mo-

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23

Gods will be deprived of a knowledge of this kind
through want of power, which is ttbsurd. And if
it should be said, that they do not wish to possess
this knowledge, this would be attended with a much
greater absurdity than to assert that they are not
able to possess it ; since, though they give subsist-
ence to things of this kind, they would be unwilling
to pay a providential attention to their own produc-
tions. Or on this hypothesis it must likewise be
granted, that not all mortal natures and particu-
lars, and everything which the world contains, were
produced by the Gods. And some things, indeed,
were ^immediately] febricated by the one father of
the universe, but others by the mundane gods, yet
through the command of their father, who at the
same time through them produced these. But it
is not lawful for those beings who produce other
things either immediately or mediately to neglect
the Gods.

If, however, the Gods loish * to provide for things
indefinite definitely, and are able to effect this, they
will entirely both provide for them, and at the same
time that they providentially attend to, will know
the desert of the subjects of their providential care.
And the Gods, indeed, will possess this knowledge
exemptly", extending to all things their providen-
tial attention : but dsemons, distributing into parts

* Hia Teraon of M«bek> tushere "rtalunt," but Ibe true read,
ing is obiiouslf vtltint.

<• Thia vord, used here by Morbeka in his version, ii "embalm }"
but tbe word used by Froclui was, I have no doubt, confornubly to
my lersion, ilnfivtiMf.

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24

tlie superesseutial ilium inn (ions wliich ttiey re-
ceire from them, are allotted a different prefecture
over diflerent herds of animals, as far as to the last
partition, as Plato says ; so that some of them pre-
side over men, others over lions, and others over
other animals, or have dominion over plants. And
still more partially, some are the inspectjve guard-
ians of the eye, others of the liver, and others of the
heart. But all things are full of Gods ; some pro-
viding for certain things, immediately, but others,
as vpe have said, for other things through dsmons
as media: not that the Gods are incapable of being
present with all things, but ultimate natures are
not able of themselves to participate such as are
primary. The inaptitude of participants likewise,
by insinuating itself, becomes sometimes an obsta-
cle to the enjoyment of the beneficent influence of
the Gods, and to the conscious perception of the
providential interference of dsmons. That, bow-,
ever, which possesses a proper adaptation, has the
Gods immediately present with it, and hence knows
when it is known by them ; and begins to see » Pro-
vidence descending into it, the guardian care of
which it was ignorant of prior to its adaptation, and
which it had participated immanifestly. But if some
one sleeping in the light of the sun, and being il-
luminated by it, should be ignorant during his
sleep that he wan thus illuminated, and on waking
should see himself surrounded by the solar splen-

* It apjieam to. me lo be necessary In add in thia pari of Mor-

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25

dour, he might then think that this light was not
present with him before, because he, on account of
his ignorance, was not present with the lighL Then,
therefore, [i. e. when a thing becomes adapted to
the participation of the Gods,] the indefinite also
becomes definite, and is converted to divinity, with
whom the indefinite subsisted definitely, and from
thence derives, through paiticipation, bound. For
prior to its conversion to divinity, it was indeed
with reference to itself indefinite, but not such to
divinity; but conformably to his nature, had with
him a definite subsistence, and was known to him
as a thing separated from him through its own in-
definiteness, yet not so separated as to escape all
bound; for in this case, falling into the abyss of
nonentity, it would become latent; but it is cut off
from him in such a way, as neither to be without
bound, nor yet to be perfectly establislied in it.
After its conversion, however, it both has a know-
ledge of its own indefiniteness, and of the pre-ex-
isting bound by which indefiniteness is adorned.

This will likewise follow, if we admit that good
accedes to all things from Providence alone, in the
same manner as intelligence proceeds from intellect,
and life and vital motion from soul. But if every-
thing which lives, in any way whatever, lives on
account of soul, and everything intelligent intel-
lectually perceives on account of intellect, it is
evident that whatever participates of the good of
Providence, possesses this good on account of Pro-
vidence, though the participant should rank among

j:,q,t,=cdbvGoOgle

partml natures, and things which partici))ate of it
only at times, and not always. For it is requisite
to lead everything to its fountain, from which tlie
whole series of it is derived. If anything, there-
fore, which the world contains is benefited', it is
benefited on account of Providence; and this is
not only the case with eternal, but likewise with
corruptible natures ; and not only with definite, but
also with such as are indefinite, whether each of
these receives its proper good from Providence im-
mediately, or through media is first benefited by
it For intermediate beings do not subvert the
gifts of the causes prior to themselves, but render
the inaptitude of ultimate natures adapted to the
parlicipatioD of such as are primary, corrobor^
ting them by their own forerunning illuminations.
Hence things which are more proximate to Pro-
vidence enjoy and are adorned by it in a greater
d^ree ; just as we must admit from. common con-
ceptions, that the natures which are nearer to the
sun aie more illuminated by it than those which are
more remote from It ; that 'the beings which are
moce proximate to soul, are more vital ; and those
that.are nearer to intellect, are more perfect in in-
tellectual percepdon. For proximity is said to be
thst which it is, on account of the alliance of its
essence to the things to which it is near, and re-
moteness is entirely so denominated on account of
its essential elongation from something else. It be-

• Ih Morbeka's verbioxi, for "bonifical" in Uiis place, it is neces-

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ing admitted, therefore, that Providence is nothing
else than that which imparts good to all things,
those natures which more largely participate of it,
are in a greater degree benefited and adorned.
Hence it is not requisite that everything should be
proximately suspended from Providence, but it is
proper that intermediate natures should be sus-
[)ended from those that are proximate to Provi-
dence ; for this causes the latter to enjoy the good
of Providence by themselves, and the former to be
in want, as it were, of other colhgations, in order to
receive the good which it imparts. For if there
was not a coordination of all things with reference
to the one, neither would the world be one ; or if
all things participated of their adorning cause after
the same manner, there would not be an order of
things adorned. If, therefore, there are both order
and co-ordination, the former giving distinction to
all things, and causing some things to be prior and
others to be posterior, — but the latter converting
divided natures to one good, — if this be the case,
it is necessary that all things should participate of
Providence, but that the participations should not
be the same; that all should participate, indeed,
on account of co-ordination ; but not of the same
things, on account of order, which causes some
things to be first, others to be second, and others to
be successive to these. For, as Plato says, every
power which is motive of greater, is much more
motive of less things, and obtaining dominion over
stronger, it will much more predominate over more

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28

debile natures. There*, however, wilt concurring
with power, it is necessary that Providence should
extend its beneficeiit care to things of a less excel-
lent nature. For it must not be said, that Provi-
dence is nble indeed, but unwilling, to effect what it
is able to effect ; since whatever good men are able
to accomplish, they also wish to ticcomplish. Nor
is the power of Providence without will, nor its will
without power; since the latter would render ap-
petitioD vain", and the former would cause power
to be imperfect.

If, however, it is requisite that Providence should
extend itself to secondary, it is much more neces-
sary that it should extend itself to primary natures.
For it does not pertain to Providence to profit and
adorn less excellent beings, but leave such as are
more excellent destitute of itself. For if more ex-
cellent beings are not in waut of anything, they de-
rive this superiority to any kind of indigence from
Providence, which imparts to primary beings the
power of being sufficient to themselves. Our com-
mon conceptions, therefore, as we have before said,
necessarily proclaim, that we should assert Provi-
dence to be the cause of all good, and that we should
confess that the power by which any being is suffi-
cient to itself is thence derived, and subsists for its
sake. Whether, therefore, beings are indigent, they

' i. e. with Proiidence.

' The veraioD of Morbus in tint place ii, " Hoc quidem enim
tippetitum facil lerum, hoc autem Tirtutem imperftdaiD i" but for

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nre allotted plenitude from Providence in a way
conformable to their nature; or whether they are
not indigent, they are always filled, and have suffi-
ciency from themselves {to aarapxij) prior to the
natures which are always indigent ; but at the same
time they always receive from Providence an appro-
priate plenitude. All things, therefore, as I have
said, according to the order which they possess,
derive their subsistence from Providence; and of
the beings which are generated, and are not always,
some are essentially produced from it, and tron^
eternal beings; but others have their generaticai
through eternal beings, not because Providence is
indigent of things posterior to itself for the produc-
tion of these, but these, in consequence of being
much distant from it, requiring to the participation
ofit the influence of the beings which it proximately
produced. If, however, though Providence is pre-
sent everywhere and in all things, yet the same
good is not in all things, we ought not to be sur-
prised. For this is the work of the most excellent
Providence, to im{>art good indeed to all things,
but to measure the participation of it by the desert
of the recipients ; and for everydiing to receive
only as much as it is able to receive, whether es-
sence causes a difference, as in souls and bodies,
(for the good of each of these is not the same, be-
cause the essence is not the same,) or whether their
desert arises from energy alone, as we say, that
souls differently energising, always receive from
Providence different allotments. And all souls, in-

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deed, have allotments from Providence; but some
submit to their allotment with facility, and others
with difiSculty; because they cannot be converted
to Providence without obstacle. This, therefore,
must be admitted. For that it is most true that
there is also a particular Providence, may he as-
sumed by directing our attention to sublunary af~
fairs, because all these contribute something to the
universe, and no one of the things which it contains
is superadventitious, though we are not able to
peixeive the conses from which it b derived. To
which it may be added, that in certain rouIs also
the power of Providence is displayed. But it would
be ridiculous to admit that these things thus sub-
sist, and others do not, if all things existed after a
similar manner. On this subject, however, enough
has been said.

4. Respiring however, as it were, from the dis-
cussion of this head, let us consider in the fourth
place, from another principle, after what manner
we say the participations of the Gods ere effected :
which also those who engage in the speculation of
ideas are accustomed to investigate. For if the
Gods always energising, the natures which are here
do not always participate of them, must it not fol-
low that the Gods would energise iu vun? Or if
we do nut admit th^ they possess an eternal energy,
a still greater absurdity will follow : ifit is proper -
to call that which is impossible absurd. For what-
ever exists with the Gods, always exists with them,
and prior to all time. Hence their energy does not

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SI

take p1»ce in a part only of infinite time : for time
and that which is infinite are external to the Gods.
That these tilings, therefore, may also be appro-
priately-discussed, it must be observed, in the first
place, that every participation, whether it is of eter-
nal or of corruptible natures, is always allotted a
middle order between participants and the things
participated. And as a communication with the
extremes is requisite to all media, it is necessary
that the media should be united both with the par-
ticipants and the things parlicipated ; for if the
media pertained to one of these only, they would
not conjoin both the extremes to each other, but
being media, they subsist in the before-mentioned
manner in their participants. For they proceed
indeed from the things participated, but are esta-
blished in the recipients of their energies; just as
we say, that knowledge primarily subsists in gno-
stic natures, and not in the things known. For
gnostic natures have to things that are known the
relation of participants; since every gnostic being
wishes to participate that which is known. Hence,
participation having this order, and Providence
being primarily participated by all things, by ani-
mate, inanimate, rational, irrational, eternal and
corruptible natures, according to their several pow-
ers, — for with respect to ail the instruments of it,
these are more proximately produced, but those
more remotely, — this being the case, it is necessary
that not only participations should indicate Pro-
vidence OS the cause from which they proceed, but

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S8

also thnt there should be an antecedent aptitude
in the participant, lliis aptitude, iherefere, will
subsist rationally in rational, but intellectually in
intellectual natures; phantastically or sensibly in
those beings which live according to phantasy or
sense; and essentially, and through existence alone,
in those which possess being without life. But all
these being instruments, and Providence using all
of them, it is necessary that each of them should
correspond to the power which employs each ac-
cording to its proper work ; neither in its energy
obscuring the peculiflr hyparxis of Providence, nor
its own nature, but exhibiting one thing which is
effected by both. Thus the sun transmits light to
the moon, and from the moon imparts it to us ; yet
the light which we receive is not such as that of the
sun,u^i/e' anddry, nor like that of the moon, gross
and caliginous, but is mingled from the power of
that which is participated, and of the participant,
and its colour is changed conformably to its energy;
■ and in many other particulars this also may be
seen. Hence, Providence being placed above all
beings according to divine union itself, and ener-
gising confoimably to one energy adapted to the
one, everything which accedes to participates of it,
and in a way conformable to its natural adaptation ;
one thing indeed essentially, another vitally, an-

* InMortieka'sverM'on"i:a(iii«m"i liul the true readingUdoubt-
len amdidum, sgreesbly to the above iranslation. For according
U> Plato, as is shown b; Proclus in Tim., the solar light it liiilic

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other gnostically, and another participating of it
according to all these, and being naturally perfect.
One thing, likewise, always receives the beneficent
illuminations of Providence, on account of its own
power, and possesses a never-failing participation'
of it through the infinite energy of the giver, and
through its own permanent and firm habitude with
reference to it; but another is a participant only
sometimes, in cunsequence of not being allotted a
stability of nature. Hence, on account of its debi-
lity not being always a participant, it possesses, in-
deed, well-being from Providence, but it is owing
to the recipient that it does not always [mrticipate ;
Providence being always able to give, and giving to
those natures that possess the power of always re-
ceiving from it that which it imparts. Hence the
participation which is effected sometimes only, is
not from Providence, but from the imbecility of the
participant; just as the sun, illuminating perpetu-
ally that vrhich is not always able to see its lighl^
aud which only sometimes sees, does not by its light
occasion this temporary perception, but the recipi-
ent rejecting its light, deprives itself of perpetual
vision, and when turned from no longer participates
of the solar rays'*.

* In the version of Morbeki parliliBntm ; but the true reading
U doubtless pariicipaliiHiem.

* That which energisea essentially does not enerpse in Taio, Iw-
cause Buch an energy is natural to it. Hence the perpetual emis-
sion or light from the sun. though it is not receiTed bj' opnke bodies,
ii not emitted in vain, because the very nature of the sun consists
In such an emission, though its light is only rec^Ted by bodies that

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If, therefore, Providence [always'] energising
something, only participates of it at a certain time,
the thing itself diminishes its own participation, yet
does not exclude the eternal energj' of Providence ;
but the energy of deity remains always the same.
Just as if a face standing in die same position, a
mirror should at bne time receive a dear image of
it, and at another, one obscure and debile, or in-
deed no image at all. If some one, therefore,
should say, that oracles sometimes participate of
Ibe Gods, ' who are the sources of divination, and
soniedmes fail, becoming inefficacious, and, as it
were, without spirit for a certain time, the causes of
the irregularity are to be referred to the spirits that
use and energise through the prophetic Gods, failing
in the power of always participating of these Gods.
For true oracles are those to which at^els, demons,
and heroes give completion, and which are illumi-
nated by the Crods, and by the ^lotments which
have a perpetual subsistence in the universe; though
certain waters and chasms of the earth cannot al-
ways participate of them on account of the instabi-
lity of their nature. Or if it should be said that
the virtues of sacred rites, wbidi sometimes cause
statues to be animated'' and replete with divine in-

are od^ted to receive it. In lite nBtnier the eleriially beneficent
illumiiiBtions of Pravidetice are not extended in vain, though,
through the inaptitude of paiticipanls, they are not always eSica-
cioua i tor Providence is essentialiied in an, oveifloning perennial
communication of good.
' Semper 'a wanting in this place in the verdon of Morbeka-
" These were sUtuei of the Gods, tabricHted by (fbKif, or mstlu

bvGoogIt'

Epiration, fail in certain periods, the defect also of
these, as it appears to me, ought to be ascribed to
the recipients, and not to any variation in the ener-
gy of the Gods by whom these statues are inspired.

opmuort, so as to become animated, illuminated by diyinlly, and
capable of delivering aracleii. These statues are alluded la by
Proclud, on Ibe Timsus and Cratylua of Flalo, and by lambli-
chus, and tlie aathor of tbe Asclepiaa Dialogue; but an very
eiplicitly mentioned by Hennias, in liis Scholia on the Ph«drua,
p. 104, as follows : IIwi }i xmi aya\iix-rm Xiyitiu tjitvfisj ; « estb
^t ittfyii tu wif " Sun, 1 yt «J>»j;« iim, «i».ii rtt iXnt 1 riXirrmii
iiMiueiniKra xat Tttat j^Kfflvrfifar xm evftiaXa rtfttiira ru ityaXfiartt

mi(»T. ri ^It yaj lyaiX^a, ii ai n>.triif, faiu <pl|»(, U( « iTBMll

m /at ymf t^a/am dmnsini, nii^ h raXn i/tlftfiinii. te h Mirur,
in i fiu •^axu t/ipipiifim am mfyv injj « 9u», tit sima^rii itrif

'^"K"*'' *' Z'" amKafMn, rt h Mym9.fiM, ii s* ro^v, svrtt ^hi iAA^^

itkajt «« TiBf un rsv T%Ktfr*v T^Xaei^ nxt i/t^irj^a/^n. Lfi. '*Bnthoware
statues said lo have an entbusiaatic energy? May v« not say, ibat
a Btalue, being inanimate, does not itself enwgise about divinity;
but the telestic art, purifying tbe niaiter of which the statue con-
sists, anil placing round it certain characters and symbols, in tbs
first place renders it, through diese means, animated, and causes it
to recnve a certain life from tbe world i and, in the neit place,
after this, it prepares the statue lo be illuminaled by a divine nature,
through which it always delivers oracles, aa long as it is properly
adapted. For Ihe statue, when it has been midered perfect by tbe
lelesljc art, remains afterwards [endued with a propbelic power}, till
it becomes entirely unadapted todivine illumination ; but (he mer-
tal who receives the inspiring influence of Ihe Gods, receives it only
at certain times, and not always. But iho cause of this is, that Ibe
soul, when filled with deity, energises about It, Hence, in ceaiw-
quence of energiung above ita own power, it becomes weary. For
it would be a God, and similar to tbe souls of the stars, if it did not
become weary. But tbe statue, conbrauibly to ita participatJ*Bs,
d2

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S6

For neither must we dare to accuse the sun as the
cause of the moon being eclipsed, but we must as-
sign as the cause of this, the conical shadow of the
earth into which the moon falls. Nor, in reality,
must the participation of the energies of Providence
by some things at certain times only be attributed
to Providence, but the cause of this must be referred
to the participants, and not to that from which the

remaina illutiuDiEed. Hence the inaptitude of it entirely piocecdi
into pnTationt unJefiA it is againt de ntpot perfected And reanioutcd
by the mjatic operator."

Conformably to thii, Proclus also, in Tim. p. 339 and S40, ajt :

r*' ^X" <"*'"•■ ""» rt "" "' "f "" nAn"" (lege tiAwt*)
i(tin, ll» X'f^C" »"" tiftitrtn t«mM.», nXiatTii rs ayaX/ian,

evidetit that Plato etUblisbes the DemiurguB conformably lo the
moit consummate of the telesta : for he exhibita him as the statuary
of the world, just as before he represented him the mater of divine
names, and the enunciator of diviae characlen, through which be
gate perfection to the souL For thece things are eStcied by tboaa
wbo are leleito in realiiy, "ho gi»B completion to ttitues, through
characlen and vital names, and render them living and moving."
It must be obaerved, that these leleiia were initiators into I he myste-
ries, and were IheurgitU, or capable of performing divine opera-

And again, in his Scholia on the Cratylus, p. 21 : Km, itnf i

ftara Tiit 3m« atnianin, naA mnlus Tuu it(ii iwittxf' rtri Sum

leaticart, through certain symbols and Bicane signatures, as»milat«
statues to the Gods, and makes them adapted lo the reception of
divine illuminations, so the legislative ait, according to the same
assimilative power, gives subaslence to names, as the statues or
iraagea of things." The excellent Sallusl, in his treatise on the

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37

participation is derived, both to these, and to those
beings that always participate. Providence, how-
ever, according to the traascendently united and in-
6nite energy of itself, b present to all things ; and
of those beings which participate of it differently at
different tlmeo, in consequence of tlieir possessing
an incomprehensible variety, there are certain col-
ligations, conjoining the one of Providence and the

Gods and Ihe World, in
placed round statues «<

Jsmblichiu alto, in a treatise rip s^uA^uinn, on StaCues, which
is unfortunateljr lost, but is menliDaed b; Ffaolius, in Biblioth.
p. 554, and which Philoponus attempted to confute, sbows, "that
■tatues are divine, and full of ditine pirdcipadon. And this be
demonstrates to be the case, not only nf such statues as are fashioned
by the bands of men, by an occult art, and which arc dEDOminated
duplet, (i. e. descended from Jupiter, or from beaven,] through the
immanifeUneai of Ibe art by which they were made, — for these are
of a celestial nature, — but also of such as are fashioned by anista

And, in the last place, in the A sclepian IMalo^e, which is at-
tributed to Hennes Trismegistus, and is only eitant in a Latin
translation, ascribed to Apuleius, it is stud, near the end : " Omnium

cultum relieionemque di*iiiam, invenenint artem, ijua deos effice.
rent, cui intenlte adjunierunt virtulem de mundi nalura conreni-
entem, eunque niiacentes. Etquoniam animas facere non polerant,
eTOcantei animas dsmonum, vel angelorum, eas indiderunt imagi-
nibua Sanctis, divinisque mysteriis, per quas sola iilola et benetaci-
endi et malebciendi vires babere potuissent." In this extract it is
clearly asserted, that the ancient Egyptians evocated the souls of
dEaroom, or angels, and inserted tbem in sacred images ; and that it
was through these soids atone that idols possessed the power of being
beneficent or maleSc. These sacred statues are likewise alluded to
in other parts of this work of Hermes.

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multitude of these, the impaMsivity* of the former
and ihe instabilky of the latter. H^tce, as it ap-
pears to me, of these colligations, nngels are more
proximate to Providence, but heroes to beings of an
unstable nature ; and diemons form the connecting
link between the two, uniting the beings which
participate of deity differently at different times,
to the perpetually-abiding hyparxis of Providence,
and multiplied natures to the one. And sometimes,
indeed, the illuminations of Providence immedi-
ately extend to the beings posterior to angels, dse-
mens and heroes, but sometimes through these as
media. For there is a great difference between
illuminating some of the better genera, and the
transmission of illuminalions through the better
genera. For the natures to whom these illumina-
tions are transmitted, scarcely participate of the be-
ings which are proximately arranged above them,
through the inferiority of their aptitude; but the
better genera, on account of the excellence of their
nature, tend upwards to the participation of supe-
rior beings, and the illuminations which they re-
ceive from thes% have the relation, as it were, of
matter with reference to supernal gifts. Thus, if
some one should be able to participate of geometry
alone, but another'', not only of this, but also of a
Bublimer theory, though not without the assistance

• The TerMon of Morbeka has in this place, "et n pmivum U-

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of geometry, through which he is led upwards, antl
becomes aceuitomed to an incoiporeal iwture; the
former of these characters delightinj^ In geometri-

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40

tetition to a fifth subject of inquiry, wViicb disturbs
the imaginations of many, I mean, why, if Provi-
dence exists, evil has a place among beings ? For
through this many are persuaded, either to deny
the existence of Providence, in consequence of
perceiving that evil extends to all things; or, if
they admit that Providence adorns all things, they
are induced to exclude evil, and to assert that all
things are alone good, though certain persons think
fit to call that good which is most remote from
primary natures evil, for there is not any evil,
which is not a less good. If, therefore, we also
accord with these, there is no occasion to investi-
gate any further what we proposed to consider.
For there will not be anything evil) which, as we
have said, will molest Providence. But if there is
something, which in some way or other we assert
to be evil, it is necessary to explain whence this is
derived. For it is not proper to say that it is
from Providence, from whom everything that is
good proceeds; but if it is derived from another
cause, if this ranks among Uie causes which origi-
nate from Providence, then again it will be re-
quisite to refer to it this cause. For the beings
which proceed from the causes that owe their
existence to Providence, proceed likewise from
Providence. I^ however, they are produced with-
out Providence co-operating in their existence, we
shall make two principles, one of good, and the
Other of evil, and we shall not preserve Providence
unmolested, since it will have something contrary

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41

to it. Admitting, therefore, that there is sncb a
thing as evil, let as consider what kind of a thing
it is, without molesting the kingdom of Provi-
dence.

And in the &'st place, because evil is twofold,
Mis existing in bodies, and being preternatural,
but that in souls, and deviating from reason j and
because that which b preternatural does not sub-
sist in all bodies, nor in souls that rank as wholes,
let us direct our attrition to the bodies in which,
by the will of Providence, the preternatural exists.
It is obvious, therefore, that what is preternatural,
is in corruptible bodies alone : for that which is
not susceptible of the preternatural, is perpetual,
since the preternatural is the path to non-being.
But everything which is corrupted has a place
among beings. Hence, it ranks among beings,
either on account of some other cause, or in order,
as Timfeus says, that the universe may not be im-
perfect, and that primary natures may not be the
last of the whole of things. For primary natures
are eternal, and congenial to their cause. If evil
therefore exists, it exists as that which is corrupti-
ble ; but this is, in order that there may not only
be that which is eternal ; and this again in order
that the universe may be perfect Hence, it is
most manifest that evil subsists on account of that
Providence which energises about the world, and
that Providence may be entirely what it is, by
causing the world to be perfect. For to this evil
the end is good i since on account of good, evil was

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introduced among brings, ss contributing some-
thing requisite to the wh<de of things. For all cor-
ruption is on account of the generation of an-
other thing, and everything which is preterniUural
exists in order Uiat aoniethiog may he prodiKed
which is according to, but not contrary to, nature.
Hence, that is not ia every respect evil, which is
for the sake of good, nor is tt unmingled with good,
but bo a certain thing it is evil, viz, to that which
is corrupted, and to another thing good, vie. to
that which subsists on account of Uie corruption of
it. Hettce, likewise, it is good to the universe, as
the cause of the oorrupdon of one thing, and the
generation of another. For it is necessary that
^ere should be both generation and corruption,
and the universe requires both these, in order that
it may be truly all% as we have frequently sud.
And if, indeed, that which corrupts energises ac-
cording to nature, but that which suSers, suffers
pretematurally, perhaps this also suffers according
to nature. For being a contrary, it is natural to it
to suffer from a cimtrary, and thus it now becomes
manifest to us, that on account of the most excel-
lent Providence by which the universe is governed,
that which is preternatural takes place among
beings, and that it is not absolutely preternatural,

* Pniclus alludes here to the foUowing words of Plato in that
part of tbe UmiBus in wbicb the Demiurgus says to the junior or
■ounduie Oodi, Ii* »■ Snrs ri j, »,«( T<t< trrut irmr ^ x.r.li. tIi.
" In order, iberefore, that loortiil lulures may elist, and that the
unitene ma; be truly all," &g.

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but is in a greater degree conformable to than
cODtrarj to nature; since it is natural for that
which is corruptible to be corrupted, and for that
which is capable of corrupting to corrupt. And
if they are contraries, it is requisite that the one
should be corruptible, but the other corruptive. If,
also, it is necessary that generation should always
exist, it is necessary there should be contraries :
for generation is from contraries. Hence, if gene-
ration is according to Providence, and that which
is prior to generation is likewise according to Fro-
ridence ; and if, also, that which is preternatural
subsists differently from alternate generations,— if
this be the case, the preternatural is an instrument
of the cause of generatitms, and gives completion
to that which is natural. But let us here termi-
nate that which does not require much discussion.
Let us, therefore, pass on to the consideration of
that which is preter-rational, and evil in souls, in
order that we may understand how this likewise
subsists according to Providence. Here, there-
fore, the association of certain contraries, I mean
of the immortal and mortal soul, affords a place
for that which is preternatural. For when that
whidi is mortal in us predominates over that whicli
is divine, then the generation of evil b effected in
tbe soul; as, for instance, when either anger or
desire predominate, in consequence of either of
them suffering that which is conformable to its
nature ; the one in wrath, but the other in concu-
piscence. For each of them suffers that which it

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is naturally adapted to auflfer; bul on account of
that which is essentially divine being extraneous
to mortal passions, and the irrational nature exist-
ing in those beings in which this conjunction takes
place, the natural union of these two becomes pre-
ternatural. Hence reason, which possessed in us
the appellation of divine, is denominated preterm
rational, instead of preternatural ; at the same time
both the rational and irrational part of the soul,
wishing to energise conformably to ihe desire of
that which is natural ; the one desiring to live with
. passion, but the other without passion ; and the
one rationally, but the other irrationally. In the
mixture, however, of both these, and in their de-
praved habitude with reference to each other, that
which is denominated a patypostasis, or a deviation
from subsistence, takes place, which as it has not a
principal essence, it is evident that what is called
preter- rational and not preter-irrational, is not only
evil, but is likewise not evil ; for it is evil to that to
which a deviation from reason is not natural, but
not evil to that to which the preter-rational is ac-
cording to nature. For where there is not reason,
nothing of this kind is evil, as in irrational animals;
and this, not because to suffer through passion b
according to nature, but to be vanquished by rea-
son preternatural ; since the latter is in a greater
degree conformable to nature, because reason is
naturally adapted to vanquish. For when of op-
posites, one is better, but the other worse ; though
the latter, in energising as it is adapted to energise,

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suffers that which pertains to itself, yet when snb-
servient to the former, which is better, it is trans-
ferred to that which is above its own nature; since

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preter-rational to good, in consequence of Provi'
dence distributing everything into tbe world ac-
cording to its desert. But, indeed, it is evident
that it is good for the human soul to descend to
tbe ultimate part of the world, in order that the
universe may be perfect, and that it may not only
be full of rational and immortal animals, and again,
of such as are irrational and mortal, but likewise
of the media between these, viz. rati<HiaI, and at
the same time mortal animals. For a thing of
this kind exists in the universe; since if these na-
tures were wanting, the world would be truly im-
perfect. It is likewise manifest to every one, that
in consequence of a divine soul acceding to gene-
ration, it is requisite that prior to this a mortal
soul should be present with bodies ; and Uial the
divine soul should not dwell in these fleshly, bony,
and, in short, terrette organs. For bow is it pos-
sible that body destitute of vitality, and mingled
from many things, should of itself participate <^
an incorporeal and immortal soul? How also in
reality is it possible, if it were merged, in material
masses, that it should not blind its Own reason,
itself suffering everything which pertains to the
mortal soul j perceiving indeed the passions of the
body, which are the objects of sense; being capti-
vated by imaginative forms ; desiring whatever is
adapted to the wants of the bu<ly ; and wishing, by
energising according to anger, to repel whatever is
noxious to the mortal animal. For suffering all
these, it would be corrupted in as great a degree

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47

as the body, and its descent would bt in vain^ IhrovgA
not being atsisied, but corrupted by tls recipients^ •
For neither would it be possible to know the things
which externally corrupt, without senge which
knows particulars ; nor to desire liquid and solid
aliment, without that part of the loul wbkli is th«
source of all-various appetitions; nor to pursue
what is mortal, without the remembrance of that
which is able to hurt or assist it. By how much
better, therefore, it is for that which is connected
with another thing different from itself, by which
also it is perhaps molested, to be thus connected,
sometimes only, and not always, —by so much more
beneficial is it for the soul, to direct its attention
to the irrational nature, than \o become itself irra-
tioDal. If, therefore, it is neoes.sary that the im-
mortal soul should descend faither, that the mortal
soul also should subsist on account of it,— ^nd the
existence of both these is conformable to the will
of Providence, — if this be the case, the preterna-
tural'' also must be referred to the same bound of
Providence, for the sake of that which is accord-
ing to nature. Thus too in souls, that which is
preter-rational is for the sake of that which is ac-
cording to reason, that which energises preter-

* The nhole of the abore which is in italics, is in the version of
Matbel:s, '• it frustra utique descensus easet, non jam adjalus ab
^itisniBCipienlibu* ipsum.sedcarruptis." Bat as Proclus is here
^leaking of the rational soul, foi w^Hu it [b necessary (o read
at0tila ; for ijirum, ipiam; and for porru/ilu, corruj-ta.

* In Morbeka "pmrtermtioNffni" but ilia obiiouBly necessary,
from whal inincdiatelf follows, to r«Ml praUr (uftrnmi.

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rationally in us subsisting for tbe Bake of our ra-
tional energy. But respecting this problem enough
has been said at present.

6. Consequent to this, let us direct our attention
to the sixth problem. If Providence exists, — and
Providence existing, it is necessary there should
be that which is according to desert, — how does it
happen that there is so great an inequality of human
lives in the universe.'' — some tyrannizing in con-
sequence of being depraved characters, but others
being in a state of servitude, though they are vir-
tuous? — and some, indeed, being prosperous, in
consequence of having a good condition of body,
living in affluence, and the like; but others, on the
contrary, being deprived of these, so that worse
circumstances fall to the lot of better men ? For
everything of this kind appears to accuse Provi-
dence as not only here distributing equal things to
things unequal, which is itself irrational, but, on
the contrary, in things unequal, distributing what
is worse to tlie better, and what is better to the
worse ; though neitlier can it be thought that arith-
metical media will accord in such cases, nor the
geometrical, by which a distribution of external
goodor evil is made according to the desert of those
that receive it In the first place, therefore, we
should say, that Providence distributes to every-
thing that which is adapted to it, — fur tliis is
admitted, — and bestows ends which accord with
habits. But this being the case, it is not at all
wonderful that it should give to good men what-

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49

ever mny increase virtue; nor that depraved meni
relinquiiihing the benefits with wliich virtue is sur-
rounded, should earnestly endeavour to procure
health of body, and should he solicitous to obtain
wealth and power, which are wholly neglected by
the good. Hence, as those who direct all their
attention to apparent good, are not grieved that
they are not temperate, that they are not contem-
plators of real being, and that their soul is muti-
lated^ — thus, also, neither are good men afflicted
because they aie not rich, or because they are de>
prived of power; but pursue virtue alone, with the
possession of which they are satisfied. For iieiiber
are husbandmen indignant because they do not ob-
tain the same things as sailors ; nor sailors, because
they do not reap; but both these, being intently
occupied in their proper ends, if they obtain these
from Providence, they are satisfied and rejoice.

We must not therefore say, that the donation of
Providence is destitute of geometrical proportion ;
for it is the most harmonic of all gifb, imparting to
all things good, and to each that good which it
shows itself qualified to obtain, viz. either true or
apparent good. For this is evident, that he who
pursues virtue, alwai/s obtains ike object of his desire,
and lives according to virtue; but he who desires
externals, does not always obtain that which is con-
Joined to his ajrpetition; here, also. Providence
bestowing what is adapted to habits, — to the vir-
tuous, indeed, that which is stable, and sufficient
to itself; but to those who pursue externals, that

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which is dubious and full of indigence. This,
thererore, must be Uamt in the first place; bat
this, in the second place, that with worthy men a
deficiency of apparent good contributes to virtue;
for it accustoms them to despise the body, with-
draws them'from a. solicitude about appearances,
mlarges their conceptions of ihe magnitude of vir-
tue, discloses to them the inanity of those things
which are believed to be good by the multitude,
and exhibits to those who are able to perceive true
beauty, Ikat good which is essentially venerable*
and admirable in the most transcendent degree.
For we do not admire the pilot's art during the
tranquillity of the sea and air, but in tempest and
storm ; nor virtue in an affluence of human good,
but in those things which the violent attacks of for-
tune cannot shake.

In the third place, if we say that Providence
affords instruction to those who do not live ac-
cording to Providence in such distributions, we
shall assert that which is not very remote from the
truth. For if Providence always imparted to the
good, riches, beauty of body, and power ; but to the
bad, deformity, ignominy, poverty', and everything
of this kind, it would indeed truly" appear that
virtue, comprehending all things, possesses what is
honourable, and vice what is fleeting. But now,

° The verMon of Morbeka lus in this place "peamiati" but it
appears to me to be necessary to read insleail of iliKiiiiier

'' Morbeka hai here "txler;" but it sbould be, cwifoi
his barturous Teruon, enter, i. e. in Gre«k, artan.

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51

exhibiting virtue by itself alone, and vice with all
its abundance, it renders the foi-nier in n gi-eater
degree admirable in a worse furtune, but shows
that the latter is to he in a greater degree avoided
in a better fortune, and excites those that are well
born to the love of virtue and the avoidance of
vice ; the latter \i. e. the bad] blaming fortune on
account of itself; but the former p. e. the good]
truly adorning every condition : and the latter not
suffering any diminution in that which is foreign to
itself, but filling it with turpitude; but the former
using every ' circumstance that may occur as its
proper ornament. Or will not justice* blame
wealth, but health intemperance*', and magnificence
of soul, power? And magnanimity, indeed, adorns
poverti/, but a masculine mind sorrow, and a trau'
scendency of •wisdom the privation of power. If we
assert, therefore, that these things thus distributed
are the eruditions of Providence, we shall not wan-
der from the truth. This, likewise, as it seems,
must be said by us, that man is soul, and this has
been well demonstrated ; but he is soul, using the
body and the mortal form of life. And the two
latter frequently oppose tlie amatory energies of
the immortal soul about that which is truly good,
ond require such things as may be able lo prevent

' The TcrsioD of Horbeka has here erroneously "iiguililia," in-
Mmd of jutfitta.

* Moit»ekB's leraion in (his place is, "lanilalem aulem mltmpe-
rantia ■" instead of which it is neceasary to tead, laiatas mttem in-
IrmjKranliant.

£2

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their attacks. Thus^ for instance, affliction is re-
quisite, that the body may not, by its wanton im-
pulses, draw down the intellect which is in us [from
the contemplation of real being] ; but poverty, that
the soul may not through tcealth bellied with an in-
temperate Jbrm o/" life ; and the privation ofpayoer,
that it may be void of ambition. Hence many
worthy men have thought fit to live ia insalubrious
instead of salubrious places, punishing the evil ger-
minations of corporeal desires, and choosing rather
to carry about with them a feeble instrument, than
to become unwise^ by using one that is robust.
But others have abandoned the riches which they
possessed, in consequence of wishing to have a soul
liberated from those passions which germinate
through wealth. And many instances may be ad-
duced of tiiose who have acted in this way. Tlius,
Plato dwelt in an insalubrious place'', in order
that he might subdue the excessive impulses of
the body. But Crates abandoned bis wealth, at the
same time exclaiming. Crates liberates himselffrom
the sordid burden of riches 1 And other examples
are recorded of the like kind.

If, therefore. Providence imparts to good men
such things as they themselves affect through the

■ In niorbeki here for "de^iicert" it is necessary to read dc

^ See the fir»t book of my translation of Porphyry's treatise on
Abstinence from Animal Food, in which ihis ia asserted, accom-
panied by many admirable observations of Porphyry, well Hortby
n of the liberal reader.

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53

Jove of virtue, independently of Providence, how
can any one complain of its dispensations to those
that are worthy ? And how is it possible that the
donations to the wicked of wealth and power, and
the like, should not rather be called punishments
[than blessings] ? For these gifts call forth into
energy their latent evil, in order that by punish-
ment they may be finally purified from if.

Again, therefore, according to another mode of
considering the subject, we must say, that it is
the work of Providence not to comprehend in oae
descriplion of persons alone the donations of all-
various good, — as neither did Plato, when insti-
tuting the most excellent city, think it fit that one
genus only should be adorned with every good,
but that different tilings should be distributed to
different persons,^-and that this is the province of
him who intends to make the whole city happy, and
not one part of it alone. Because, however, souls
descend into generation, it is requisite that they
should have a certain experience of those evils in
which they are here involved, by which they are

* Sfneaius, in perfect conformity to Khat is here asserted by Fro-
dus, says, in his eicellcnt (leatise OD Dreams, p. 141 : " Misfor-
tunes, nbich are said to bappen contrary to our deserts, are of the
grcatesl adisntage in eilirpating the affectiona by vbicb we are
oqilivatcd with eitemaU- and thus the doctrine of ■ FrorideDce !■
confirmed lo the intelligent, from the very circumstancea nhich
produce diffidence in the ignorant. For no place would be left far
the soul 10 take her flight from the dominion of matter, if in the
present sUte she lived free from the incursions of evil. Hence it is
proper to believe, that the prefects of the mfeinal regions hare in-
vented vulgar prosperities as the snares of the soul." .

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5*

excited to desire a transition from hence, to that
place which is beyontl the reach of every ill. To
those, therefore, who are good from themselves,
tilings apparently disastrous are for this purpose
sent by Providence. But as it is requisite that
bad men also should participate of good, they par-
ticipate indeed of a certain image of it; and the
punishments inflicted by divine vengeance lead
these likewise to a flight from this terrene abode.
With respect also to everything which we pos-
sess, — some of these belong to us on account of
the free will of our soul, some on account of our
being passive to other things, and some on account
of the universe alone as the cause. Hence, if those
things over which we have dominion through our
own energies [terminate badl^], we must accuse
ourselves. For if any one becomes diseased, or is
in poverty, through his own misconduct, the cause
of this must be referred to him, and not to Pro-
vidence. For we must not say that free will ob-
tained the power which it possesses in the universe
for the destruction, but for the salvation of its pos-
sessOT. And with respect to those things which we
sufler from others, though we may unjustly suffer,
we should consider that the law of the universe
permits parts to act on each other according to
their own impulse : for such are all things which
conspire in union ; these, indeed, naturally acting
and suffering, but those electivdy. Retribution',

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liowever, follows both those that act well, and those
that act HI. That also which suffers, suffers ac-
conling to its desert, and what it does is not neg-
lected by the law [of the universe]. For as it is
said of beings which energise immaterially, that
they produce what is contingent in an uncontin-
gent manner, and that they do not suffer from
what is contingent; thus, also, in those beings that
ener^se electively, it does not appear that every-
thing suffers from everything indiscriminately, but
that only which has an opportune arrangement in
the universe for this puipose. Nor does the self-
motive agent relinquish its proper motion, though
it may become the instrument of the universe: for
the quality of the impulse leads that which acts to
retribution ; since it was not an inanimate instru-
ment, but an instrument co-adapting itself to that
which uses it. The cause, however, of those thftigs
which we suffer from the universe, whether they
are better or worse, must be ascribed to our desert ;
and this must either be referred to the present life,
' — as if we should require, for instance, a certain
bridle, as it were, (since many on account of cir-
cumstances become better,)— or it must be referred
to a former life; since if those that suffer, were
not worthy from the first, purification is requisite
prior to the possession of virtue, — or it must be
referred to a future life, Providence withdrawing
us from human concerns, id order that, by consi-
dering virtue alone to be the perfection of our na-
ture, we may establish the love of it in ourselves,

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and be persuaded tliat nothing else is our proper
good.

Further still, if some (me after the same manner
should inquire, why equal thtngs are imparted by
Providence to things unequal, according to arith-
metical equality, (for this remains to Ite considered,)
— as for instancy when whole cities perish, and one
destruction ensues both of the good and bad, and
a similar circumstance, as it appears, takes place
with respect to those who are dissimilar in their
habits, — in answer to this inquiry, therefore, it
may I think be said, in the first place, that they do
not suffer what is similar so far as they are dissi-
milar, but so far as they are similar ; being willing,
perhaps, to inhabit the same city, to enter the same
ship, to engage with others in the same battles, or
act in conjunction with them In anything else, and,
by thus acting, suffer with them the same calamity.
Hence, so far as some of them are better, and others
worse, they bear the common calamity differently;
the latter, indeed, impatientlvi but the former mild-
ly, though they perish. And afler a separation from
the present life, the abode of more excellent souls
receives the former, but of depraved souls the lat-
ter. In the second place. It may be said, that of
such co-ordinations of those that are at the same
time saved, or at the same time perish, there is an
order by which they are similarly collected together
in the universe, and a common period of &te, pro-
ceeding from different principles to the same end.
There is likewise a concurrence of prc^ression^

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whicli are either preservstive or destructive of all ;
and It is requisite that of parts, in consequence of
their following wholes, these should eflect and suf-
fer something in conjunction with certain things,
but those with other things of a different nature;
since with us, also, the heart is sometimes so dis-
posed that a certain part is copassive, but many
parts at another time. In this universe, likewise,
with respect to the less principal parts, these suffer
peculiarly, but those in common from the more
principal parts; and some suffer nothing from those
things from which others suffer. It is not won-
derful, therefore, that the motions of one of these
should be conformable to Providence, but those of
the other should be from necessity, in consequence
of being subdued by passions.

It may also be added, in answer to those who
accuse Providence of distributing equality in things
unequal, that they are ignorant of the different equa-
lity of souls, which originates from many causes.
For of souls which proceed frbm the same divinity,
as, for instance, the sun or the moon, there is an
assimilation of the former to the latter in different
conditions of life, and in former periods there was
a conformity in their energies. Nor is it at all won-
derful that they should suffer the same thing, since
this is notliing more than a retribution of actions
which proceeded in common from common pas-
sions; and by how much the more amply they
corresponded with each other in different circum-
stances, by so much the greater is the similitude of

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the incideDtal events which befall them. But in
answer to those who accuse Providence on account
of the inequality which takes place in the external
circumstances of the good and the bad, we ask
whether laudable renown, which is alone bestowed
on the good, is not to be preferred to corporeal
delight, to riches, and bodily health? For all bad
men are inglorious and without honour, though .
they may be surrounded by myriads of flatter-
ers ; since those who estolled them when living,
scorn them when dead. But those who despised
good men when they were alive, admire them in a
transcendent degree when they are dead. If, there-
fore, better men partake of the greatest of external
goods [t. e. honour], how can it be any longer said,
that Providence does not impart that which is ac-
cording to desert, bestowing on those who desire
nothing else, such things as extend only to the
present life, but conferring on others those bene-
fits which are capable of being transmitted to a
future and more excellent life? For the former
live according to the mortal, but the latter accord-
ing to the immortal part of the soul. Hence,
whatever is of a more mortal nature, is adapted to
those who prefer that which is mortal in things
within and external to them; but such as are more
immortal, are adapted to those who prefer* that
which is immortal. And thus distribution accord-
ing to desert is preserved in each, through the

* For " ai^ciUBna," m this place, in MorlH-ka's version, I read

anlquniinuVnii.

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similitude of ihe gifts to the life of the recipients.
But if to him who possesses virtue, that which is
propitious is always present, and this is imparted
by the Gods themselves; but the whole life of the
depraved man is full of inquietude and perturba-
tion, of brutal delights, ferocity, and the envenomed
bitterness of guilt ; and if he finds no rest from
these evils, which are to him inexplicable, is it
not perfectly evident that Providence proclaims
the former character to be deserving of things of a
more excellent nature ; but that the latter, by sub-
jugating himself to the dominion of his passions,
coanumerates himself with beings inferior to the
nature of man?

7. Relinquishing, therefore, any further consi-
deration of this subject, let us pass on to those
questions, which are wont to be continually a^-
tated, respecUng brutes, and let us direct our at-
tention to this seventh problem, Providence also
proceeding to irrational, as well as to rational ani-
mals. What equality, therefore, is there in brutes,
since some of them are well disposed, but others
not; some of them possess an ill, but others a good
habit of body; and according to odier such like
differences they are separated from each other?
Again, therefore, what equality can there be in
them, since they are thus dissimilar? For of these
also, as well as of men, we see that there are certain
common corruptions; and It is requisite in these
to contemplate the cause of the events, being per-
suaded that Providence extends even to the last of

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things; and likewise to consider wbat reason can
be assigned for their ultimate devomtiiHi. For
these are tite three particulars which occasion men
to doubt respecting the administration of Provi-
dence, viz. the inequality in what happens to brutes,
the common corruptions of these, and their devo-
rstion of each other, of which it is now requisite
to say something; and to discuss this in the first
place as follows : Either there is some vestige of a
self-motive life in brutes, and which is separable
from body, or there is none ; and every species of
soul which is in them is extinguished together with
the body, and is assimilated to [corporeal] quali-
ties, and to innate beat But this division being
made, we shall abound with arguments, by which
we may be able to show that there is a Providential
dispensation in these.

If, therefore, as we have said, there is some ves-
tige of a self-motive life in them, und a brut^ can do
something worse and something better from itself—
such as we say is the case with the self-motive nature,
whether according to opinion, or according to truth,
— if this be admitted, then we must refer to Provi-
dence their good domestication, their devoration of
each other, and their common corruption, just as we
refer to Providence wbat happens to men from the
management of their passions, and the co-ordina-
tion which they are allotted, either according to a
similitude of life, or according to mundane perioils,
or according to both these. But if brutes are only
corporeal, it is of no consequence if they sufifer the

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same thing as a shadow all-variously transformed,
and are sabject to the dominion of Fate'.

S. After this, let us consider, in the eighth place,
a doubt which is very widely diffused, and occa-
sions many to oppose the existence of Providence
viz. why punishments do not Immediately follow the
commission of crimes, but this happens some time
after, or even after a great lapse of time? For
offenders wiil be corrected in a much greater de-
gree when they are immediately punished, than if
the punishment is deferred for so long a time that
they forget for what they are punished. And, in-
deed, they are excited to murmur at Providence, in
consequence of feeling the punishment, but forget-
ting the offence which they had committed; In the
same manner as he is affected who suflers for the
crimes of others a long time after they have been
committed''. In answer to this we may say, that
the implanted root of wickedness causes the same
energies to take plaoe in consequence of continuing
inflexible by punishment, just as the earth bearing
thorns, though the germs are a thousand times
cut off, still produces the like. Providence, there-
fore, waits for an appropriate time, not such as
may be pleasing to the vulgar, but such as it knows
will contribute to the health of souls, and will in^

<• Here, loo, in tbe remaining pan of this eighlli question, the
verdon of Morbekn Is bo t>arharous, that I bave been obliged to
epitomise it.

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struct many by endurance. For, together with the
Gods, says Plato, Fortune and Time govern all
things, whether it be requisite that some good
should be imparted, or that there should be a pu*
rification from something contrary to good. The
cure of souls, indeed, which is called Sixi; (or jus-
tice), is more artificial than all external medicinal
arts. For the cure of the soul may be said to be a
divine thing, the evil which is in it being more
various than that which is in bodies. Id the next
place, vice is a punishment to itself and the most
grievous injury the soul can sustain. Precipitate
anger, also, is not a good dispensator of punish-
ments. Plato once, being about to chastise a slave,
was seen holding his hand in an elevated position
for some time, and being asked why he did so, said
that be was punishing his own impetuous anger.
Archytas said to his servants in a field, who bad
not done what he had ordered them to do, and
expected to be punished for their negligence, " It
is well for you that I am angry." And Theano'
said to one of her servants, " If I were not angry I
would chastise you." Among the Egyptians there
was a law, that a pregnant woman, who was judged
worthy of death, should not be put to death tiil she
was delivered''. Is it, therefore, wonderful that
Providence should for a lime spare those who are
deserving of death, but are able to perform hot

' The wife of Pylbagoras.

'• See Flutu-ch. De sera ATUwinii tmdicta, in whieli treatise be
says the same thing.

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trifling, but iUustrious acUons, till they have ac-
complished them? If Themistocles had been im-
mediately punished for what he did when he was
a young man, who would have delivered Athens
from the Persian evils* ? Who, also, would have
explained the Pythian oracle? If Dionysius had
perished in the beginning of his tyranny, who would
have freed Sicily, which was thought to be irreme-
diably lost, from the Chalcedonians ? If the pu-
nishment of Periander had not been deferred for a
long time, who would have freed the pleasant island
of Leucadia, — who would have liberated Anaxo-
rium from its adversaries? To which may be added,
that the time of deferred punishment seems long to
our feeble vision, but is nothing to the eye of Pro-
vidence, just aa the place, also, in which we live,
and carry about these bodies, is perfectly small for
the punishment of great offences; but there are
many and indescribable places of punishment in
the infernal regions, and excessive torments for
the offenders that are there. On account of the
magnitude of the punishments, likewise, the whole
of them are not inflicted at once. Souls, also, are
naturally adaptetl to feel remorse, which is the fore-
runner of their greater sufferings. For they suy,
that Apollodorus the tyrant saw himself in a dream
scourged and boiled by certain persons, and his
heart exclaiming from the kettle, *' I am the cause
of these thy torments ! " But Ptolemy, who was
stise of Plutarch, in Ihia aod tbe

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6*

surnamed Thunder, thought in a dream that he
was called to judjj;emeut by Seleucus, and that vul-
tures and wolves sat there as his judges. Such are
the preludes to the vicious of impending punish-
ment.

9. Afler this, let us consider how the crimes of
other persons, as, for instance, of parents of an-
cestors, are punished in their posterity. For tliat
certain persons are said to have suffered punish-
ment for the crimes of their ancestors, both reve-
lations and the mysteries manifest, and certain
liberating Gods are said to purify from them. In
answer to this it may be said, in the first place,
that every city and every genus is one animal, in
a much greater degree than every man, and is more
immortal and sacred'. For one tutelar deity pre-
sides over a city as over one animal, and likewise
over the whole of one race; and there is one com-
mon period to a city, and also to a generation,
comprehending in one boundary the life and death
of each'>, as if one nature pervaded through the
whole city, and every individual that it contains.
And hence, one common nature extending through
a whole city, and a whole race, makes each to be
one. If, therefore, as we have shown, every city,
and each genus of men, is a certain one, why is it
wonderful that the crimes of progenitors should be

* See PluUrcb in the before-ineDtioiicil Ireatiae.

** Moibeka'a veruon of the concludiDg put oT this M

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punished in their posterity? Ant! the life of cities
being one, has a retribution in afler-times for the
better or worse deeds which it performed in prior
times. For Providence not onlj rewards or pu-
nishes each of us for what we have done at another
time, but considers a city as one, and a race as
one ; the first agents also not being neglected. For
Providence existing, it is not lawful that anything
should be neglected. There is also a co-passivity
of posterity with their ancestors; for the former
have a reference to the latter as to a summit or
leading monad, being generated from, and having a
common life and nature together with them ; and
hence, on account of them, they are deservedly
honoured or punished. I do not, however, con-
ceive it to be at all wonderful, if all being parts of
one, and some things being co-adapted to others,
not those that are near, but those that are remote,
should be allotted circumstances similar to those of
their ancestors. For neither is there the same si-
militude of all the parts to all ; but of these it is
greater, and of those less. Nor is there the same
proportion; for there is a greater colligation of
these, but less of those; and this, not because that
which is near has more similitude, but that which
b more remote less'. For nothing hinders lis from
admitting, that things which are more remote may

' Tb* laller part of ibis sentence is bolb derecUve and eiTonooua
in Moibeka. For instead of, " et htec quidein nan, to gvod prope
habtt Tf mapi out rt myus, I conceive il Decessar; te read, et htec
gvidtm, nun o yuod prope habet rt nupi, aul cfood rtmotku to

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6«

be more assimilated than such as are more near.
And ihis, also, is manirest from medical operations.
For when the loins are diseased, phjrsicians caute-
rize) not the parts which are near, but those which
are opposite to the loins ; and when the liver is im-
posthumated, they scarify the epigastrium. When,
likewise, the hoofs of oxen are extremely tender,
tbey anoint the tips of the horns, and not the parts
which are proximate to the hoofs*. For the effect
produced in them is not through the parts which
are near, but through those which from co-passivity
are in want of sanation. All the first delinquents,
therefore, sufler punishment for their crimes; and
through these, something occultly passes to their
cf>-passiTe posterity. Nor do these suffer unjustly,
but from a similitude of life similar things are al-
lotted to them by Providence. If, als<^ it be re-'
qubite to speak of the transmigrations of souls, and
^eir transitions into different lives, it must be ad-
mitted by those who believe in this doctrine, that
souls are rewarded or punished in a posterior, for
what they have done in a former life. Besides, in

' This, and the pieceding sentence, are taken Trom Ihe treatise of
nutarch, Hi^ rm ir4 ran Bum 0{a!uif n/uifiv/uwi, i. e. Omceming
thaevhoare liovilypuniiludly Dimnity. And the wholepaBiBgc in
the original is as followa ; VMiijiitum irrtf n imt{i*j n Xf'tf
HU lijuutr uri, xn yiXfii i fxtuKt iHiKn ii>«i tut irx"' rimrmn tiu

wrpar, Mia wmt ^amt U9 us rnt ^nXut /ittXtimMei r^trttXufut ra mufit
rm jiifann, i.t.1. But for tj> arrij^iifn, in this exlmct, I read <m
■rTuu/UM, tht oppaBle ]mrts. Morbeka, also, has in his reruon,
" ongii enim agrotastibui, mm qua profit, sed qaa ez oppOBto niiu-

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67

human iife, the whole period of a race is anal<^u5
to a drama, different souls helng frequently in-
taoduced in it, and often the same souls, in order
to give completion to the inevitable scene'; just as
there the same players- sometimes speak in the cha-
racter of Tiresias, and sometimes in that of CEdipus.
Providence, however, punishes or rewards souls
according to their desert, and, through a similitude
of life, punishes some on account of others, as if
cutting off a certain malignant root of a plant,
which it could easily antecedently perceive. For a
Bting is congenial to scorpions, and venom to vipers.
But there is a power in llie universe which knows
this prior to the percussion. After the same man-
ner, therefore. Providence, perceiving in souls ini-
quity congenial to that of their ancestors, punishes
them for it^ though they may not have committed
the same crimes; previously destroying the similar
evil in those who possess it, like a malady growing
to an epilepsy. For as the excrescences of the
extremities, blackness, and marks of fathers which
do not appear in their immediate offspring, reger-
minate in their grandchildren, thus, also, the pecu-
liarities of manners burst forth in more distant
progeny, which are indeed unknown to others; but
by the one of Providence, which knows all things,
it must be granted that they aie known by an
antecedent knowledge. The similitude, however,
becomes evident through this, that it is seen to

" but Ihe originul wai, doubtless,

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extend to them puniiilimeiits correspondent to tli€
crimes which their ancestors committed. But I
well know that I have elsewhere discussed these
particulars.

10. I shall, tlierefore, put an end to these doubt^
hy adding as a colophon, as It is said, a tenth
inquiry. For Providence, by this its much cele-
brated unity, knowing and reducing all things to
good, how are angels and dtemons said to energise,
providentially; and, if you are willing, heroes like-
wise and souls, governing the world in conjunction
with them and the Gods ? For it b requisite that we
should define what the nature is of their providen-
tial energy, since it is not, like that of the Gods,
characterized by the one, if we admit that a daemon,
an angel, a soul, and a hero, are not the same with
deity. For the hyparxis of every God, as I have
before said, subsists according to the onei and this
one is prior to intellect, and is the same with the
good, from which also it proceeds. But unities or
goodnesses are twofold, which the good itself pro-
duces, being the cause of both, and being one in a
more transcendent degree. And of these unities,
some indeed are self-perfect, but others are distri-
buted in their participants. For the one and the
good have a triple subsistence; viz. either accord-
ing to cause, as, for instance, the first good ; since
this is from itself the cause of every good, and of
all unities; — or according to hyparxis, for thus every
God is one and good ; — or according to participa-
tion, as, for instance, the one and the good which

c,q,t,=cdbvGoogle

Subsbts in beings, on account of which every es-
sence is united, and every God is boiiiform, though
he is a unity. The unity, however, of self-perfect
natures does not belong to anything else, but per-
tains to itself only. But every intellect, and every
soul, [)articipates of a certain one. For the one
which soul, and also the one which intellect parti-
cipates, possess a transcendency of union*. Thus,
likewise, one all-perfect intellect is the cause of all
intellects. But of the intellects which proceed from
it, some are self-perfect, each being partially that
which the ail-perfect intellect is totally ; one pos-
sessing the partial according to a certain thing, but
another according to something else ; and this ex-
isting in the moon, but that in the sun. This, also,
being distributed into some other of the forms con-
tained in all-perfect intellect, but that being an
illumination from these intellects in intellectual
souls ; on which account, also, these souls are said
to be intellectual according to participadon, and
tend upward to the first intellect. And all souls,
indeed, have the self-motive nature in common ;
but those which participate of intellect, universally
possess intelligence. If, therefore, we direct our
attention to the first soul, and the twofold souls that
proceed from it, we shall perceive that some of
them are essential and separable from bodies, but
others are illuminations in bodies, derived from

• InMorbeka's

lersim

" «>«>&«(

"b

tthi>

ntbeGr^

w«

doubUe» .«.« «.

,andi

~««gnifl«

rm

MVIOf

i^tSA., a (

'an.

icmiUncy o/uwon.

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70

essential souls ^ For that which is animated, is so
through the participation of a certain soul, which
some one'' calls (tmKexeia) entelecheia, and which
ojay be denominated an animated bond.

Hence, there is a number proceeding from each
of the principal hypostases, ^'iz. from soul, intel-
lect, and Ike good. But this number is twofold, the
one consisting of selt^perfect essences, but the other
of illuminations proceeding from these selP-per--
feet beings into subordinate natures'^. Henc«,too,
though angels and daemons are neither Gods nor
unities simply, — and the like is true of hero^ of
souls superior to ours, and also of ours, — yet they
participate of certain unities, atid are profoundly
united. And the first of these illuminations are
those which are suspended from the Gods them-
selves ; the second in order are suspended from the
first ; the third from the second ; and the fourth,
which is our order, is suspended from illumina-
tions which rank as the tliird. For in us, also,
there is inherent a certain occult vestige of the otic,
which is more divine than our intellect, and in
which the soul, perfecting and establishing herselfj
becomes divine, and lives, as far as it is possible
for thb to be accomplished by her, a divine life.
All the Gods, therefore, energise providentmlly.

* For B demoDitradon o( what is h«re said by Proclus about in-
tcUects and souls, see my traiiKlation of bis Tbeolagical ElemenU.

» It i« so colled by AristoUe in his Treatise on ibe Soul, to my
(ranslation of wbich I refer the reader.

° See PropouUon64 oTiny tnm&lation of FrocIus'sTIicolo^cBl
Etcmenu.

c,q,t,=cdbvGoogle

But angels, dsemons and heroes, in consequence
of possessing a certain seed, an it were, of the one,
exert a providential energy, not so far as tliey are
viljil or intelligent, — for it is the province of soul
to move, and of intellect to know, and the former
characteristic property exists in all souls, and the
latter in all intellects,— but they energise providen-
tially through the one wrhich they contain. For
according to that through which they imitate* the
Gods, they provide for alt things. But if all the
Gods primarily exert a providential energy, because
they are primarily good, but souls aAer these, when
they are established in unity, energise divinely, and
provide for other things without habitude together
with the Gods, and the genera which transcend
our nature, — if this be the case, the providential
energies of souls do not consist in reasonings con-
jectural of futurity, like those of human political
(jharacters, but in illuminations in t/ie one of the
soul derived from the Gods. Hence, being sur-
rounded with the trans cendently united splendour
of deity, tbey see that which is in time untempo-
rally, that which is divisible indivisibly, and every-
thing which is in place unlocally; and they ener-
gise not from themselves, but from the powers by
which they are illuminated. And souls, indeed, are
sometimes affected In this manner, but the above-
mentioned energy is always present with angels,
daemons and heroes. On this account, likewise,
' In Morbeka's version in Uue place, for " miranlur," it is neces-

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72

they providentially attend to subordinate natures
in a Rjore excellent manner than if they energbed
according to ratiocination, not in a way similar to
their productions, but perceiving all things accord-
ing to tie one and causally, without aay diminution
of providential energy. These powers, therefore,
differ, as we have said, from souls, by always at-
tending to the objects of their care ; but they differ
from tlie Gods, of whom they are the attendants,
by not energising providentially according to the
whole of themselves, but according to their most
divine part, by wliich they are conjoined with the
Gods themselves. For of the Gods, each Is a unity ;
but of these, each possesses through participation
a transcendency of union. Hence, each having
something else besides unity, imitates through
unity the divinity prior to itself, and from which
it is suspended; but by something else, it lives
according to another energy. And the summit of
the essence of each is according to the one; but
being subsists in each according to that which is
not one [but united}. This, however, being known,
other particulars which have I>een mentioned con-
cerning Provi<lence may be adapted to diemons
and heroes in a secondary ilegree, except that iii
these also, in the same manner as in the Divinities,
unity has in some of them a more total, but in
others a more partial power. The ineffable prin-
ciple of things, however, as it is more excellent
than every power, so likewise it transcends Provi-
dence. But if some one should dare to assert, that

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7S

it providential!}' attends to all things, it must be
said that this is in no other wuj than as desirable
to all things, and as that for the sake of which alt
things subsist, and as the cause of Providence. For
the providential energies of the Gods, and of all
the beings posterior to the Gods, are on account of
good; and this both things themselves manifest,
and also Plato, as we have said in the beginning
of this discussion.

C,q,t,=cdbvG00glC

ON THE SUBSISTENCE OF EVIL.

What the nature of evil is, and whence it derives
its generation, some of those who preceded us hnve
investigated, and engaged in the theory' of it not
superfluously, nor for the sake of something else ;
but have considered whether evd itself, surveyed
by itself, is, or is not; and if it is, what kind of a
thing it is, and whence it proceeds into existence
and hypostasis. But it will not be amiss that we
also, since we have leisure, should briefly narrate
what each of these has said rightly, and prior to
these, what have been the speculations of the di-
vine Plato concerning the essence of evil. For by
understanding what has been asserted by these
men, we shall always more easily and more nearly
comprehend the subjects of investigation, and shall,
as it were, enkindle a light in ourselves from these
inquiries.

1. In the first place, therefore, it must he con-
sidered whether evil is, or is not. And if it isj
whether it is in intellectual natures or not? And
ifitisin sensibles, whether it subsists according
to a principal cause, or not ? And if not, whether
some kind of essence must be ^ven to it, or its
existence must be considered to be wholly unsub-
stantial? And if it be admitted that it has some

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75

kind of essence, how does it subsist, there being
another principle [contrary to it]? And, further
still, how Providence existing, evil exists, and
whence it is derived? In short, all such parti-
culars must be considered as we are accustomed
in our Commentaries to investigate.

The beginning, therefore, according to nature, of
the speculation of these things will be, whether evil
ranks among beings or not? But after what man-
ner is it possible for that to exist, which is entirely
destitute of the principle of beings? For nuther
is it possible fur darkness [so far as it is darkness]
to participate of light, nor vice of virtue, nor evil
of good. As, therefore, if light was the first cause,
there would be no darknes:^ in secondary natures,
as the generation of it would not be from chance,
nor from anything else than theprinciple of things;
so, because good is the cause of all things, it is re-
cjuisite that evil should have no subsistence among
beings. For if it is from goodness itself, how can
the good* be any longer the cause of all good, when
it also produces the nature of evil ? But if it does
not derive its subsistence from Ike good, the good
will not extend itself to all things, and will not be
the principle of all beings, since evil having an ar-
rangement among beings, will escape the progres-
sion which b from fhe good. In short, if every-
thing which has an essential subsistence, of what-
ever kind it may be, deriyes this subsistence from

* For "ut nyafiii" here in Morbcks'svenioD,

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76

being; but lliatwliicb participates of being, neces-
sarily likewise participates oithe one', since at tbe
same time that a thing bas being, it is one; for the
one is prior to being: and if it neither was nor
will be lawful for eternal natures * to produce what
they produce in any other way than in conjunc-
tion with the principles superior to themselves, —
intellect indeed with life, but life with being, and
all things with the one^, — if this be the case, it is
again requisite that evil should suffer one of two
things. * For it is necessary either that it should
not at all participate of being, or that, deriving its
existence in some way or other from being, it
should at the same time participate of that cause
which Is beyond being. And again, as consequent,
and, as it were, successive to these things, it is ne-
cessary, either that there should be no principle of
things, or that evil should have no existence, or
that il should not have been generated as evil.
For that which is deprived of being is non-being,
and that which proceeds from the first cause is not
evil'.* But in either way it is necessary to as»ert
that evil has not anywhere an existence. And if,
as we have said, the good is above being, and is the
fountain of beings, because all beings and gene-
rated natures, of whatever kind they may be, desire

* For lecvlU in lhi> place, in Morfaeka'c leruon, the original was
doubtleaa mi ojtmii,

*• See m; tranil*tion of Proclus's Theological Element! for a
dcmonslTstioQ oTwbat is bere asserted.

' The punctuation of the (lart between the asterisLi. U in Mur-
belu'b veriioa obviousl}' very errotteoua.

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77

good, how can evil rank among beings? For it
will be excluded from such an appetition of good.
If, however, it should be said that it is requisite
evil should exist, because it is necessary there
should be something subcontrary to good, yet
being subcontrary, how can it desire a nature con-
trary to its own? But it is impossible for that
which does not desire good to rank among beings.
For on account of this desire all beings are pro-
duced and exist, and from this derive their salva-
tion. If, therefore, evil is contrary to good, evil
is not one among the number of beings*. AntI
what occasion is there to be prolix. For if the one)
which we also denominate the nature of the good,
is beyond being, evil is beyond non-exbtence".
But I mean non-existence or non>being simply
considered ; for the good is better than that which
is simply being.

One of two things, therefore, must follow, if non-
being is that which is in no respect being, much
more ia evil without existence, which is more debile
and less permanent than perfect non-entity. For

* Tliissealence in Morbeka's Ter»oii is, " Quart d malum eort-
trariuvi b&Tio, malum non eit aternunu" But the word fEtemutti
is here obviouslj irrelevant. InBteail of it, therefore, I substitute

' In the version of Morbekn, "ulTatpmm cue mafuin"; butit.
is necessary to read, ultra ipium mm iiie malum. For as the gimit
through its transcendency is beyond being, the processions tnrni it
extend beyond those of being. But non-being is that in which
the progressions of being terminate, and that which is non-good
bounds the progresuons of the good. Hence erilis something mora
debile than non-enlit;.

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78

ivil is much more distitnt from' good iJian non-
being. Hence that which is in no respect being,
has a subsistence rather than that which is called
evil. And consequently evil is much more deprived
or existence than that which is in everj' respect
non-entity. But if the Demiurgus, as Plato says
[in the Timseus], not only produced the nature of
good, but was also willing that there should be no-
where anything evil, by what contrivance is it
possible evil can subsist conlrary to the will of the
&bricator of all things P For it is not lawful for
him to will some things, and produce others [con-
trafy to his willH ; since will and productive energy
are simultaneous in divine essences. Hence, evil
is not only contrary to the will of the Demiurgus,
but is likewise unhypostntic ; not because be did
not produce it, (for it is not lawful to conceive that
he did,) but because he was willing, in short, that
it should not exist- What, therefore, can cause evil
to have an existence, after the father of all things
has brought it to a perfectly non-existent state?
For what is there contrary to him, and whence
does it derive its being ? For that which is maletic
is not from divinity, (since it is not lawful to admit
that it is,) and it would be absurd to suppose that
it is derived from anything else. For everything
which the world contains proceeds from the father
of it, either immediately — and these are self-subsis-
tent natures — or mediately, through the energies of
other superior powers.

And such is the reasoning which exterminates

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19

evil frotn existence ; and such are the arguments
which may with probability be a<Iduce<1. But he
who asserts the ccmtrary to this will require us to
look to the hypostasis of things, and to direct our
attention to intemperance and injustice, and what-
ever else we are accustomed to call the evil of the
soul. He will also ask us whether we call each of
these good, or each of them evil. For if we adroit
that each of these is good, we must necessarily say
one of two things, either that virtue is not contrary
to vice, the whole to the whole, and the parts like-
wise analogously, or thatwhatopposes good is not
always evil. But what can be more contrary to
common sense than each of these, or less congruous
to the nature of things? For the virtues oppose
the vices, and the manner in which this opposition
subsists is evident from the hostile conduct of men
towards each other, viz. of the unjust towards the
just, and of the intemperate towards the temperate;
and also from the dissension which is in souls
themselves ; as when in the incontinent man reason
draws one way, but passion compels another * way,
and both acting in contrary directions, the better
is vanquished by the worse. For what else is this,
than the dissension of the temperate with the in-
temperate manners of the soul? And does not
something else of the like kind take place in the
opposition between reason and the irascible part?
And is it not so in other evils, in which we perceive

c,q,t,=cdbvGoogle

discord in the soul ? For, in short, the apparent
contrarieties of evil to good, by a much greater
priority occultly subsist in souls tliemselves; and

. this disease of the soul then takes place, when our
more excellent part, and its inherent forms which
participate of good, are subdue<l by passions which
are terrene and vile. The recalling these things,
therefore, to our memory through many arguments
cannot be considered as very foreign to the pur-
pose.

If, however, as we have said, the vices are con-
trary to the virtues, but evil is entirely contrary to
good, — for the nature of good is not adapted to be
discordant with itself, but as being the offspring of
one cause and one unity, through similitude and
friendship and unity, it adheres to it, — and if beings
which possess a greater portion of good are the
saviours of such as possess a less degree of it, and
the latter are adorned by the former as being more
perfect, — if this be the case, it is necessary that
the vices should not only be evil in definition, but
that each of them should be really evil, and not a
less good. For nowhere is a less contrary to a
greater good, as neither is what is less to what is
more hot, nor what is less to what is more cold.
But if the vices of the soul must be confessed to
be of the nature of evil, it will be shown that evil
eflects something among beings; and the effective
power of evil is likewise evident from this, that it
is corruptive of everything. For that evil is this,

. is demonstrated by Socrates in the Republic, who

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81

very properly says, that the good of everything is
that which is preservative of everything, on which
account all things desire good ; for existence anil
salvation to all things are thence derived ; just as
non-existence and corruption are on account of the
nature of evil. Is it necessary, therefore, that
nothing should be corruptive of anything?" But
thus the prf^ress of generation would be stopped.
For things of a corruptive nature not existing,
neither is it possible that there should be corrup-
tion ; and corruption not existing, neither will there
be generation, because all generation is effected
through the corruption of another thing. Gene-
ration likewise not existing, the whole world will
at the same time be imperfect; for it will not con-
tain in itself the mortal genera of animals. It is,
however, requisite that it should, in order (says
Timseus'') that it may be sufficiently perfect. If,
therefore, it is requisite, [as Plato says in the
Tinifeus,] that the world should be a blessed God,
it is also requisite that its similitude to all-perfect
animal'^ should be perfectly preserved. And if
this is necessary, it is requisite that mortal genera
should give completion to the universe ; but if this,
then there must be generation and corruption ; and
if this also be admitted, different things must be

* This sentence is not iaterrogative in Morbeka, but doubtless
ought to be.

" i. e. the llniafui of Plato.

' The paradigm of the univeree is called by PUlo, in Uie Timaus,
ali-ptrfect animal. Sue my translatioD of the Commentaries of
Proclui on that Dialogue.

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82

generative and corruptive of difTerent things. Fur
generation and corrcption are not from the same
things to all things. But the natures which are
allotted generation being corruptive, are so from
an innate power, and this is their evlL For the
evil of that which is.generated,isacorruptive prin-
ciple, primarily and essentially inherent in it- For,
indeed, one thing is corruptive of the soul, but
another of the body. That also which is corrupted
is different from that which corrupts ; and there is
not the same mode of corruption; but in one thing
it is essential, and in another vital ; and in this
thing essentially leading to corintption*; but in that
vitally, in consequence of the life of it flying from
being to non-entity. The same reasoning, there-
fore, will preserve for us the whole world perfect,
and will give a place to evil among beings. Hence,
not only will evil exist on account of good, but it
will also be good for it to exist. This, therefore,
which is most paradoxical, will again become more
known.

If, however, it be requisite not only to acquiesce
in the above reasonings, but to pursue the object
of inquiry in another way, let us unfold it in the
following manner. Every good which receives the
difikrence of the more aAd the less, according to
the more has a greater degree of perfection, and is
constituted nearer to the fountain of its existence.

* In Morbefca, " el hnjut guidem rubslnntii ul esst et camtjAimem
ducente." But for «i I eonceife it lo be neceetsry lo read et, and
far el, after esK, to read ad, conformably lo the above Itanslation.

C,q,t,=cdbvG00glC

Again, according to the less becoming debilitated
and more imperfect, it recedes to the less excellent
part of its unity. For with respect to the equal,
also, that which approximates to itin a superlative
degree, will be most allied, and, as it were, conse-
quent to it; but that which is equal in a compara-
tive degree, will have the second order after this;
and that which is equal in a positive degree only,
will possess the ultimate order [in the approxima-
tions to equality]. And the same reasoning will
take place with respect to the hot and the cold, the
beautiful, the great and the small. Must we not,
therefore, also admit that injustice and intemper-
ance have the more and the less ; or must we assert
that all men are equally intemperate and unjust?
By no means must we admit the latter. But with
respect to the more and the less, must we not say,
that what is less unjust is less distant from the na-
ture of good ? And again, with respect to that
which is more unjust, must we not say, that by how
much the greater its possession is of injustice, by
so much the more it is destitute of good? This,
indeed, must be necessarily admitted. Of every
good, however, whether it be less or whether it be
greater, it must be granted, that when augmented
it becomes nearer to the first good, and that what
is perfectly good, is the same with that which is
good in the most transcendent decree. Hence it
is not proper to call either a greater or a less in-
justice good, but each of these must be denominated
entirely evil. For that, indeed, which is a less good.

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84

becomes by increase good in a greater degree ; but
that wbich is unjust, when it increases does not
become a greater good. Siibsisling, therefore, in
a way contrary to good, how is it possible it should
not rank among evils? Hence reason confidently
asserts these things of the hypostasis of evil, which
is also corroborated by the testimony of Plato, who
not only enunciatively, but also demon strati velyi
appears to have introduced the nature of evil into
beings. For Socrates, in the Theaetetus, strenuously
asserts that it is not possible for evils to perish ; and
again says, that the existence of them is not super-
fluous, and, as it were, casual ; for they are neces-
sary, and are good. But if it is good for evil to
be, evil exists as Socrates says ; and thus indeed
by its transition into existence, it has good for its
principle.

What cause, therefore, shall we assign of the ne-
cessary existence of evil, and that contrariety of it
to good, according to Socrates ? For there are, as
we have elsewhere observed, both all forms, and
that which is beyond forms. But divine forms are
not adapted to generate immediately after them-
selves that which participates of essence casually;
nor do they extend their energy as far only as to
those beings which, without transition, are always
able to enjoy them with invariable sameness ; but
on account of exuberant power, and transcendent
goodness, they produce orders which proximately
participate of themselves, and subsist uniformly,
without being mingled wilh privation. Theylike-

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85

wise produce by their energies the last hypostases,
which are incapable of remaining immaculate and
intransmu table. For these cannot participate of
those beings which are inseparable from wholes,
and exempt from all the natures which subsist in
others; and tbej' rank among participants alone'.
Nor is it proper that those beings alone should
exist, which always receive the impressions of di-
vine forms, and that the last of things should not
be produced, which sometimes only participate of
these forms. For in Uiis case, all excellent beings
would have an ultimate rank, and things which
have an eternal subsistence would have a material
order. Hence they would be sterile and debile,
and would have all the properties which we are
accustomed to ascribe to generable and corruptible
natures, in the same manner as if such natures did
not exist. If these things, therefore, are necessary
from the omnipotent and all-beneficent energy of
first causes, neither will good always subsist with
invariable sameness in all tieings, nor will the ge-
neration of evil be expelled from beings. For if
there is that which is sometimes able to participate
of good, but again someUmes neglects a co-existence
with it, there will indeed, from necessity, be a pri-
vation of participation ; but as the privation of good
is not able to subsist by itself, nor can be entirely
liberated from the nature of which it is the priva-

' i. e. The]' are merelj' participants, and are not participated by
other things. But the beings which are inseparable trom trholeii,
are participated by inferior naturea.

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86

tion, it is after a certain manner rendered powerful
by this nature, on account of its complication with
the order of things contrary to good. Other pri-
vations, indeed, are alone produced by the absence
of habits, assuming nothing from themselves which
contributes to existence; but good, on account of
the transcendent excellence of its power, gives
strength even to the privation of itself. For as iii
all beings the good implants the first power, so
likewise every being which is perfectly good gene-
rates its own power. But, as we have said, the
privation which is complicated with good, using as
a remedy for the instability of its nature the power
of good, becomes indeed contrary to good, yet is
corroborated by its mixture with it^ and thence is
enabled to oppose that which is proximate to it
Nevertheless it is not aCTected in the same manner
as other privatitms. For these have an existence
when habit departs ; but evil, when good departs,
vanishes into non-entity. For there is no sj^ecies
of life so bad as to extinguish entirely the power
of reason; since reason remains within, but speaks
in a deblle manner, in consequence of being sur-
rounded by all-various passions. These things,
however, will be considered by us again.

But if, as we have said, it is not only requisite
that the above-mentioned arguments should have
been adduced, but that the doctrine concerning
the existence of evil should be unfolded from the
writings of Plato, what has been already delivered
by us is sufficient even for those who are only able

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87

in a moderate degree to comprehend discussions of
this kind. It is fit, however, in the same manner as
in a court of justice, that we should not only hear
J^he arguments of the contending parties, but that
we should offer some opinion of our own. Let the
following, therefore, if you please, be our decision
on the subject, — that evil is, as I may say, twofold ;
one, and that the Brst^ being real evil, unmingled
with good ; but the- other not being real, nor un-
mingled with the nature of good. For with respect
to good also, one kind is primarily good, and, as it
were, good itself) and nothing else than good, being
neither intellect, nor intelligence, nor truly<exist-
ing being; but another kind is mingled with other
things. And good is sometimes found unmingled
with privation, and sometimes is to be seen mingled
with it For that which sometimes participates of
what is primarily good, is complicated with what
is not good ; because being itself, also, and the na-
ture of being, is in its highest subsistence truly-
existing being ; aud being alone, but in its last sub-
sistence, is in a certain respect comingled with non-
being ; so that in consequence of being replete with
Don-enlJty, it possesses more of non-existence than
of existence. And non-being itself, which is in no
respect whatever another being, and is beyond the
nature which subsists accidentally, is neither able
to subsist according to itself, nor according to ac-
cident For that which is true non-entity, has not
existence in one way, but in another not. But the
beingwhichsubsists simultaneously with non-being,

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whether it be lawful to call it a privation of being,
or difference, is not the same with true non-entity.
For with rcHpect to non-entity, one kind is entirely
deprived of being, but another kind, which subsists
in intelligibles, suffers, as the Eleatic stranger [or
guest] says', no ditninuticm of being. But in
those things which are sometimes beings, and some-
times non-beings, non-entity is more debile then
entity; but yet after a certain manner they are
vanquished by being. As, therefore, with respect
to non-being, if some one should ask us, whether
it has an existence, or whether it has not, we should
reply, that what is entirely non-being, and in no
respect whatever participates of existence, is in no
respect whatever being ; but, nevertheless, that non-
being is after a certain manner to be connumerated
with beings. Thus also with respect to evil, be-
cause it has a twofold subsistence, one kind being
evil alone, but another not unmingled'' with good;
the former has no existence whatever, in conse-
quence of falling below being, just as the good is
beyond being ; but the latter must be ranked among
beings. Hence it is not deserted by being', on

* Tbe Don.being of wliicb Procliu ii here (peaking, u denami.

nuledbytheElea^cguesi, in the SophisUoT Plato, (^^irrmfv, and
is one of the live genera of l>eing in intelligililes. But ibete live
genera are, esxnce, tamenesi, diff'erence, motion, ani iKrmanency.
See my translation of the Sophists.

' " la 'yim^A^, *' hoc avUm non permixtam ad btmum f' but for
permiilum, it is necessaiy to read impermixium.

' For "abcac," bcic in Moibeka'a version, it is necessary tu read

C,q,t,=cdbvG00g[C

account of the intervention of good, nor by good,
since it in still capable of remaining, on ivccount of
being : for it is at one and the same time being and
good. And that which is iti every respect evil,
since it is a perfect falling off from the first good,
is deservedly likewise deprived of being. For what
can have a progression into beings that is unable to
participate of good ? Bat that tchich is not in every
respect evil, is sub-crmtrary indeed to a certain good,
but not to all good. It is, however, arranged and
benefited through the transcendency of the source
of all good. And it is evil to those things to whick
it is contrary; but it is nevertheless suspended as good
from total good. For it is not lawful to act in op-
position to this ; but it is requisite that all tilings
should be disposed according to justice, or that
they should have no existence whatever.

Plato, therefore, rightly says in the Timeeus, that
so far as pertains to the demiurgic will, all things
are good, and nothing is evil. But in the Thete-
tetus he asserts that evil cannot be destroyed, and
that it has from necessity a place among beings.
For all things partake of good through the will of
the father J and nothing is evil with reference to his
fabrication, either of real beings, or of things which
are becoming to be. And darkness, indeed, which
is entirely mingled with its contrary, is therefore
not destitute of light; and things which are made*
in the light, are on all sides terminated by it. With
the sun, indeed, nothing is dark, for it gives even
to darkness a debile splendour; but in the air,

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90

darkness is a privation of the Itglit wliicli was in
it. AH things, therefore, are good with the father
of all ; and evil is in the natures which are not alile
to remain established in good. Oo what account,
however, this is necessary, we have before shown.
Alier what manner] therefore, evil subsists, and
after what manner it does not, is from these things
evident For both those who assert that all things
are good, and those who do not, speak in one re-
spect rightly, and in another erroneously. For
that all beings are good is true ; but non-being
also is complicated with being. All things, there-
fore, are good, because there is no evil which is not
adorned and mingled with good. And evil is in
those beings whose nature is not adapted to remain
in good in an unmingled state.

2. In the next place it is requisite to consider, in
what beings evil exists, after what manner it sub-
sists, and whence it Is derived ; because the nature
of it has appeared to us to be something belonging
to beings. Let us begin, therefore, from on high,
and survey as far as we are able, where evil sub-
sists.

The Gods, then, the kingdoms of the Oods, their
numbers and their orders, obtun the first portion
of being, or rather they preside over all beings and
an intellectual essence, on which being, as it were,
' seated, they generate and rule over all things, pro-
ceed to and are present with all tilings, without being
mingled with tliem, and exemptly adorn everything
which the universe contains. Nor b their intel-

C,q,t,=cdbvG00g[C

ligence debilitated by their providential energies,
nor their paternally transcendent government dis-
solved by the purity of their intellections. For
their intellectual energy is the same ivith their es-
sence; and providential inspection is present with
them on account of goodness, and likewise on ac-
count of their twofold power, [viz. providential and
demiurgic,] not being iviUitig^ to remain in itself,
but,asit were, producing into light from themselves
whatever it is lawful for them to produce, viz. all
beings, the genera tliat are more excellent thnn
souls, souls themselves, and whatever else has a
being inferior to these. For the Gods themselves,
indeed, are beyond all beings, and are the measures
of existence, because every being is contiuned in
them, just as number is in monads. But beings
proceed from them, some indeed [at the same time
that they proceed from,] abiding in them, but others,
through their manifold nature, falling off from the
unity of the Gods, in consequence of a diminution
of essence. And these latter, indeed, are placed in
the order of participants, suspended from the good-
ness of the Gods; but the former are essentialized
in good itself, and the measure of wholes, and are
nothing else than the unities, and measures, and
goodnesses of beings. They are likewise, if you
are willing summits, and as It were Bowers, and
superessential luminaries, and everything of this
kind. And they are indeed participable according

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to true being and the 6rst essence ; but they pro-
duce from themselves everything good and beauti-
ful, all media, and being of every kind. As, there-
fore, if some one should interrogate us respecting
this visible light, which the God who is the king
of it, and who has an arrangement analogous to
the good, scatters through the whole world, — whe-
ther it is of itself susceptive of darkness or not,
our answer to him would be multifarious. For at
one time we should adduce the simplicity of its
nature; at another time, its continuity with the
divine*' genera; and at another something else.
Thus also in speaking of the Gods, we must assert
that evil has no subsistence whatever in them ; and
it is requisite to recollect that the Gods adorn all
things, that they are not indigent of anything, and
that their life is perfectly blessed and divinely exu-
berant. For these are our unperverted conceptions
respecting them, and from these we should assume
what it is requisite to assert of the Gods themselves.
But souls of a fortunate destiny'', giving themselves
to intellect, expanding the winged part of them-
selves, and being assimilated to the Gods, are per-
manently established in good ; and no evil is pre-

■ In Moibeks, " guondjjue aaitm tarn qua ad genera cmtimd-
lalem." Bai for ad genera, it is requisite to read oif gmfro dnma.

* In Morlwka ■■ amrmxepAimera." But tor e]ihinieTie, which in
the Greek, as the leurued FiofeBsor observes, wiu if ii/u{iai, I read
tBfui(mi; fat Procliu is here speaking of that order of souls which
are denoiQiaMed by the Platonisls rnxfrrm, or undefUtd. See
Proclusin Tim^ and elsewhere; for this order of souls is mentioned
by him in many places in his works.

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93

sent wilh them, nor ever will be. Perrect hljarity,
likewise, an innoxious life, anil the choir of the
virtues, Uad such a soul to the supernal region, to
the banquety and the enjoyment of delicate food*,
and to a condition of being far removed from the
evils which are here, not for the purpose of van-
quishing these maladies, but that together with the
Gods, adorning sublunary affairs according to jus-
tice, they themselves may remain established in the
Gods. And though while they are filled with the
contemplation of real being, they possess a latent
tendency to these inferior realms, yet they do not
experience that which is perfectly evil. If, there-
fore, there is no evil in souls which are divine, how
is it possible it should exist in the Gods? For, as
it is said, heat is not in snow, nor cold in fire :
and hence, neither is evil in the Gods, nor is a
divine nature situated in evil.

In addition, therefore, to what has been said, it
must be remembered that the very essence of the
Gods is established in good. For as souls are
derived from that soul which ranks as a whole'',
and as partial intellects are derived irom an all-
perfect intellect, thus also, from the first good, or
rather, if it be lawful so to speak, from goodness
itself and from the unity of ail good, the most pri-

' All the abore m iulio ia, ai_ Motbeka, " jua vHqvt lalem
animam dttcunt ad laperiorem laaan, ad epviatiimem^m tt Jrui-
(wnfln." But Fnwlus in wbat is here uid, alludes totbefollowiDg
words of Plato in the Fhiedrus ; «■«> h tn wpi Inn ri wu twi
^n> Hvit, ■.r.>. p. 2.1. Aatii edit.

^ i. t. ai thej are derived from the soul of the world.

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inary number of things tliat are gooO is derived,
the being and existence of which is nothing else
than unity and goodness. For neither is the es-
sence of partial intellects anything else than intellec-
tion, nor of souls anything else than vitality. For
if to all the preceding natures there is a continuetl
progression from their principle, through simili-
tude, — if this be the case, the progressions from
the first unity must be primary unities, and from
the one [firstj good a multitude of natures charac-
terised by good. How, therefore, can evil, and the
nature of evil, be inherent in things essentially
good ? For it is not lawful that it should ; since
good is measure and light; but evil is darkness
and incommensurability. And the latter, indeed,
is without location, and is debile; but the former
is the cause of all location, and of all power. The
former likewise is preservative of all things ; but the
latter leads everything with which it is present to
destruction, according to the order which each
thing is assigned : for, as we have said, there is
not the same mode of termination in all things.
Whether, therefore, shall we say, it is false that the
Gods are good, or shall we admit that being good
they are changed ; which we assert to be the case
with partial souls, these being transmuted into
dilferent forms of life? In thus speaking, how-
ever, we shall assert of the existence of the Gods
what is both impious and absurd. For good is
not congenial with non-good ; and that which is
not good is not God. Nor is that which is trans-

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muted similar to the one, and to that which is bet-
ter than all energy. For what similitude is there
between that which subsists according to an eternal
essence, and that which is prior to eternity; or
between that which is established in an invariable
sameness of energy, and that which is more excel-
lent than the peculiarity of even the highest energy?
Hence, there is no evil in the Gods, neither simply,
nor according to time. For, in short, the eternal and
time are posterior to the Gods'; since both these
are essences, and subsist about essence. But the
Gods are prior to essence and being. Fgr beings
derive their subsistence from them, they having an
hyparxis prior to being. And here, indeed, every
one is good ; but truly^existing being is suspended
from the good [which is the characteristic of the
Gods].

Again, therefore, aller the Gods, if you are
willing, let us direct our attention to the order of
angels, and consider, whether we must assert this
to be perfectly good, or that evil subsists in this
order primarily. If, however, evil, of whatever kind
it may be, is in them, how can we any longer call
them the messengers of the Gods ? For alt evil,
indeed, is far distant and foreign from the Goils,
and is like darkness with respect to the light which
is with them. It also is not only ignorant that it is
itself evil, but it is ignorant of everything else, and
especially of whatever is good. For it flies from

...vGoogIc

and (le&troj's itsell^ not being able to know either
itself or the nature of good. But the genus which
is the interpreter of the Gods, is continuous with
the Gods, knows their intellect, and elucidates the
divine will. This angelic genus, also, is itself a di-
vine light, proceeding from that effulgence which
is concealed in the ad^ta of deity, becoming exter-
nally manifest, and being nothing else than good
primarily shining forth from the beings which eter-
nally abide in the unfathomable depths of the one.
For it is requisite that the progression of wholes
should be continued; and, on account of similitude,
one thing is naturally consequent to another. To
the fountain, therefore, of all good, many natures
characterized by good are consequent, and an oc-
cult number of unities abiding in the ine&ble foun-
tain of deity. But the first number of preceding
and proceeding natures continuous with the divine
unities is that of the angelic order, which is situated,
asit were, in the vestibules of the Gods, and unfolds
their tiuly mystic silence. How, therefore, can
evil exist in those beings whose essence consists in
the eluci<)ation of good? For where there is evil,
good is absent ; so far is it from being elucidated ;
but it is rather concealed by the presence of a
contrary nature. That, however, possesses a tran-
scendency of union which is enunciative of the one ;
and this is also the cose with whatever in a second
order is enunciative prior to that energy which is
in other things. Hence, the angelic tribe is in a
transcendent degree assimilated to the Gods, from

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97

which it is suspended, so that it is able, by a most
manifest similitude, to unfold its peculiarity to pos-
teiior natures.

If, also, you arc not willing to survey the bene-
ficent order of angels in this way only, but accord-
ing to another mode, consider that in all the genera,
and all the numbers of beings, of whatever kind
they may be, that which is allotted a first and
principal order possesses good genuinely, and un-
mingled with evil. For it is requisite that tohat is
_first in every series of things should bear the image
of the first cause ,- since everywhere primary natures
are analogous to this cause, and tie salvation of all
things is through the participation of it. For whether
you divide all beings into intellectuals and sensi-
bles; or, again, the sensible nature into heaven and
generation ; or, in like manner, the intellectual es-
sence into soul and intellect, — you will everywhere
find, that what ranks as first and most divine is
unreceptive of evil. It is requisite, therefore, that
not only in thes^ hut also in the triple empire of
the better genera, [viz. of angels, dsmons, and he-
roes,] there should be the immaculate^ the intellec-
tual, and the unmingled with evil. And this is
likewise the case with everything that has a first
order essentialized in good, because the progres-
sion of it takes place on account of goodness; just,
again, 'as the pn^ression of dsemons is according
to power, and to that which Is generative* in the

* la Morbeka, " gaiimuin Dmntm ;" butfurgentniun il» ne-
ceuai? to read gnufntun.

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Gods; and hence, also, they rank as media in the
three genera. For power pertains to the middle*,
just As intellect, and a circular conversion to the
principle, pertain to the third progression, which
is that of heroes ; but goodness energises in angels,
and defines their existence by its own unity. How
is it possible, therefore, for any one to admit that
evil can enter into such natures as these ? Hence,
that alone which is boniform will obtain the order
of angels, but will never partake of any evil For
angels are the elucidators of the Gods, are the
suramit of the better genera, and their Very being
is characterized by good.

Does evil, therefore, subsbt primarily in de-
mons? For they exist in an order consequent
to that of the angelic choir. There are, there-
fore, (tome who speak of the passions of daemons,
and these, indeed^ such as are according to n^
ture, when they tragically narrate their different
deaths and geoeraUons. But of other dtemons,
the passions are from choice alonc^ and these
tbey denominate wicked and evil dsnions, wlio
defile souls through iniquity, lead them to mat-
ter, and draw them down from their celestial jour-
ney to the subterranean place. The authors of
these asserUons, likewise, think that they have
Plato as the patron of this doctrine, who establishes
twofold exemplars in the universe ; the one divine,
luminous and boniform, bnt the other without

mpotmlii;" bat Tor "iMftUiS," It h

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99

God, dark and malefic. Of souls, also, according
to them, pome tend to the former, but others to the
latter, at which when they arrive, they suffer the
punishment of their crimes. As, again, of those
that are in Hades, some fly from the mouth of the
opening which is there; but others are dragged
along by Jiery and fierce phantasms, are torn on
thorns, and hurled into Tartarus'. What is as-
serted by these men, therefore, insinuates that every
such genus of daemons which is seductive, malig-
nant and destructive of souls, is susceptive of pri-
lAary evil, and that the nature of deemons is distin-
guished by good and evil. It is requisite, however,
to inquire of these, if we ask them nothing else, —
for the fathers of .these assertions are divine vien'',
— whether are the daemons which you call evil,
such to themselves; or are they not evil to them-
selves, but to others? For if, indeed, they are
evil to themselves, one of two things must follow;
either that they must remain in evil for ever, or
that they are susceptive of transmutation. And if^
indeed, they are always evil, how can that which
subsists from the Gods be perpetually evil ? For
it is better not to exist at all, than to exist always
essentially evil. But if they are changed so as to
pass into different forms, they do not rank among

■ See the lOlh book of tbe Republic of Plato, neir the eai,
from Hfaich what it bcre uid bj Proclus ia derived. Its verdon
of Moibeka in this part is eitremel^ barbarous aad inaccurate.

•■ Among thew is Porphyry. See the 2nd book of my transta-
tion of bis treatise oa Abedneace from Aoimal Food.
H 2

U,.vz-:-,;G00gk

those that are essentially (Iceinons, but among those
who are such only through habitude * [i. e. through
proximity and alliance]. The like must be said of
that which is better and worse, and has another
form of life. All essential demons, hoHever, re*
main so perpetually, and continue in the order
which they are severally allotted. But if they are
good to tliemselves, and evil to others, in conse-
quence of leading them to a worse condition of

* After amtial heroo, aa order of Kiuls follam, who pnni.
matelf goTern (he affmirs of men, ■ad arc dicmonucal ■«■ rx'""'
eccordiiig In haUlude or alliance, but not esaenliillf. Of this kind
are ihe Nympha, llial ajnipathise with waten, Puu, with ihe fe«t
of goals, and the like : and the; diSer from tfaoae powen that are
euentialljof a damoniacal characteristic, inthia, that they assuma
• Tanet; of ahapei (each of the othen immutabl; preserving cne
form), ara gullet to various passiuna, and are the cauiea of mani-
fold deception to mankiad. Froclus, in his Scholia od the Cialj.
luaof Plato observes, 'Ori un mu Vmtti rfmyttni-ui *mi AAtHuiiai
^*j:«i rxo/utri r->u>jii xff"""' "• '(««« *»■{ ""» "tf^-n

i. f. " There are Pans with the feet of goats, and Minerval souls
aatuming a variet; of shapes, and proximately governing nunkind,
such Bi was the Uinerva that appeared to Ulyssei and Telemactius."
Frodiu also, in Plat. Folit. p. 359, remarks concerning das.
mona nmrm r^trn, as follows ; n^trtuttt )t rm nXavttut tj rut VIA
T<i( aXa/uw, in irarni a'j'll&f, Ik fuin »• iun, nXXa xai T« Imitmn,
J(i XaCui am rai-mf ni rftrtntiMt Jt' " M alit/^t iai/ww, varrti, «
n jHfw rxTif, i "mi luraStXmi iri/uHi wMrriiu, xu amtrf rnmm

aXn/iimiHt •rm. a>^H !■ » aliarn hh aWxai aai ■^it^iw. lii ami
iDXmTarr iVKunr aXnrfipTftn ra? r« itu/UHrr mu iwty tiXi^ in a^iv-
3jf Hb a^iartT ym^ rat ^uiltirf aXXa V9 ^p it mfvut MXn0iyut

rH i ifrtfurtu, 6 rat xp*f/"^^1 vwitni/ttut, a rmt jvAannr va'aatM^
j) wu i« vavn^tarjv rjH rv^^w^rtf, niii aava 'j^tAV trrir imifurtir,
u h riHi iwt I m fH wr ammrHW rm nriii tm/iimf, Ii' lamvi ara-

C,q,t,=cdbvG00glC

being, ttiia is just as if some one slioulil call certain
preceptors and pedagogues wicked, who, from rank-
ing as castigators of faults, do not permit thosti
frhom they superintend to pursue a better order
in an unappropriate manner. Or as if some one
should denominate those evil, who, standing [as
guardians] before sacred places, prevent the im-
pure vulgar from entering within the curtains, be-
cause they prohibit them from a participation of

Plilo however adds, in what he says about truth, that not only di-
vinity, but likewise s dsnioniacal nature. !■ entiielj iritfaout false-
hood, it ii neceBsary to assume bom tbU addition, tliat what uuljr
possesses the tiHlure of a dmnon, and not a dtenioD according to
habitude, is perfectly free from falsehood. For a dsmon accord-
ing to habitude suataias aJi-Taiioufl murations, and deceives ^ose
with whom he is friendly. But every esseulial dsmon, and who
IS at the same time rational, is perfectly veracious ; and if he ia
irtationsl, be ia unrrceptive bolh of truth and falsehood. Hence,
I'laio does not say, that every dwnaatscsl and divine nature ia ve-
radoui, but that every such nature is ailhout falielao± For all
these are unreceptive of falsehood ; hut this is the case with the
rational kind, as baing aaturally adapted to be alone veracious ; and
with the imtional, as not being conversant with either truth or
falsehood. Hence, whatever deceitful kind of damons is men-
tioned in history, either as secretly assuming the office of delivering
oracles, or becoming obedient to invocations, or being casually pre-
sent with certain persons,— every such kind pertains to those who
are dKoaoDS according to habitude, proximity and alliance. But
if certain persons are deceived by those who are truly [or essenti-
ally] demons, they are deceived through themselves, and not
through them, as we before observed respecting Ibe Gods." To
such damans as these may be applied what laQiblichus says, De
Myst sect, 4. cap. 7., vii. " jin mil dtenum reguiret that hit mir-
iliiper ihoiM be juti, becatim atcK a damaa atntmei the a/^xarance
of one befangiKg ta the dimu genus ; but he ii suttervienl ta what U
ui^ua, btcavie he is diprnved."

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lOS

the internal rites. It is not evil, therefore, for
those to remain external to these sacred places,
who are not worthy to enter into them; but it is
evil to be of such an order, and to deserve such
prohibitions'. Hence, if of the mundane demons,
some lead souls on high, but others keep the souls
that are not yet able to ascend, in their own man-
ners, we cannot justly say that either of these are
evil, — either those by whom souls are separated (rcrni
hence, or those by whom they are detained. For
it is requisite there should be dromons, who keep in
custody about the terrestrial region souls that are

' Wliat tbe Fieudo Dionjniu ujt ia ifaat part of bii treotke on
the Diriae Noma in which he tbow* that there i« no >U£h thidg
M evil iuelT, is vhollr derived from this treatise of Proclus, as will
be erideot b; compariDg the oite with ihe other. I give the follow-
ing eitract fi'om that work, u an obTious ptoof that what is said
b; Pnclu* in this place, was taken fVom (hence b; Dioajaiiut
Otw mfm tvit it myytXmt tm rt xMJttu sXXfl i»Adt(ur mn MftMfnagrrmr

MM3UI, Mmt ran li^r «j rtr ^CqXn THv ttuH /MBrritft*ir MwUfytmt- Mat~
Tu tiHt T« xtXm^uftii tmxft kT^Xm rt k^mt yau4mi MsXuruti^ nit rt
Tutr' m^t mwu^yiritu tki ji^ir my.XM n aroy*, iLm mni^ ytnrfsu xMi
rut mxt"r^ mrtrmitin. i,e. "Hence, neither ia evil in angels;
unless it should be >ud that they are evil because Ifae; punith of-
fenders. But if this be admiUed, the caMlgators of all thou who
act erroneously will be evil; and consequently, (his will be the
case with thoie who eiclude the profane from tbe inspection of di-
vine mysteries. It is not, however, evil to punish (bose that deserve
to be punished, but it it evil to deserve punishment. ' Nor is it evil
to be deservedly eicluded from sacred mysteries, but to become d^
filed and piolkne, and unsdapted to (be paitidpation of what ia
pure." Hie learned reader will find, on perusing the whole of
what is said by this Dionysius concerning evil, in the above-men-
lianed treatise, (bat Ibe greater part of it is derived from tbe pie.
sent work of PiocIub.

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103

defiled with vice, and unnorLhy of a progression to
the heavflBs. Neither^ therefore, does it appear
that evil, even in tliese deemons, can rationally be
found ; for they severally effect that which is con-
formable to their nature and always af^r the same
manner. Bat this is not evil.

Again, with respect to the genus of heroes* does
not, in thefirst place, the -^ry tteing of tliese con-
sist in an essential' conversion to that which is more
excellent? And, in the second place, heroes are
always the causes toother things of a conversion
to better natares. ■ This providential employment,
therefore, ' was assigned them by the father of the
universe; and if their energy is invariably the same,
it is not evil.' For everything evil is naturally un-
stable and without locaU^; but the contrai-y is
true of that which is always a whole. For perpe-
tuity is power ; but a subsistence in capacity per-
tains to those things to which evil pertains'. In
short, to be changed in the form of lifej in any
way, causes those who suffer this change to be
heroes according tO habitude, and not yet to be
such as essential heroes. For every angel, dsmon
and hero, who is such ess«itially, is naturally
adapted always to preserve its own order, and
does not subsist in one way at one time, and in
a different way at another, but ener^ses always
according to the nature which it has received.
Further still, if anger, violent efforts, and every-
thing of this kind which is called evil, are em-
ployed by them through a. perversion of what is

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according to nature — in this case, evil in them b
a disorderly use of their power, and is everywhere
a departure from a perfection adapted to their es-
sence ; for evil is impotent and imperfect, and is of
a nature too debile to effect the salvation of any-
thing. But if each in thus acting preserves itself
and its own nature, and the condition which it is
perpetually allotted in the universe, how can it any
longer be preternatural in them thus to act ? For if
it is according to nature, to them it will not be evil,
if the evil to everything is that which is preterna-
tural to it For you would not say, that fury is an
evil to lions or leopards; but it is an evil to men, to
whom what is most excellent is reason. To ovher
beings, however, whose essence is according to
intellect, it is not good to energise according to
reason*. For it is requbite that evil, as we have
frequently said, should not be that which is ac-
cording to nature, and which in everything is the
better part, — for a thing of this kind b good,— but
that it should be the concomitant of a deteriorated
nature. Hence a precipitate phantasy, fury, anger
and pertinacity, are not unnatural to those beings
to whom such things, and not reason, are essential.
What, therefore, b evil to themfrom these things?
But the above-mentioned particulars are impedi-
menls to souls, and a bond ; for to those, a ten-
dency downward is a deviation from rectitude.
For these powers do not lead to the place adapted

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to themselveS] those souls which have not yet fellen
into vice, because this would not be possible. But,
in conformity to the laws of the universe, they
punish souls that tend to a subordinate nature,
and that require chastisement [as preparatory to
their purification]. And these powers, indeed, in
so doing act according to nature ; but the uni-
verse* uses them as instruments Tor the sanation of
souls. For it also uses brutes for the devoration
of men, and inanimate substances for some other
natural purpose. And a stone, indeed, in falling
naturally strikes that with which it meets ; for these
actions are the percussions of bodies ; and the uni<
verse opportunely uses the nature of these in order
to give completion to the necessity of that which
ought to suffer. Neither, therefore, is percussion
«vil to bodies; nor, in short, is there any evil in
tlie operations of things which act conformably to
their own nature. But everything acts according
to nature, which has no energy better than its na-
tural energy. Hence, it is not possible to assign
any more excellent energy of these heroical powers
than what has been before mentioned. For this is
their order; and this species of energy was assigned
to them by the fabricator of the universe, for the
sake of guarding the perfections of things. Hence;
whatever is transacted in the boundaries of these

* I/toihelut'sjenioa ottiAifaitii, "utUuraulemipMiiulorgana
ad umationem amnem." But for ■' omnera" it h necessary to read,
conTcHiDabtjr to Uie oboie tnuieUtJciii, omne, i. e. n ■■■>, tAe unt-

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powers, contrary to their life, becomes in destined
periods of time subject to their guardian care. But
the period of the lime of punishment corresponds
to the power of the patients; and the purgation
being perfect, the mouth of the opening ' ceaSes to
bellow, and all the other impediments to ascending
souls are wididrawn. While the punishmeait, how-
ever, is as yet imperfect, some souls, on account of
an ignorance of themselves, desire a progression
upwards, and the universe leads these to what is
appropriate to ^eir condition. The guardians of
such, likewise, being subservient to the will of the
universe, convert some to one, and others to a dif-
ferent kind of punishment; and employing coercion
to these for a longer, but to those for a shorter time,
they at length dismiss them conformably to the ar-
rangements of the universe and its laws. We mu^t
say, therefore, with respect to the Gods, and the
genera superior to our species, that their conduct
towards us is throngh commiserating our condi-
tion, and that there neither is any evil in them,
nor ever will be. For they energise in all things
conformably to the order in which each of them is
arranged, and, abiding in their accustomed man-
ner, they preserve invariably that boundary which
they possess from the fabrication of things.

S. In the next place, let us direct our attention
to the natures consequent to the above, and inves-
Ugate whether evil is anywhere to be found in these.

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107

If, however, it must be said, that evil has Qowhere
an existence, it follows that it is neither there, nor
in hnman souls. For all the above-mentioned ge^
nero are unreceptive of transmutation; I mean, of
a transmutation according to their order*. For
each of them is always adapted to preserve the order
which it received. But the natures consequent to
these [viz. human souls] possess a power of some-
times ascending, and sometimes tending to genera-
tion and a mortal nature. Of these, likewise, some
are better and more divine, and, in being connected
with a mortal nature, do not abandon divine know-
ledge; but others sustain all-various fractures and
distortions of their circles^, and are replete with
oblivion, habitude [to things subordinate], and
evil. Let us, therefore, in tlie first place, consider
the better kind of human souls. That these, then,
in consequence of lieing better, do not admit in
themselves any passion of human depravity, is in-
dicated by Socrates in the Republic, where he
accuses the poets of representing the ofispring of
the Gods [i. e. heroes] as equally avaricious with
[other] men, and replete with such evUs as we
perceive to be accidental to human nature'^. If,
however, as it is said, a very great part of their
period consists in contemplation, in an innoxious

* i. e. thej cannot be changed inio a dittercDl order.

^ tbM » asserted bj Plato in the Timcus. See m; tnuuUtioD
of ibe 5th book of Frocliu on tbat Dialogue.

" Seetbe IntroductioD to theSad and 3rd booksoftbc Republic,
in vol. L of mf tninBlation of Plato, in which the reader will nnd
an apology Ibr what it here s«d, from Proclus.

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lOS

li^ and in a secure providence of wholes in Con*
junctiun with the Gods; and if, when they descend
into generation, their descent is for the benefit of
terrestrial souls, — some, indeed, for the purpose of
procuring a good o£&pring, others for the sake
of purity*, but others for the purpose of tran»-
tnitling the illuminations of a divine intellect, — and
i^ also, they accomplish this in conjunction with
the Gods, with renown, tc^ether with the inspira-
tion of good dsmons, and the consent of the uni-
verse, — what evil, in short, will there be in them,
unless you are willing to call generation itself [or
the whole of a visible nature] evil? For, as So-
crates says in the [loth hook of the] Republic, it is
necessary that every soul should drink" a certain
measure of the cup of oblivion. With respect to
oblivion, however, it is different in different souls ;
in some, indeed, the habit of recollecdon being
lost; but in others, remembrance in energy being
alone buried [for a time, but not destroyed}. This
rest of energy therefore, — habit remaining within,
like a concealed light, incapable of proceeding ex-
ternally on account of the adjacent darkness, — you
may call oblivion, or, if you are willing, the evil of
these souls. These souls, likewise, are unpassive

' Id Uorbeka, "prapariiate"; but the true reading i>, I hare
no doubt, confoiiDabl; to the above troiulalioD, pro purilale.

*> Moibeka's vemOD of this poit ii, " Meruumtn ftdn quaJtdam
poctdi oMiBumii luceuariutii omnetit animam /acert" ; but fbr "j!i-
eeri" it ii requisite toretdbAert. Morbeka appears In bsie had in
his MS. iTHiii instead of nui, whicb is t2ie true Tending. The words
or Flalo are : Hit>» /iir tut ri rti/ Hnrtt nm e»}-iuiii una waiti

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109

to the perturbations which subsist about the soul
in generation, and on this account we are accuse
tomed to call them immaculate*; because the evils
which are here cannot enter into them, though
they are incapable of preserving in this terrene
abode that invariable and immutable life which
they led in the intellectual realms; but they per-
mit that which is adapted to disturb them, and is
unstable, to remain in the natures which are sus-
pended from their essence. These impassive souls,
too, are internally silent, as long as they are situated
in tranquillity ; but when they are excited to vehe-
ment energy, then their heauty shines forth, so as
to evince that they are truly the offspring of the
Gods. Henc^ whether in terrene animals, or in
other parts of the universe, there are generations of
souls, this is the mode of descent to all of them,
and as iar as to this, oblivion and evil are the r^
suit. For we say, that light is darkened, because
the extraneous nature of that which surrounds it
being gross and nebulous, it cannot illuminate that
which is near to it. But that is perfectly involved
in darkness, which cannot even be tlie saviour of
itself. The descent^ therefore, of these divine souls,
not destroying their internal life, gives to them a
debility of energy.

* See >n admicBble account of these undefiled raulg in the Scholia
of Froelus on the Cntjius, in Ihe notea st the end of the 5lh volume
of my Flalo; where the reader will Gad a muulalion of nearly
the whole of thne moet eicellent Scholia, which are nothing more
than eitracU trom a complete Commentary on that Dialogue of
Plain, b; KHne one of the diiciplen of Proclui, n will be erident
to the intelligent reader &om tlie peruul of them.

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110

With respect, however, to the souls that are
posterior to these, and which destroy their internal
life, and TaU into an oblivion of the contemplations
arising from the energies of it, — in souls of this
kind there is death, an insatiable tendency to mor-
tal concerns, adefltuiion of their viings*, anA what-
ever else of such souls, we are accustomed fre-
quently to assert. For what other medium is it
re(]uisite to assign between that which is unsusce{>>
tibie of evil, and that which is entirely malignant,
tlian a slender, and, as I may say, apparent evil?
These things, therefore, must be asserted of such
souls. The habit, too, of these latter tribes^ of
souls is truly all-various, and is transmuted by
all-various impulses and elections. Their internal
powers, likewise, suffer defalcation, and their enei^
gies are attended with great labour. Being also
lame and debile, they suffer all the evils in which
souls are said to he involved through falling from
that place, the inhabitants of which are free from
sorrow, and lead a blessed life. For every soul
when on high is conversant with sublime concerns',
governs the whole world, and ascends, together
^ith the presiding Gods, to the contemplation of
the felicitous and most perfect energy of truly ex-

* See ihe Fhadrus of Plato, where it is nid that such aouls
lufTet this defluiion.

."* In Morbeka, " fioiilsm outem tu f Mfl^ id etf tr#iu omnimo'
ivm enttr atetBamun," &c,; but for " fiiXtt, id 4tt tr^mt," it is
mcenat; to read fii>Mi, id en tribUmi.

' In Morbeka ^nai;<initi; iasteadof wbich it it requisite to retd
/oniiftrAu. For Proclus here, and in wbal inmndialely' follows,
•Ifaldes to what iasaid iu the Plueilnis, where tMi word is used by
FUto. See Flat. Pbadr. p. S3. Edit Alt.

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in

isting being, and surveying all the forms that it
contains, is filled with the nectar which is there.
For, as some one says, contemplation, prudence,
and an intellectual life, are not the primary good
of the beings that energise according to these; but
the energy according to a divine intellect is that
which is primarily good, comprehending intelli-
gibles in the intellectual perception of itself, but
encompassing sensibles by those powers which be-
long to the circle of difference*, and exhibiting to
these also a certain portion of the most exalted
good. For that which is perfectly good, not only
possesses plenitude in the salvation of itself, but
likewise in what it imparts to other things, and
througfi the unenm/ing abundance of its energy, de-
sires to benefit all things, and causes them to be
similar to itself. But when the soul, according to
both species of life", is incapable of imitating its
presiding Gods, it then indeed becomes deprived
of the contemplaUon of truly-existing being, and is
attracted by other secondary powers, which revolve
about the world. This, then, is to souls the prin-
ciple of generation, and of a periodic revolution, and
is the cause to them of impotency, and of a privation
of the contemplative energy; and this is their evil.
For there that which is sufficient to itself primarily
exists, where there is that which is primarily good ;

* L ff. to opiaion ; for opioion in called by FUto in&e TluneiH,
thi cfrci» vf d^erenee ; just ai iamin, or Ihe discursiTe energj of
reason, ii there called b; him the circU of tammta. Moriiekft's
versiati of ihb part is, " JtiMent ottfcn itTit&Sia tit qua tMeriut'

■ Aecordiog to the theoretic and pisctic IHb.

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112

and there power is transcendent, where that which
is sufficient to itself subsists. This, therefore, is the '
debility of the soul, that, tailing of the perfection
pertaining to the first life, it tends downwards ; but
it there again acquires a power of ascending to the
region from which it fell, before it siuks intpthe
profundity of a material life. For there is not the
same mode of debility to all things. For neither
are all bodies placed in the same degree of dete-
cioration through their distance from the power*
by which they are measured and preserved. But
if, as Plato says'*, the soul through an unfortunate
occurrence, by which it becomes connected with
generation and mortality, is filled with oblivion,
and, becoming heavy, falls to the earth, then the
universe", indeed, leads it to an appropriate order i
but it varies the form of its life, till, as it is sud in
the Timseus, following the revolution of that same
and similar nature contained in its essence, it
vanquishes those abundantly turbulent passions,
tumultuous and irrational, which afterwards exter-
nally'^ adhere to it, and is led back to being itself
and the most splendid of being.

' i.e. through their distance from the phyucol power b; which
their part* are held together.

* Plato Mys thia in the Fhsdnu.

' In Morbeki, " Jhtcit qtaden ipam ad amBtrdaOtm eributu
omaem." But fbr omnem, it is, I conceive, obviousl; necenar; to

^ In all the printed editiom of the HmMui, the nord i£Wi^ a-
temid^, a wanting in this place. For it is evident from the Com-
mentary of Proclug on that Dialogue, that it ought to be inserted.
Hence, in m «vXt« 'x'^ "^ imftt r^MfnTs, ».r.k., immediately
after ix^fl it is requisite to add i|a>/>h

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The soul, therefore, descending from thence, ar-
rives at the circumambient etber*, and sm'veys the
souls that are there. It likewise proceeds under
the throne'' of Necessity to the plun of Ohlivion,
no longer contemplating such objects ias it did,
when it possessed a primordial nature. For the
objects of contemplation to souls when on high,
were the plain of Truth, and the divine forms which
it contains. The nutriment, however, as Plato says,
which is adapted to the soul in its best condition of
subsistence, is derived from the meadow which is
there'; but the nutriment which is here, is pro-
cured through opinion. Hence, also, this terrene
abode is near to the river of Oblivion, and the dire
•morld^, through which the soul is filled with folly
and darkness, and is surrounded with all the evils
to which the mortal nature is subject. For the
fractures and distortions of circles [mentioned in

■ By ItectrcumamMmtefAer, I suppose PnKJuBalludestowtut,
ia wid by FI>tO near the end of the 10th book of his Repubiic,
Til. ■■ that soul« descending pure from heaven, lesled (hemMlies In
the meadow, u in a public auemblf," &c.

* In Moibeka, " omiet aultm el mb ntceutlala lermimtm, el ab.
Bubmu campum." But for ttrmmum, it is necessary to read
Ihnmunt : for Frocliu here alludes to the following paaaage in the
lOtJl book of PUto'i Republic: Emufii li )* ■^nnjim in nr
TS» Armyxni IIMH d^p#f- Mm ii IJBUMfr JitflA/fHW, ttriilq mm ti mXKv
in^Ht wsfiutttut turmmtt us n n\t Air/itf nl/rt.

' U e. ttaia the meadow in the auperoeleMial place. See the
Ftuednu of Plato, lUa meadow, therefore, ia very different from
Ifap drciimambient elho', mentioned in Note '.

* In Morbeka, "et mutujunt Aorum dirtim." But the dfr« uurM,
ia the /urtfmm lur/tti, or tigit-hatmg viorU, ntCDtioned in the Chal-
dean OrocUa.

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the TinuEus], and wbstever introduces deatli to
souls, the periods of a thousand years, the punish-
ments of the passions, and all that is tragically said
respecting the law which the universe ordains, are
the consequmces of the soul's lapse into this mortal
ahocle. And we shall not be able to fly from these
maladies, nor to rest from labours, till rising above
thiags foreign to our nature we separate from mor-
tal nugacity, our own good and the oonlemplation
of real being. We miist therefore strip ourselves
of the garments with which in descending we be-
came invested*, we must proceed naked from hence
thither, must entirely purify the eye of the. soul by
which we oontemplata truly-existing being, and
instead of a^ise must make intellect to he the prin-
cipal ruler of our internal life. Our communication
indeed, and life in conjunction with a nature sub-
ordinate to our own, exhibit to us the generation
of evil; and our oblivion and ignorance arise from
surveying (hat which is unintellectual and dark;
but our good consbts in a flight and similitude to
that which is divine. For there total good exists

* Fyodui here alludes U> the following beautiful passage in
Porpbjr. de AbMia., lib. i. p. 27. Ankmn mft rm nkXtvt

rf"X"' ""^ •*' itf/atriHir yufK Ii uh ax''""" '*' " "■■'"•
■HtCKW/Hi, in m mi •t''X1' OXiquino ayonr^uni. i. a. " Wa
mn<t iherafore diveM ouraelvte of otir nuiufidd garments, botli of
itiii vifibls and fleshl; TeMount, and of ttanse vitb which we are
intemallf clothedi and wtuch aie proiimata to our cuMneoui babi-
limeDts ; and we muat enter the stadium naked and unclothed,
MtiTiug for [the moM glorioui of all prizes] (he Olympia of (he

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and the fountain of all good, and there the purity
of [real] being, and a felicitous life are present with
perfect souls. And thus with respect to the soul
which b able to asc^d to a divine nature,' and also
to descend bidier, we have shown after what man-
ner evil subsists in it, together with debility, mis-
fortune, and everything else which we have before
ntentioned. -

' With re^ct, however, to those souls, whioh are'
not parts of [real] beings, but certain images and
parts of a worse soul, which the Athenian stranger
or guest csUs tnalefic. It is requisite to consider
whether they are Unreceptive of evil, or whether-
evil also exists in them, but after a different man-
ner. If, therefore, they are indeed worse than the'
souls of men, — I mean than the irOageofthe rational-
soul which is in us, — evil in them consists in not'
acting conformably to nature. For in the nature*
which are always chuiged according to a good and
a bAd condition^of being, the good and the evil
have not a uniforni subsistence ; since the good as
well as the evil varies. But if, like our souls, they
pertain to another soul which is' prior to them,
again it is necessary that the soul, which is capable'
of being better and worse, and which is also con-
nected with the image of the rationdl soul, must
sometimes tend to supernal beings, and somedmes'
to generation and the abode of matter ; and that in'
consequence of irraUonali^ being susp^ded from
reason, that which is worse ,ip, them must consist
in a discord with reaBonjiin' not receiving light

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from theiic«, aitd in the incommensurability of its
nature being deprived* of tbe measure which is
thence derived. For this is not the power of such
souls, but debility, and a defect of power. Hence,
to these souli, the ascent to that which is better
lakes place when some energy is resplendent in
them conformable to reason, which, like a present
dsemon, inspires them with an energy leading to
such a progression. But again, their tendency to
that which is worse is effected, when, on account of
the evil condition of tbe body, or unappropriate
aliment, the natural energy being vanquished, the
soul is filled with a depraved habit.

In the next place, let us consider nature, and
everything to which this imparts the whole of its
being and existence: Vbetber, therefore, is there
evil in this, or not ? And if there is, on account of
what cause does it subsist ? We neither assert,
therefore, nor conceive, that the nature of the uni-
verse, nor the nature Of any eternal body, departs
at eny time from its own habit. But we are of
opinion that abiding such as it is, it leads conform-
ably to nature the body with which it is connected :
for what else is the employment of nature, than to.
preserve and perpetually retain that in which it
subsists? And the same thing is effected by all
causes. This nature, also, when it exists in a part-
over which it entirely predominates, conducts it;
rightly and wisely ; but when as being partial it is.

* In Morbeba, " et >t immenniraium ipnta curanlt to gvoit
inie m«(r«"; but fi^r "curattte," it ia necestai; to read canntt. :

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n1

vanquished, then the whole of that which uses it
thus perverted, acts in a way contrary to its native
adaptation. For to nature, indeed, considered as
a whole, nothing is preternatural; because all nc^
tural productive powers are derived from it. But
to the nature which ranks as a part, one thing is
according to, and another contrary to nature.
Thus the form of 9 lion is preternatural to the
nature of man, because neither the productive
power of this, nor of any other species, is inherent
in man, but that of man alone. And thus in every
other class of beings, the productive powers of
diflerent speCies are different. Hence it pertains
to a partial nature to be vanquished, and to act
contrary to nature, but not to the nature which
Tanks as a whole, nor to anything which is eternal.
For matter, when it is the subject of beings that are
not eternal, is frequently vanquished by the bonds
proceeding from nature, and then it adorns and as
it were illuminates its own darkness and deformity,
and invests itself with a foreign ornament And
thus in the beings that rank as wholes, its turpitude
is concealed. Hence though it subsists from a
principle, it does not become known to every onSf
nor even to those who have elucidated many of the
secrets of nature. But the nature which exists in
a part is impotent through a defect of essential
power. For it is as it were a ray, impression and
reason [or form] of total nature, being divided
from thence, flowing downward into body, and in-

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"8

capable (^remaining unmiogled and pure, lluq,
ag^n, likewise arises from the power of tbe con-
traries by wbich it is on all sides surrounded* For
th^ tilings which are external to it are many* wd
fincign to the mortal nature.

Thus then, as we have said, tiii«. parUal nature
beconiing debile, and superinducing the baseness
of itself, defalcates iqdeed its own energy, and
causes by its own defonnity the light which pio^
ceeds from it to be darkened. For the turpitude
of nature, in consequence of reason [or form] not
b^ving dominion, is passion, and is iaordi(f&t«
through the impptence of order ; b^ Uien reason
is vanquished by that which is spbordioate to rea^^ou^
and becomes itself irrational. If, therefore, there
is also in the energy of a partial nature the unjna-
p^ed, we shall have all thin^ according tonatar^
^nd there will nowhere in th^se essences be eviL
But if in this, one thing is an end to it, and a path
according to nature, but ano[l\er thing is contrary
to this, and &". impediment to nature ; and if, iq-
deed, reason. is one, but the things which aredi^
ferent from it, are infinite, what else can we .say
than that this is the evil of nature? For to the
being to whom contemplation is good, the priva-
tion of it is evil. But to that to .whiph it is good
to effect something in another thin^ and to anergic
according to reason, it is evil for reason not to van-
quish, and for energy not to arrive at its destined
end, through being vanquished by an inferior na-

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119

Inre. And the avil of bodies coBaists Id the tbmb!
which b above them bang vanquished* bj that
which is worse thaD themselveg. For corpoi^e^
turpitude arises from reason [or form] being anb-
dued, and the disease of body, iirom its order being
(litstrfved; because beauty then exists when form
vanqiusbes matter, and falls like a [luminous] flower
on things deprived of form''. And with respect to
health, this is produced, when the order which ia
conformable to nature is stably preserved. These
things, therefore, as existing in nature, extend aa
far as to material bodies, and intfividual beings ;
but do not extend to beings which rank as wholes ;
nor must it. be admitted that they substst in iba
natures which are beyond the reach t^ matiOr, For
deformity, wherever it exists, is- irom matter, which
we 8xe accustomed to call deformity itself and die
last of things, as bemg without measure^ and with-r
out beauty, and as not possessing even the most
delMle porticM) of sploidour. But where is inordi-
nation and the prsetematural to be found in those
beings which always subsist according to nature,
and which, in consequence of this, possess on inva-
riable sameness of weU being ? Individual or par-

' For " iiamaUSt" bere, it ii aeceuar; to read vinciUfii.

* The whole of thia sentence is in Morbeka's veruon as folloira :
" £ffffuin turpitudo qu^ carpondia rif, ncfa ratione ; tt agriludo pr-
dine tolalP, jveniam tt pidchriliulo pumda niiuff, ipecin iWHf jlot
ipcdeiuj ngmineidiiu." But it ■pprare to me that for <■ fuamta
tAndt, tpeeiei," &c, we sbould read, confonnablr to the shore tnuu-
lalion, fufltidn malmom ruJto vindl, ^leeieietlulJlot^ckbuicaTm'

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ISO

ttcalar bodies, therefore, which in matter sustain
all-various mutations, sometimes, indeed, possess
order and good, but sometimes not, through con-
traries vanquishing their nature. Bui the bodies
which do not rank as particulars, and which as
wholes remain always the same, and complete the
measure of their nature, perpetually possess order,
vanquishing inordinatian. And of the l)odies which
are immaterial, some, indeed, are always numeri-
cally the same,'and always possess similar energies,
and are liberated from all mortal difficulty; but
others are in their nature and essence the same,
yet in their energies are led to the better and the
worse. And such are the organs of huroaa souls^
which have, indeed, the essential according to na-
ture, but possess a variation according to life. And
sometimes, indeed, they abide in their own beauty,
and in an energy and order according to nature ;
but at other times they are dispersed into aforeign
re^on, are brought into a condition contrary to
nature, and introduce into themselves the baseness
of matter. For each organ of the soul follows the
impulses of it, and in so doing sustains all-various
motions, and becomes assimilated to the appetiUons
of the soul. We have spoken, however, of a cor-
poreal nature, and have shown what the evil of it
is, and how in a different nature, there is a different
evil.

Let us, therefore, in the next place direct our
attention to matter, and consider whether it is evil
or not. For it is by no means possible that evil

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can happen to it, because of itself it is without
quality, and formless ; is a subject, but is not in a
subject; and is simple, but is not one thing in
another. But if in short, as some say, it is evil, it
is essentially evil. And hence, according to them,
maimer is primarily evil, and is that which is odious
to the Gods. For what else is evil than the want
of measure and bound, and whatever besides these,
is a privation of good ? For good is the measure,
the bound, the end, and the perfection of all tilings.
Evil, therefore, is incommensuration, — the infinite
itself, the imperfect, and the indeterminate; for all
these are primarily in matter, not being anything
else than it ; but they are matter itself, and the
very essence of it. Hence matter is primarily evil,
and is the natureof evil, and the last of all things*.
If also good is twofold, — one being the good itself
and nothing else than good ; but another good sub-
sists in saraething else, and is a certain good, and
not primarily so,^-evil likewise will be twofold, one
being evil itself, and primarily, and nothing else
than evil; but another evil subsisting in something
else, and being a certain evil, by a paiticipation o^
or assimilation to, evil itself. And as good itself
is the first, so evil itself is the last of things. For
it is not possible for anything to be belter than
good, or for anything to be worse than evil ; since
we say that all other things are better or worse on

* All that is here said about matter b«ng primarily «ii], and
evil itself, is said confonnably to the opinion of Flotinus. S«
my translation of his treatiu On Ecil.

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122

account (^ these. But matter b the last of ihingo.
For everything dse is naturally adapted either to
act or sufier. But good itself and evil itself are
not adapted to either of these, being deprived c^
the power of both '. Hence matter is evil itself
and that which is primarily evil.

I^ however, that which is preternatural in bodies
arises, as we have said, irom the predominiuice of
matter, — and in souls evil and debility are produced
by their lapse into, and inebriation from matteri
becoming assimilated to it, through the indefinites
ness which subsists about it,— why, dismissing this,
should we investigate any other cause, principle
and fountain of these evils? But if matter is evil)
we must either make good to be the cause of evil,
or we must admit that there are two principles of
beings. For evei^thing, of whatever kind the na-
ture of it may be, is cither the principle of wholes,
or from the principle. Matter, however, since it
is from the principle, has also its progression into
being from good. But if there are two principles
of beings, we must admit that there are two prin-
ciples opposing each other, viz. that which b pri-
marily good, and that which is primarily evil. This, '
however, is impossible ; for there cannot be two
firsts. For whence, in short, can there be two
principles without a monad [from which theypro-

' Good ittelf is depriTcd of the power of acting or suffering
IbTougli tBameeodeticj at nature, sb being superior to both ; but
evil itself is deprived of tbis power, ihrough tbe most eitreme de-
bilit)' oF nature.

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c«ed} ? I^ indeed, each of these is a unity, it is
necessary that priOT to both, there should be Me
orut and one principle, through which each of these
is one*. Nor can evil be produced from good.
For as the cause of all that is good, ia good in a
greater degree than the things of which it is the
cause ; so likewise that which is generative of evil,
is evil in a greater degree than the things which it
produces. And on this hypothesis, how will good
possess its own nature, if it is the cause of the prin-
ciple of evil ? But if that which is generated, loves
to be assimilated to its generator, evil itself also
will be good, in consequence of possessing the form
of gpod, throi^h participating of its cause. Hence
good, indeed, will he evil, as the cause of evil ; but
evil will be good, as being produced by good.

If> however, matter is necessary to the universe,
and the world would not be in every respect a great
and blessed God** without matter, bow can the
nature of evil be any longer referred to matter?
For evil is one thing, and that which is necessary
another. And matter, indeed, is that without which
it is impossible for the universe to exist ; but evil is
the privation of existence. If, therefore, matter
exhibits the aptitude of itself as subservient to the
fabrication of the whole world, and was from the
first produced as the receptacle, and, as it were,
. * llib WDleDca in Morbeks U, " £1 eni'm vtnanqut duarum
unumj oporiet avie ambo ene rt vnunt guo hoc ambo unum, et
urwni pindphtm." But for hoc ambo, it is requidte to read, con-
rormably to (he atHivc translation, kirrum ulergue,

' Tbc woild ii thus denominalcd by Flato in the Timsiu.

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nurse and mother of generation, [as Plato says iil
the Timseus,] how can it any longer be said (o be
evil, and to be that which is primariljp evil ? For
we manifoldly speak of incommensurability, the in-
finite, and everything of this kind ; since we say
that it opposes measure, b the absence and ablation
of it, and is the subject of it, and, as it were, b in-
digent of measure and bound. But matter is not
adapted to oppose, nor, in short, to produce any-
thing, since neither is it naturally adapted to suffer,
on account of its deficiency of passive power. It
is not, however, an ablation of measure and bound.
For it is not the same with privation, because pri-^
vation does not exist when measure and bound are
present; but matter botli exists, and receives Uie
representation of these. Hence the infinite of the
nature of matter, and its privation of measure, are
indigent of measure and bound. But being indi-
gent of these, how can it be contrary to them?
And how can it be still evil, if it is indigent of
good? For evil, and in short every habit contrary
to good, flies from the nature of good. But if, as
Plato says [in the Timffius], matter Is the nurse'of
generation, which it also desires and conceives, — in
this case, matter being a mother, she will not be
the cause of any evil to the natures which proceed
from her, or rather, which are generated in her.
But if debility and misfortune happen to souls, it
is not on account of matter, because they were
subject to these prior to bodies and matter. And
these in a certain respect preexisted in souls, as

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the rauses of evils, antecedent to matter. Or
whence of the souls that follow Jupiter [to the
vision of the supercelestial place] is the head of the
charioteer in some of them, incapable of raising
itself to this place, and of beholding, through dim-
ness of sight, the blessed spectacles which that place
contains?* How, likewise, does it happen that
there is an oblivion of truly-existing being in these
souls, an unfortunate occurrence'', and a tendency
downward, before they are connected with mat-
ter? For the horse which participates of depra-
vity, becomes heavy and verges to the earth. For
when the soul has fallen to the earth, she then is
connected with matter, and is involved in the dark-
ness of the terrestrial realms. But prior to her
lapse, she experienced debility, oblivion and evil.
For we should not have departed [Irom the vision:
of perfect realities] unless we had been debilitated,
because, though we are distant from true being,
we still aspire afler the contemplation of it.

If, therefore, tlie soul becomes debile prior to
her drinking of the cup [of oblivion], but proceeds

* See m; translslioD of the Fbiednis of FIsto, from which dia-
logue Hhpt ii bere said by Froclus is derived.
' * Wlut is here said likewise is from the FfatedruB; but form.
. nxf in Mortwk*, it is Decesisrjr to read tiimixm, Ihe word used
by Plato. This mirvj^ia, or un/artvnale occurrence, ia the meeting
with certain malefic dtemons. For so Hermeas in his Scholia an
the Phndrus explains IL— Vid. Ast. Phiedr. p. 149. The word
^fJii also employed by Plato ia tbis part, is erraneousl j translated
by Motbelu exarbital. BfJv yof • nn vani I'n-w fanxi^, iti l^i*
firm n hi ^«;Mih So Plato in the Phadrus.— Vid. Ait. Edit.
p. E3.

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into matter, after her flight from the intelligible
world, debility and, in short, evil do not accede to
souU on account of matter. For what can matter -
effect in other things, since it hag no e&cdie
power? Or how, again, can that which is void of
quality, so fitr as it is void of quality, be able to
act? Moreover, either' matter draws souls to it-
self, or souls are by themselves drawn and become
separate from themselves, and impotent Hence*
if they were indeed drawn from themselves, their
impulse towards and appetiti<m of that which is
subordinate, became evil to them ; butof this, mat-
ter was not the cause. For all Sight from a more
excellent condition of being is evil, and mu^ more
descent to that which is worse. And souls choosing
badly through debility, suffer what such souls oi^ht
to su^r. But if tbey are drawn to this by nutter,
where is the self-motive nature and electitms of the
soul, if we ascpbe the cause of its descent into the
realms of generation to the attractions of matter,
OS to a certain compulsive power ? Or after what
manner, with respect to those souls which subsist
in matter, do these loolc to intellect and the good,
but those to generation and matter, if matter draws
all of them to herself, and molests, and o&rs vio-
lence to souls while they are still in (he intelligible
world? Reason, indeed, will say this, and will

* For " autm" here in Morbeki'i renion, it U nccwury to
T*ftd aul. Tbe puDCtuBtunt also of tbia uid Uie following leiiteacs
ii enoneous, u the leuned reader will from the aiioie tnoilalioa
eatiij perceiTe,

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compel us to confess, not merely that matter is not
evil, but that it is good, f^ving a testimony con-
. trary to the assertion that matter is evil itself*.

It may seem, however, that Plato is drawn to
both opinions. For in the Timseus,' indeed, when
he calls matter the mother and nurse of generation,
and a concause of the fabrication of the world, it is
manifest to every one that he admits matter to be
good. He likewise denominates the whole world
a blessed Qod, and considers matter to be' a por-
tion of the worldi But in the discourses of the
Klean stranger or guest, [in the Pblidcus,} he re-
fers the cause of the inordinadon of the universe
to its subject nature. He likewise says, that the
world, through its producing cause, possesses every
good, but through a foriiner habi^ the contraries
of these are ingenerated in it. In the Philebus,
however, producing matter itself, and every nature
of the infinite from t&e one, and in short assigning
a divine cause of the difference between bound and
)n6mty, and asserting that good, and the genera^
tion which is from deity, are effected by the parti-'
eipation of dei^, be grants, that evil has nowhere
ft divine origin, but that it is requisite to invesUgate
other causes of it, as it is elsewhere smd, Perhaps,
therefore, inordination and evil arenot on account
of matter, but on account of that which is moved

• Thu KDtence in- Morbeka iB, " Hoc juidem el ista ratio diixt
M e^et mm quod mm mahim, led rt bonma materiam o$leruU cnn-
(mrii) mi modo ttmiKitaru," But for (emjwMBns, it sppeara to mo
to be requiule agreeably lo the aboTS translaUon to read atleitant.

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in n confused and disorderly manner, Fgr this is
a corporeal nature, which, as the Elean guest says,
is the cause of inordinaUon to the last parts of the
universe. For motion subsists about a corporeal
nature, matter being of itself immoveable. Nor is
the body which is void of quality the first compo>
site. For the first composite body, as Timseus
says, is visible ; but that which is without quality is
not visible. The first composite, however, witli a
representation of all forms in itself, — and thes^ as
it were, in a confused state, — in being moved, pro-
duces that which is inordinate. For the vestiges of
diflerent forms, leading to difierent local motions,
manifest the whole motion to be fluctuating and
turbulent. This, therefore, is the former habit of
the world. For body of itsell> not being able to
retain forms, shows itself to be in its own nature
unadorned, and destitute of beau^. And in wholes,
indeed, reason ' [i . e. form] has dominion ; but in
things which have the relation of parts, reason, on
account of its debility, being vanquished by a na-
ture contrary to itself, is led to evil, and becomes
as it were irrational, in consequence of being sub-
dued by its inferior.

After what manner, therefore, that which is prse-
ternatural enters into bodies, will be shortly after
manifest. That evil, however, is not from matter,
Dor from bodies, is evident from what has been

* Id Morbeko, there is nothing more in this place than, "el in
Inlia quidem oblmel " ; but afler jtiidem, I concnve it to be necessary
ta add nUio, coDronnnbly to the aboTe traiutation.

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129

said. For matter is not the same will) that which
is moved in n disorderly manner. But that matter
must not he considered to be primarily evil, So-
crates, I think, EufBciently shows in the Philebus,
in which Dialogue be generates infinity from God.
If, however, it must be said that matter is the in-
finite itself, matter, or that which is primarily infi-
nite, is from God, For it must be admitted (hat
essential infinity, depending on one cause, has a
divine origin, and especially that infinity which, in
conjunction with bound, is not able to produce a
mixture ; since God is the cause of the subsistence
and mixture of these. These, therefore, and the
nature of body, so far as body, are to be referred
to one leading cause, which is God; for it is he
who produced the mixture. Hence neither is body
nor matter evil ; for they are the progeny of deity,
the former as a mixture, but the latter as infinite.
In body, indeed, one thing has the relation of a
fountain and of reason or form, but another thing
is analogous to the infinite. For what else is the
infinite in body, tfaan matter? And what else is
bound in it, than form? What, likewise, is that
which consists of both these, than the material
world? If, therefore, all tlje natures that are ge-
neratetl, and the things of which they consist, are
from bound and infinity ,^-but that which produced
all these ranks as the fourth, as Plato says,— if this
be the case, we must say that neither matter nor
form, nor that which is mixed from both, originated
from any other cause than God. But what that is

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generated from tbence can be evil ? For [as Hato

says in the Laws,] it is not the province of beat to
refrigerate, nor of good to produce evil. And
hence, neither matter nor body must be said to be
evil.

Perhaps, therefore, some one may ask us what
our opinion is concerning matter, and whether we
admit it to be good or to be evil, or in a certain
respect each of these? Let this, then, be our de-
cision, that matter is neither good nor evil. For if
it is good, it will be an end [to which something
else will be moved], and not the last of things, and
will be that for the sake of which something else
exists, and will be an object of desire*. For all
good is a thing of this kind, because that which is
primarily good is an end, is that for the sake of
which all things subsist, and is desirable to all
beings. But again, if matter is evil, there will he
another principle of beings discordant with the
cause of all good, and there will be two fabled
fountains" flowing contrary to each other, one
being the fountain of good, but the other of evil.
And neither will the life of the Gods themselves

* The puDctuatioii of tU* tentsnce in Morbeka is Tcry nro-
neoiu; Tot " Swe enm, ionumJiniM eril et non vlttnmiB amnnm at
cti/ai gratis tl deaderabile," ^ould be, Sivt nun &inuni,jSnif tril et
mm uUJMum otimhtm, &c.

■> Plodus here (llnda to tha two ressels placed bj tbe Ibnnie
of Japiter, which are mentioned by Homer in Iliad 34. t. £97.
Butby tbe evili of which one of tbe vessels is the fountain. Homer
meant the common calamities of bunun life, whidi are not erils in
realily, but. as a rerlain poet aaid,

" Are bleiungs in disgui^."

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ISl

be innoxious, nor free from mortal difficulty, or
from anything ^se which it is not easy to bear,
and which is foreign, and, as it were, attended
with molestation. I^ however, evil is not, what
will that be which will have an existence accord-,
ing. to it? Or is it not sufficient to repeat what
has been often said, that we must assert of it an
existence which is. necessary? For the nature t^
good is one thing, but the nature of evil another ;
and the one is contrary to the other. And there is
arwther third thing, ivhick is neither simpli) good nor
evil, but necessary. For evil, indeed, leads from
good, and flies from its nature; but that which ia
necessary is all that it is for the sake of. good, haft
a reference to it, and whatever has a generation
subsists on account of it I^ therefore, generation
is for the sake of good, but another thing which is
evil, is for the sake of generation, — in this case we
must say, that so &r as it is necessary to genera-
tion, it is an end, and is good, and must not be
called [real] evil, but was produced by divinity as
necessary to forms, which are incapable of being
established in themselves. For it is not fit that the
cause of all good should aione produce beings that
are good, and who are able to generate from them-
selves natures characterized by good, but it is re-
quisite that it should likewise give existence to that
nature which is not simply and from itself good.
This nature, however, desires good, and through
this desire it gives generation to other things, and
contributes to the fabrication of a sensible e
k2

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For being [itself) not cmly gives subsistence to [real j
beings, but also to tbings which desire a participa-
tion of essence, and whose existence consists in the
desire of having a being. Hence, that which is
primarily desirable is one thing, and that which
desires this another, and which, through this de-
sire, possesses an intermediate good. But it desires
what has a prior subsistence to itselt^ and for the
sake of which it exists.

I^ therefore, we thus consider matter, we shall
find that it is neither good nor evil, but necessary
alone ; and that so far as it was produced (or the
sake of good, It is good, but is not simply good.
And so far, indeed, as it is the last of things, it is
evil, because that is evil which is most distant from
good j but simply considered, it is not evil, but, as
we have said, is necessary. In short, it is not true
to asseit that evil can effect anything by itselfi for
that which can, is not unmingled eviM, and pri-
marily evil. For if evil is contrary to all goodj it
is requisite that it should be contrary to that which
is good from itself and primarily good, prior to
being contrary to the good which subsists in some-
thing else; and also that evil should be twofold,
this being evil itself, but that existing in another
thing. But if evil is contrary to that good which
subsists in something else, much more will evil be
in another thing, and will not have an existence
from itself; for the good also to which evil is con-

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1S3

trary, subsists in another thing, and has not a
separat« existence. For n^iat that ranks among
beings will be contrary to the Itrst good ? Since all
beings exist on account of, and for the sake of it.
But it is impossible that a contrary should derive
its exbtence on account of a contrary nature. For
contraries are corrupted by each other; and, in
short, all contraries proceed from one summit and
genus. What, however, will be contrary to that
which b primarily the genus of the good? For
what is beyond the nature of the good ? And what
among beings will become bomc^neous to it? For
it would be requisite that there should be some-
thing else about both these, of which they will par-
ticipate*; aadihe good will no longer be the prin-
ciple of beings, but that will be the principle which
is common to both these. Hence, nothing is con-
trary to the fir&t good, nor to all the participants
of it, but to those only which participate of it in
a variable manner. Of these, however, we have
before spoken, and therefore here we dismiss the
discussion of matter.

Again, then, let us pass to privation, because
certain persons assert this to be evil and entirely
contrary to good. For, say they, it !s su£Scient to
matter for form to be present with it ; but privation

* Because, ai Proclus juit before obserred, contraries proceed
ttoia one summit and genus. Thus, from bang itself motion aod
permaaenc;, samepew and difference proceed, which ore opposed
to eacb other.

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is never good, since it is always malefic and con-
tmy to fomts. And matter, indeed, aspires after
good, and partakes of it ; but privation flies from
good, is the cause of corruption, and, in short, is
evil. I^ indeed, the first good was the same with
being, and good and being were at the same time
one nature it would be requisite that privation
sbcwld be primarily evil, in consequence of being
of itself non-entity and contrary to being. But if
good is different from being, and each is not the
same thing, evil also will be different firom priva-
tion. In short, with respect to inordination and
inoomm en Bu ration, these, as we have said, most be
assumed in one way, as the absence of measure and
order ; but in another way, as naturally contrary to
them. For the latter are adverse to order and
measure; but the former arc only an ablation of
them, and are nothing except a negation of these.
For when present, they are what they are; but
when absent, they leave the privations of them-
selves. If, therefore, evil is indeed contrary to
good, and discordant with it, — but privation neither
opposes the habit of which it is the privation, nor
is adapted to effect anything, the essence of it, as
our opponents say, being so debile and fleeting, —
how can we any longer ascribe to that a malefic
nature which is destitute of all e^ctive power?
For that which is effective is form and power ; but
privation is formless and debile, and is not power,
but rather the absence of power. Hence, from

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1$5

what has been said, it is evident what the beings
are in which evtl exists, and what those are in
which it has no existence.

Because, however, evil subsists in souls in one
way, but in bodies in another, what order of them
is to be sSEumed, and whence does it b^n, and
how far does its dimination extend? Shall we say,
that the evil of souls is greater than that of bodies;
or shall we admit that the latter is the last of evils,
but that the evil of the former is of a more debile
nature? With respect, however, to the evil in soul,
one kind extends to energy alone, but another re-
strains this'. And with respect to the powers of
the sonl, its evil inbx>duces to some of them all-
various fractures; but to others, as Plato says, a
cessation of energy. One evil, therefore, is alone
an impediment of energy; but another extends as
far as to power ; and another is corruptive of es-
sence itself. And the first, indeed, is the passion
of divine souls, that become connected with the
realms of generation ; but the second debilitates the

' This Hmteoce in Morbeks is u follow* : " Quod Butem in
animS; hoc quidtim usque od operatiotiem solum; hoc autem has
obtinet;" but for hat oilinct, it is necessarjr (o read Aanc rUtiatl,
For Produs here, aod iu the sentence th« ImmedUtely follovs it,
alludes to what is said b; Plato in the I^sui, of the injuiy which
the soul suBt^ns from the seuses. For ha there sajs, that through
them [he circle of sameness, or the Tatiodnative pover, is restiained
in its energies, (rm fuw tmmr ntrmntn twAmt, iMiTia imtj
fUiHiu, itmtttrxn'^X,'''*" *""'*""' mwliiHi^itnfiti'ianum; ... .

sad (hat the circle of difiercDce, or the power by which we opine,
sustUDi dl-taiious fractures and di'

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splendour of intellect, and the last is the passion of
bodies themselves. Hence, the first will be only
an apparent evil ; but the last wUl be real evil, — I
mean that evil which destroys the nature of the
thing in which it is inherent, — and that which sub-
sists between these, and which is the evil of power,
is not adapted to effect anything in essence. In
short, that which can injure greater things, is a
greater evil; but essence is beyond power, and
power is beyond energy. And that, indeed, which
is corruptive of essence, at the same time dissipates
power and energy ; but that which is corruptive of
power, destroys also energy; (neither, therefore, is
essence the same with power and energy, nor can
energy exist after the cessation of power*;) and
that which is corruptive of first power, as far as to
energy, is privation, and not the contrary; but that
which is corruptive of power is contrary to essence,
[because essence is productive of power]. A greater
evil, however, is contrary to a greater good ; and
therefore the evil of souls is greater than that of
bodies, not indeed of all bodies [for this is not true
of such as are immaterial], but of those the power
of which is naturally adapted to suffer. And the
evil is less to those beings in whom there is alone
a cessation of energy, since it is alone the absence
and the diminution of total perfection. One evil,

' This pan wiibin the (larenthnia is In Morbeka, " Kegttr ergo
nibilanlia cunt Hi, n/gw pi/Unlia poit oferatimii caiationm-" but

the true rcailing is, Neque ergo subatantia eadeai cunt iis,negtu<^-
nifio poil patenliie aisnlimem.

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rIso, is contrary to virtue, but another to the good
of the body; and one is contrary to what is con-
formable to intellect, but another to what is con-
formable to nature. By how much better, there-
fore, intellect is than nature, and that which is
according to intellect than that which is accord-
ing to nature, by so much greater is the evil
which is a deviation from intellect, (ban that which
is a deviation from nature. If, however, one evil is
corruptive of essence, but another of power alone,
it is not' wonderful. For when of the same thing,
this corrupts the essence, but that the power of it,
then" that which is corruptive of essence is evil in
a greater degree. But when this takes place in a
difl^rent thing, and of a different nature, there is
no absurdity in admitting, that what is corruptive
of power, being more remote from the nature of
good, exceeds in evil, as when the power of one
thing is better than the essence of another. For
thus the powers of the soul are said both to gene-
rate and preserve the corporeal essence [end are
therefore superior to it]. Hence, Socrates in the
[loth book of the] Republic says, that injuslJce'^ is
not deadly to the soul by which it is possessed,
which it would be if the soul was mort^. For it

' Thia seotence in Moibeka is, " Si aulem hue quidem lubilantim
at carraptinum, hac autan poteiUitc solvm, mitabOei' but for "rni-
TabUe," it is obviousl; necessary to read non miraiaie.

> For "lam," iu this place in Moibeka, it Is requisite to read

■ This sentence in Motbeka is, •' Hoc ergo et qui m PoH/id &t-

moTlate <Tat." But Tor lun iiere, it is necesery to read oJijuni, this
being the word used by Plato in the passage above leferred to.

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IS6

would rapidly lead the souls that possessed it into
non-existence. Bat it is better twt to be, than to be
in an evil condition ; since the/ormer is a privation
of being, but the latter ^ good. Hence corporeal
evil does not idly disclose to us the wickedness of
souls. For one corporeal evil hy its intensity ter-
minates in non-existence [by destroying the life of
the body^ ; but another terminates iu a bad con-
dition of being.

I^ therefore, we assert these things rightly, mat-
ter will not be primarily evil, in consequence of the
reason which we have assigned. For body, which
is nearer to souls than matter, is replete with a less
evil than that of souls. But neither is that which is
more remote from good, more good, nor that which
participates more of evil, a less evil ; but in souls,
indeed, the evil is greater, and in bodies less*;
because the order of souls is different from the or-
der of bodies. For of souls, those that dwell aa
high are entirely pure ', but in others, there is a
privation of malefic energy ; and in others, the re-
ception of evil extends as far as to their powers
[but not to their essence'']. And of bodies, some
indeed are always in order ; in others, energy and

* Hence, if tfaeerilofbodie9ial«stIiBDtbeeTilofaoula.the«rit
of mitter also muH be leu Ihan tbat of soul, because nwtUr b one
of the thJDga of which bod; conniU. Matter, therefore, ii not

* This ii the cue wilh human bouIb. for their ponen become
ot times vitiated, but not their essence. And the eiil of their pow-
en consists in the piivetioD of symmetry between the rational toA
innlional parts of the unil, as Pioclua elseirhere olnerves ; so that
these powers are not esseDlially eril, but are evil on); kutk txui*,
according to habitude, or proximity and alliance. .

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139

power BubsiBt differently at different times; and in
others, their esaence is the recipient of evil'. And
such is the order of' these.

Ztibilows, intbenext'place,.that we should sur-
vey what evil itself is by itself, and what nature it
possesses. Prior, however, to this, we should con-
' sider whether of evils there is some one and the
same cause, or whether there is not For some
say there is ; but this is denied by others. Aiid the
former of these asserting that there is a fountain of
evils, Irom this [Hroduce all evil, of whatever kind
it may be; but the latter, contending that the prin-
ciple of evil is a ni^Bc soul, say that evils are
generated from hence. Others, again, ascribing
the spedes of evil to an intellectual nature, which
is a medium, between the two above-jnenUoned
principle acknowledge that evils, as well As all
other things, have from thence their progression.
With respect to the authors, however, of these
opinions, some form their cooclusions from other
hypotheses; but others make Plato the father of
their dogmas. And the latter, indeed, establishing
intellectual ideas of all things, adduce what is said
by Socrates in the Theeetetus in corroboration of

* The celestial bodiesarealwayiinDrdeT.aDdeTpericiicenootlier
BlUretioQ than ■ mutadon of figure, and ■ vaiiatJon of light. But
of the Hiblunar; ipbereB, so for as tcholei, they always remain inde-
itiactible; but their enei^ea and powers are different at difiet«Dt
timei. Hence, in the sublunary repoa there are peiiods of ferti-
li^ and sterility, as Plato obsetres io the Republic. But the parti
of sublunary bodies are the recipients of e«il, >o far as they are de-
structible, thxiugh this dealtuctibility contributes to the good of the

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uo

their doctrine, viz. that there are twofold paradigm:^
the one divine, but the other without deity : but
the former cite the Athenian guest, who introduces
two kinds of souls, the one beneficent, but the
other, on the contrary, malefic; and they say that
the universe is governed by the former of these
souls alone, but the mortal region by both.

For, in short, if it is admitted that there is one
cause of evils, it is requisite to think that this cause
is either divine, or intellectual, or psychical. The
43ods, however, intellects and souls, receive the
brderof cause; but of other things, some are their
instruments, and others are representations and
images produced in matter. In answer to those,
therefore, who contend that there is a fountain of
evils, what has been said is sufficient. For all the
Gods, and all the fountains [or principles of things],
are the causes of good ; but are not the causes, nor
ever will be, of any evil. For if, as we have before
said, and as Socrates in the Fhsedrus asserts, every-
thing divine is good, beautiful and wise, it will
either produce evil contrary to its nature; or every-
thing which subsists from thence will be boniform,
and the progeny of the goodness which is esta-
blished iti divinity. But, as it is said, it is not the
province of fire to refrigerate, nor of good to pro-
duce evil from itself. Hence, one of two things
must follow ; either that evil must not be said to be
evil, if it is of divine origin, or that it exists, but
has not deity for its cause. It has, however, been
before shown, that there is another cause of evils,

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141

and that God is not the source of them ; as Plato
also somewhere teaches, admitting that the pro-
gression of all good is from one cause, but refer-
ring the generation of evils to other causes, and
not to a divine original. For everything which
thence subsists is good, and therefore the whole
is good. And from that which is, as it were, a
cardiack or invigorating light of goodness in the
Gods, another light proceeds, being a splendour
and power, and part of deific power. Those blessed,
however, and felicitous beings, the progeny of the
Gods, are said to adorn and give measure to evils,
and to bound their infinity and darkness, in conse-
quence of that portion of good which they receive,
and the power of existence which they are allotted.
This adorning and arranging cause, therefore, is
called the fountain of evils, not as the fountain
from which they are generated,— for it is not lawful
that the first causes of beings should be the prin-
ciple of evils, — but [it is rather a fountain of good]
as imparting to evils end and bound, and illumi-
□adng their obscurity by its own beneficent light*.
For evil, indeed, is infinite from pardal causes,
but receives an end from wholes; and on this ac-
count it is evil to these causes, but to wholes is not
evil. For the infinite in evils is not according to
power, — since thus, by the infinitude of themselves,

* It nppson to me that Morbeka, in his traailation of the abore
sentence, has either omitted or altered Bometfaiag which Produs
■aid. For how can an adorning and arranging caute be called in
an<f way tbe/aunlain afeeilt? I hiiTe therefore added [it is ratbet
■ founlaia of good].

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they would participate of the nature of good, — but
it ia in consequence of b defect of power. And
evih are in a certain respect corroborated by good
through the participation of bound.

The authors of these assertions, therefbn^ thus
ctxieeiving, and bong persuaded that the genera-
tion of evils is not inordinate, make God to be the
cause of the order of these. But it appears to me,
that not the Barbarians only, but likewise the most
eminent of the Greeks, ascribing to the Gods a
knowledge of all things, — both of such as are evil,
and such as are good, — ascribe the generation of
things essoitially good to the Gods, and also of
such as are evil, so far as they receive a portion
of good, and the power of existing, in order to
accomplish a certain end. J?'or, as vx have (fien
mid, eml is not evil •miikoui a mixture {of good] ;
but it is in one respect evil, and in another good.
And so Jar, indeed, as it is good, it isjromihe Gods;
but so Jar as evil, it derives its subsistence Jrom art-
other, and that an impotent cause, for all evil is
generated on account of impotence and defect,
because evil, so far as it is good', receives its hy-
postasb from power and [so far as it is evil from]
impotence. For the power of evil is in good " [i. e.
exists so far as it partakes of good]. For if evil
was evil without a mistjire, and evil alone, it would

* In Morbeka, " qttoniam el bmum," should be, confomuibl; to
(he above (raiiBlAdoD^ qwmifim ul bimum.

'' In Morbelu, " Tpiiui enim potenlia el in ipw ;" but tbe true
reading is, Iptiui emm inleruia eA in xpao [i. e. tti 6<ird].

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be unknown to the God% since they are good, and
are able to benefit all things, of whatever kind they
may be, which derive from them their exbtence; or,
in other words, they benefit everything of which
they have a knowledge. For their cognitions are
energetic pcnsert, and are fabricatixx qf all things,
g^ ichich also theif are said to be the cognitions. Be-
cause however evil, at the same time that it is evil,
is likewise good} and is more good than evil, because
it is good to the universe, neither most the koowr
iedge of evil 1^ the Gods be destroyed,, nor the
generation of it from thence ; but it must be ad-
mitted, that the Gods both know and produce evil,
so far as it is good. Hence, after the same manner
that they know, they produce it ; and the causes of
evils are with them powers which impart good to
the nature of evil*; just as if some God should,
according to forms, give a specific subsistence to
intellectual powers in the forms of nature.

It is well, however, that our discussion has led
us to speak of forms, and the order of forms, lest
perhaps evils, and the geuerations of evils, should
proceed froni these; or whence to evils also is the
never-failing derlyed? For everything which per-
petually exists, proceeds firom an immoveable and
definite cause. I^ therefore, evil perpetually sur-
rounds the mortal nature, what is the peipetuity of
it, and whence does it originate ? For we cannot
say that it proceeds from any other cause than that ,
* Proclus beautifully obBenea, in hia Commentarjr on the Timaui
or Plolo, " that Divinity concealed evil in the utility of good."

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144

which etemaUy subsists after the same manner, and
irom an immoveable nature. But this is the na-
ture of forms, and that which always exists Is good.
And what, indeed, will be produced by intellect
which is not good ? I^ therefore, intellect is good,
whatever is produced conformably to it is good ; for
that which is assimilated to good, is good ; but evil,
so &r as evil is not adapted to be assimilated to good.
We likewise say, that what is assimilated to intel-
lectual forms, is perfect and happy; but, on the
contrary, we denominate every being that is evil
miserable and unhappy. Hence evil, so tar as
evil, is not assimilated to intellect'; and this being
the case, neither will there be in intellect paradigms
of evils. For every image is the image of a para-
digm/ But if Plato, also, calls forms or ideas the
most divine of beings, — for the Elean stranger or
guest says, that a perpetually invariable sameness
of subsistence alone pertains to the most divine of
all things ; — and if, as we have said, the paradigm of
evils is destitute of divinity and dark, — if this be
the case, how is it possible to suppose that such a
nature as that which is most divine being innate in
forms, evil can thence be produced*" ? If, however, -
the fabricator of the universe, who contains in him-

* In Moilwlu, "Nm ergo malus fuw malui aairndalar inief-
leclui;" but for "nuilui qma midui," I read, confomiBbly to the
•boTe IraiuUUon, malum fuil nulum.

" The latter part of this sentence in Moibeka it, "quad itiffni-
tam talem juUrnvminiUii tujrponenteainAe pnduteremalmn." But
ibr " quod" I read quotnado ponibile est, and in consequence of
tbia, make the whole sentence interrogaliTe.

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us

self all forins, and the number of forms, was willing
that evil shouJd not exbt in the universe, and like-
wise wieli^ to generate all things similar to him-
self*, and therefore free from evil, how can there
still be a paradigm of eviLs? For, containing all
things, he will benefit them, and will not permit
anything to be in vain. For he does not indeed
give subsistence to, and generate some forms, but
with respect to others is barren and inefficacious ;
but by his very being producing all things, his ge-
neraUve power operates with an impartible' energy.
One of two things, therefore^ is necessary, either
that the divine intellect should wish evils to exist,
and to be generated, if it contain:! essentially the
forms of these; or that, hot being willing, it should
neither generate nor produce them, nor possess the
forms of them in the same manner as it does ofthe
mundane natures of which it is the cause*

This hypothesis, however, which introduces a
paradigm of evils, is not of itself sufficient to per-
suade Us that it is true, since it is often changed to
what is contrary to truth. But it is not wonderful,
i^ while asserting that evil is eternal, and admitting'
that there are immoveable causes of eternal beings,
we should at the same time refuse to grant that
there is such a cause of evil. For that is 'properly]
eternal, which has perpetually a progression into
existence according to nature, but not that whidi
is produced [perpetually] in any way whatever ;
since it must be said, that evils revolve about a
* Plato ■nerts this of the Demiurgus in the Tinrnus.

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mortri nature, not in consequence of everything
mortal being evil* but because these evils also are
adorned by the order of the universe, and espe- -
cially by the heavens. Hence these, after impart-
ing essence to generated natures, cause them lik^
wise to participate of eternity. But to the bodies
which have a rectilinear motion, they give circular
periods, and impart order to things inordinate^
bound to things indednite, and goodness to every-
thing that is evil. Everything therefore, which is
according to nature* and exists always, is generated
from a definite cause. But evil is not according to
nature. For neither is there a producing principle
of lameness in nature^ nor of a deviation from art
in art How, therelbre, is it possible to investigate
an immoTeaUe prindple, and a producing cause of
evils in forms, since everything which derives its
existence from them is a form and an end ; but the
nature of evils is of itself infinite and undefined?

In the third place, therefore, let us direct our
attention to the soul which we denominate ma-
lefic, and consider whether or not we must ascribe
to this the cause of all evils. Shall we say, then, that
as it is essentially the province of fire to beat, but
not to refrigerate anything, — and of other things,
there is another employment,' — so likewise it essen-
tially pertains to this malefic soul to generate evils,
and to infect with evil everything to which it is
proximate? Or shall we admit that the nature of
it is always good, but that its energies subsist dif-
ferently according to the same order, a different

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energy producing a different life? If, thorelwet
it should be said ibst these inde^ are malefif* it
must be granted that it js malefici not bemuse it ia
an frrational soul, but because it is better than tbit^
and tbroqgh which it is good. For to this soul
there is a transmutation of habit to the better and
the worse. Put if, as some My, this soul is essen-
tiall; and of itself ^vil, from whence does it derive
its being? I9 it from any other lource than the
demiurgic cause, and the qnundane Oods? And
Uw is it possible that it shoHld not proceed from
those causes, fropa which the species of the mortal
life originates ? But if it proceeds from these, how
can it be essentially evil? For all the progeny o(
these ar^ good, and iq short, all evil is beyond es-
sence, and is not essence ; since nothing is contrary
to essence. But good is contrary to evil. And a
sensible essence, indeed, is Uie image of being ; but
being [t. e. real being,] is established in good, and
general^ all things according to good, and nothing
which is tbeoce derived is evil. It is not, howeveis
wonderful, if the Athenian guest* denominates such
a soul malefic, on account <^ the evil which is in

■ Fide PUt. de LeglbuB, Ub. i. The wordt of the Atlienlui
gu*it la which ProoIuB here alludeit are, *' We Bhould nod there-
fm*, estiblub leu tfaui Hro uxila. One beneficBnt, and the other at
a coDtnry nature." See vol. ii. p. 308, of my trauUfjoD of Plato.
As I hara there observed, howerer, Plato, bj an evil Boul, meant
the natvra or lutunl life auipanded from the rational KHit of Ibt
world, and whicfa ia the proiiiiiata nil mttrit of bodlei. A> thia
life without the goraniing influence of the rational coul of tl^e
world, would produce nothing but confuaon and disorderly mo.
tionii, it may be said, when ciHUidered a* left to itielf, to be evil.

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its powers and energies, tliis evil not always re'
maining, but as 1 have elsewhere observed, being
made in a certain respect bonifonn, and adapting
its own energies to those of a superior soul. For
this latter soul is ad^ted to save itself; but the
former is incapable of being converted to itself.
And to the latter, indeed, since it is of a boniform
nature, measure and reason are derived from itself;
but to the former, from an external cause : because
to body, and to all alter-motive natures, both being
and well-being are on account of another, and, as
it were, externally acceding cause. In short, as I
may say, it is absurd to make such a soul to be the
cause of evils. For neither is it the cause to body
of all the evils that are in it, nor to a more excellent
loul. For evil and debility are to a better soul
from itself, because when it descends*, the form of
the mortal life springs up together with it; but de-
bility was allotted to iti prior to its descent into
the realms of generation. For the causes of its
descent were no other than debility, and an im-
potency of contemplating supernal natures ; since
neither while we were able and at the same time
willing to be established in the intelligible world, djd
our flight from real being, and inordination with re-
spect to the contemplation of it, exist; nor, in short,
does the flight from the survey of it proceed from
not wishing to see the spectacles in the superior
[/. €. in (he supercelestial] place. For all diose
that are distant from, aspire after the vision of it;
* And in dnccat a awing to iu debility.

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but, as Plato says [in the Phsedrus*], being impo-
tent, they are carried round in a submerged con'
dition. Hence it remains, that this arises from
debility alone. For the eyes of the soul are impo-
tent with respect to a permanent vision of the trutli
and splendour which are there. By a much greater
priority, tlierefore, is. evil in souls, and does not
originate from a second life. Afler what manner,
however, evil subsists in the former soul, and why
Plato denominates it malefic, has been shown by us
sufficiently for the present. For its incommensura-
bility and indefinite nature' are contrary to measure,
and to those boundaries which proceed from form ;
and it neither is alone deprived of, nor desires the
participation of them. If any one, therefore, look-
ing to these things, should denominate this latter
soul malefic and contrary to form, he will not assert
this of it as if it was allotted a nature of this kind,
but as ver^ng to that which is without measure
and bound, though at the same time it is able to
be drawn by itself to a more excellent nature.
• 4. But if these are not the causes of evils, why
do we ourselves admit that there is a cause of the
generation of them? To this we reply, it must by
no means be admitted that there is one cause, which
of itself is the source of evils. For if there is one
cause of everything that is good, there are many
causes, and not one cause alone, of evils; since all
things that are good, are commensurate with, simi-

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150

\ar and friendly to each other; but^ on the con-
traiy, evils are neither cominenBurate with each
other, ncH- with things that are good. If, therefore,
one cause precedes the commensurabilily of simi'
l^rs with each other, but many that of dissimilars,—
for all things which are from one cause, are friendly
to, and co-passive with, each other, and assemble
together, some in a greater, bnt others in. a less
de^ee,— if this be the case, and if there be many
causes, and not one Cause only of evils, — some, in-
deed, to souls, but others to bodies,— frotn these,
and in these, evil must be surveyed. And it ap-
pears to me that Sobrates, in the Republic, insi-
nualjng this, denies that a divine nature is the cause
of evils ; but says that other causes of th«m are to
be investigated. For by this be signifies' that
these causes are many, indefinite and particular.
For what monad or triad, or eternally producing
principle can there be of evils, the very being of
which is through dissimilitude and indefiniteness
as far as to an individual nature? But that which
ranks fls a whole is everywhere without evil. The
effective causes of evils, therefore, are these : and
souls, likewise, and such forms as subsist about
matter, are certain causes of this kind. For some
of these lead to evil, but others being adverse to
each other, afibrd a place to that which is pneter>
natural in generation; since that which is accord-
ing to nature to some things, is preetematurol to
others. Let an instance of this, if you are willing,
* In MoilMka "aeraflcanl," iiutMd «t ^gnifical.

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be tbst paradigm, destitute of Diviiiity and dark*
which is mentioned by Socrates in (he Tbestetus*,
where be speaks oF the evils which necessarily r^
Tolve about a mortal nature, and this place of our
abode. For souls when assimilated to evil beings,
change their life by an assimilation to a more ex-
cellent nature. For the soul, indeed, beholds the
exemplars of good, when she is converted to her-
self, and to beings better than herself, with whom
things primarily good subust> and the summits of
beings, separately established on a pure and holy
foundation ; but again* she looks to the paradigms
of evils, when she directs her attention to things
external to, and posterior to^ herself, which are
naturally inordinate, indefinite and flowing and
are destitute of that good by which the eye of the
soul is nourished and watered *", and Uves her own
.proper life. The forms and powers of evils, there-
fore, are not effective, but are impotence and de-
biUty, and an incommensuraiile^ comtmmion with,
and mixture of, similars. Nor, again, are there
'certain immoveable paradigms of evils, and which
always subsist after the same manner, but such as
are infinite and indeterminate and borne along in

* Proclui hera alludn to tlie foUowing worda of FlMo in tbe
ThcBtetui 1 nnfoluy^MTM « ^Xi •• Tf tn UriHW, n» fui turn iik
iK^nmfu, «• It irfuii ■/Xwnrf H, ■■rO. Sea to\. it, at tnftzta^
Ution of Plato'* woAs, p. 59.

* rfiftrmi nai nfltnu- >o FUto in (be niadnii.

* In Morbeka, " cammauimUa atomnmio" ; but for " mminm-
wnUa," it u neccoary to read iacammmniraca.

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152

pther, and these innumerable, things. But that
Ear the sake of which something else subsists, is
the least of all things to be ranked among evils.
For it is not 6t that the end of evils should be
good : but because souls search after good in eveiy
possible way, and for the sake of this undertake all
that they effect, and act badly, — on this account,
some one perhaps may think that the end uf evils
is good. AH things, therefore, are for the sake of
this good, both such as are really good and such
as are contrary to it. For we act badly through
BD ignorance of our own nature, at the same time
desiring good. And perhaps it will be well, neither
to establish evil as a principle, nor as a paradigm
according to nature, nor as of itself subsisting for
its own soke. For the form and nature of evils is
defect, indetermination, privation, and a mode of
hypostasis, which, as it is usually said, may be ra-
ther assimilated to a parhypostasis, or deviation
from subsistence. And hence, as it has been fre-
quently observed, evil is involuntary. For how,
indeed, can it be voluntary, since that which is
voluntary subsists for the sake of good? But evil
of itself is neither desirable, nor an object of choice
to any being. These things, however, we shall
elsewhere discuss. But from what has been said,
it is evident that evil in souls arises from debility,
and the victory of a subordinate nature; for the
horse which participates of depravity, says Plato
[in the Phasdrus], gravitates and tends to th^ earth.

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153

And in bodies, it arises from the mixture of dissi-
milars, viz. of form, and matter which is formless,
and of contrary producing powers.

It follows, therefore, that we who admit that evil
is to be called a parhyp<xtasis, or deviation Jrom
subsistence, should show after what manner, from
the above-mentioned causes and non-causes, it sub-
sists; since it is not possible for It to exist other-
wise than as a parhypostasis. For that which is
produced by a principal cause, of whatever kind it
may be, has itself a principal subsistence, neither
haviiig an indefinite end, nor the relation of that
which alone subsists for the sake of something else',
nor a progression from itself into being. And [in
short,] whatever is generated from a cause, is ac-
cording to nature. For without a cause, it is im-
possible for anything to have a generation, or to
refer the order of its existence to any end. Shall
we say, therefore, that evil is accidental to certain
things, and that it subsists for the sake of some-
thing else, and is not derived from the first princi-
ple ? For we also energise in everything, for the
sake of the participation of good, and in conse-
quence of looking to it, and being as it were, par-

■ In Morbeka, " n cvjui gratii," nhich In tfae Greek was »
iniu nv, which u opposed lo ra iS Uikk, or thaljbr tie latt D^it>Mct
MAer Ihings luAu'M. For as Pioclus besutirully abaerres, in Plat.
Theol. lib. ii. p. 105, T« /m yn{ ir^xrn nn rfuytuim, iniM rm
/HHiim.T'h VfHviiulriUjiuHr. i.e. " The last of ihings is that
which only nihaists for the sake of totnethiiig else ; but the first
principle of things is that for the sake of which alone other things
subsist." Hence, the itiM viv /mh> pertains to mailer, but the iS
l.i»« turn, lo tlu uwffiibU principle oftkingi.

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154

turienl' v/ith, and alwaji deBiring it Hence, in
some things we act rightly; bat in othergnob For
because we esteem that which is not good> [as if it
were good,] we act erroneoasly ; but l}ecause in
what we do, we desire to obtain good, we act rigbtlj.
And our conduct, so far as pertains to what is uni-
versal, is right; but so far as pertfuns to what is par-
ticular, is wrong. Hence that which is desirable
to us is one thing, and that which we obtain is
another. And the one is the nature of good ; bat
the other is ctnitrarj' to it. The generation, there-
for^ of what is c<mtrary to good, of whatever kind
it may b^ arises from the debility of the effident,
and its Incommensurability to that which is e&cted.
For we rightly assert that those things have a mlh-
sistence which proceed from a principle, and have
a certain end to which their progression is directed ;
but we say that those things have a detdationjrom
subsistence, which neither proceed from a princijde
according to nature, nor liave a definite end. But
evils neither have a principal cause of their genera-
tion, — for neither the nature of that which b prseter- ■
natural, nor the reason^ of things prseter-rational,
is a cause, — ^nor do they reach to an end. For every-
thing which is generated, is generated for the sake
of something [difiereot from itself]. Hence such

* In Motbtlu " parimut," foi whkh ft ii aeeeuarj W read
parimriMUt i in tba Greek wliHHti, an npiwvoo much lutd by
Frocluh

'' JteOBHi in tb* Oraek Xtytif ugolSes in thi* place a pntbulae
poatr, but whicfa, fram in imbcEilitjr, doai not merit the appellation

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155

a getieiradon must be said to be a deviation irom
subsistence, imperfect and without a scope, and
also in a certain respect uncaused and indefinite.
For neither is there one cause of it, nor does that
which is a cause of itself, and a principal cause,
effect anything, looking to evil itself, and the na-
ture of evil. But the very contrary to this takes
place. For everything which is produced, b pro-
duced for the sake of good ; but evil is extrinsically
derived, and is superadvenienL The attainment
indeed, of that which is appropriate, is to every-
thing an end ; but the unattainment of it proceeds
from the debili^ of the efficient, so far as it re-
ceives a nature wbidi is partly less and partly more
excellent ; and in consequence of this, one part of
it is different from the other. For where the one
■8, there at the same time is the good; but evil is
in its nature divided and not one. For the incom-
mensurable, the unharmonious and contrariety are
in multitude ; but from these debility and indigence
proceed ; because in the Gods also [who are cha*
racterized by unity] there is the winged natur^
and at the same time each of the horses u good;
There, however, all things are good, and from
such things as are good, and not from their con^
traries ; but in other beings, there is a mixture of
evil and good, multitude and a diversity of powers
through which they are drawn to things of a dif-

* In Moibcka, " wnvl *t <;uaruBi ulrwinfu^" but after ttlrum-
gae, it ii necessary to add Auniu. See the Fhadrui of PlolO, lo
which Proclut in what he here sajri ■Uude*.

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f«rent nature. And among divine beings, indeecl,
multitude looks to one thing, and is bounded by
one species of life. But where multitude and dif-
ference shine forth, there, on account of adiminu-
tion of union, there is an indigence of power. For
all power is one thing, and is that which it is from
unity, and discord and discrepance arise from the
appetition of one thing being dififerent from that
of another. And thus we have shown after what
manner the generations of evils subsist, and what
that is which is called & parhypostasis, or deviation
from subsistence, and whence it is derived.
- 5. It must now, therefore, \x shown what evil
itself is. It appears, however, to be the most dil^
ficult of all things to know what is essenUally the
nature itself of evil; since all knowledge is a con-
tact with form, and is itself a form. But evil is
without Ibrm, and is as it were privation. This,
perhaps, will become manifest, if, looking to good
itself and the nature of what is good, we thus sur-
vey what evil itself is. For as that which is the
first good, is beyond all things, so evil itself is de-
stitute of all good; I mean so far as it is evil, and
a defect and privation of good. With respect to
good, therefore, how far it extends, aAer what man-
ner it subsists, and what orders it possesses, we
have elsewhel^ shown. But with respect to evil,
if so far as evil it is entirely a privation of good,
it follows that as evil it is destitute of the fountain
of good; that as infinite it is deprived of the first
bound; as debility, that it is without the power

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ISI

which is in the intelligible order; that as iticom-
mensurable, and false, and turpitude itself, it is des-
titute of the beautj, truth and symmetry* through
which that which is mixed, and in which the uni-
ties of beings subsist ; that as being naturally with-
out location and unstable, it is deprived of the
nature and power oi eternity which abides in one^i
but that as privation and without life it does not
participate of the first monad of forms S and of the
life which is there. And if evil is corruptive, and
the cause of division to the natures with which itis
present, and is imperfect, it is deprived of the per-
fective goodness of wholes'*. For as corruptive,
indeed, it leads from existence to non-existence;
as dividing, it destroys the continuity and union
of being; and as imperfect, it prevents particulars
from obtaining their perfection and natural order.
Further still, the indefiniteness of the nature of evil,
causes it to be destitute of, and to deviate from,

* Proclua here Blludc* to what Plato says in tbe Philebus, tIi.
" lliBt every mixture if it k rightlj made requires three tfaiags,
n>. beauty, trulh md ii/iBmrln/." But that which is first miied
is being iuelf; and in sjmnKtry, truth and beauty, the unities of
beings subsist. See the 3rd book of my tianiUlion of Proclui tin
the. Theology of Plato.

* Platosajslhisof eternity in the HmnuSiSothatthe Greekof
the "nmnenht <>f«rni in unn" of Morbeka is, tiu umih /tnurn
•• 1~.

' Tie first monad of fotms is ivhst Ptalo calls, in the Timaus,
mmZiHt, or anmal itntf, and is the eitiemity of the intelligible
tiiid.

' vit. it is deprifed of the intelligible and at tbe same time in-
tellectual tirdet of Gods.

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186

the summit which possesBea transcendent union*;
its infeaundity deprives it of generative **> and itt
inertnass of demiargic', power. For it is the exi>
elusion, debility and indefinit«ness o( every good of
this kind, viz. it is a privation of the monadic cause,
<^ generative power, and efficacious productimi.
But if it is the oaase of dissimilitude, partition and
ioordinadoo, il is evident that it is thus deficient of
aaumilitativei' good, and of the impartible provi-
deqtial inspectjon of partible natures, and of the
order wbidi is necessary to impartible beings. I^
however, good does not only extend 1a these orders^
but there is also the immaculate' genus, which is
efficacious and maguificent in its energies, evil will
be inefficaoioQs, dark and material. Or whence
will it possess each of these, and other things of a
like kind, if not from privations of the above-men-
tboed species of good? For there good subsists,
pnmarily, of which the good ihat is in us is a part

* a*, eri] }■ dfititute of ib^ pwtidpatioii of the Buromit of the
intdlactwl ordsTt i. «. of SaWm.

* tit, Mil il deititUW f>f ■ p*rii^p#li«n of die middl* at the in-
MUwMiiI efdff,, wbicb is Tiri&i uid genanitiTe.

' K tt. evil 6im not prntidpate qf tha eitremitf of the inlellec-
tiul order, Id which the Demiurgus lubdils.

Eril elM dow nut pRrtlcipite of the good deiived trcm (he
Wpei-DUDdiae order of Godi, who are chacsctenied b]r siinilituda.

* The immacvlaU gnuu, il Ibe order of the awaXvrn tm, oi &
tm iUi G*i*, which geniM it wad by Piwdue, in Theol, Fl4t.tib.n.
p. S8T, » be mxV""^ wkOIW, « Dm /i«« m r» x*if^ i^*" ""
lExfVUmi infxi' »*"" »? •''P "■ ""/^ rff^xf ■ '■ e. " M no*
lerging to lem exoelleot natural, nor destiaying iu eiewpt tnuu-
cendencr, b; its prondential enei^es abovt tbe world."

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and m image; and of which evil is the priTatioD.
And what occasi<m is there to say this, since the
evil also which Is in bodies, is not only a privation
of the ij^ood which exists in the intelligible and in-
tellectual orders, but also of that which prior to
body is in souls. For the good which is in bodies,
is a corrupt iin^|e of the good of souls. Hence,
likewise, the privation of form will not be a frus-
tration of anything dae than of intellectual power;
because form is the (^spring of intellect ; and that
which is productive of essence, is essentially intelr
lectuaL And thus we have shown, that what is in
every rei^>ect evil, is a privaUon and defect of good.
Such, therrfore, bdng the nature of evil, let us
in the next place show whence its contrariatf to
good proceeds. For evil, indeed, is a privatkn,
but not perfect privation. Hence, being co-es-
istent with the habit of which it is the privation, it
causes it by its presence to be debile ; but fnwi the
habit assumes itself power and form. In conse-
quence of this, the privations o£ forms, being per^
feet privations, are alone the absence of habits, and
are not adverse to them; but the privations of
good, are adverse to, and in a certain respect con-
trary to, their habits. For they are not entirely
impotent and inefficacious, b^og co-existent with
their powers, and led as it were by them into form
and energy. Plato also knowing this, says that
injusUce itself, is of itself debile and inactive, but
through the presence of justice both possesses power
and is led to energy, not abiding in its own nature,

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nor in a privation of vitality alone, because tfaat
which is vital subsisting prior to evil, imparts to
evil a participation of life. All life, however, is
essentially power ; but evil being produced through
a power which is not its own, is contrary to good,
employing its own power for the purpose of re^st-
ing good. And the greater, indeed, the inherent
power is, the greater are the energies and the works
of evil ; but they are less when the power is less.
In the powers of nature, likewise, in bodies, the
prsetieniatural then exists in a greater degree, when
order is entirely dissolved. Hence, in' souls also,
greater effects are produced from a less evil, but
less from a greater*. For evil being destitute of
its contrary" [good,] is increased, indeed, accord-
ing to its turpitude and privation of form ; but
being diminished according to power and energy,
is debile, and at the same time inefficacious. For
its strength is not from its own power, so that the
power being increased, the transition would be to
somediing greater; but it is from the presence of
its contrary ; just as if cold should use the power
of heat for the purpose of effecting its own work,
vanquishing its power, and causing it to be in sub-

' For B leu evil, psnidpating moie of good, has more ponei;
but a greater evil hue leas power, la consequence of participating
less of good; becauae the power of evil, auch as it is, is denTed
ftvm good. For evil in itself, BO far as evil, is powerless; solbat
the power which it appears to have, arises ftom its mixture with
good,

" In Morbeks, " Salijicata eiu'm a conlTiirio"i but the original
of " nJ^iaUa " wbb, I have no doubt, ipiftKirm.

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Jection to itself. Hence, there being a deficiency
of the nature contrary to evil, and privation in-
creasing in proportion to the deficiency ; and the
effective energy likewise becoming more debile,
through a diminution of power, the evil, indeed,
is greater, but the effect produced by it is less.
If, therefore, these things are rightly asserted, it
inust not be said that evil [so far as evil,] either
effects, or is capable of effecting anything; but
both its efficiency and its power are derived from
its contrary good. For good, on account of its
mixture with evil, is debile and inefficacious; and
evil participates of power and energy on account
of the presence of good, since both subsist in one
thing. Thus too, in material bodies, where one
thing is contrary to another, that which is accord-
ing to nature corroborates that which is prsetema-
tural. Or whence do bodies derive a periodic
measure, and an order of periods, except from na-
tural numbers, and from that disposition which is
conformable to nature? That, however, which is
prfetematural debilitates that which is according to
nature, the energy qfnatwe being blunted^, and the
order being dissolved in which its well-being con-
sists. Thus also in souls, evil vanquishing good**,
employs the power of it for its own purposes, viz.

' 'la'i/ioAtAm,"latilanttnaluT4ad/acere"; but Tor "latiloiUe,"
it appean to me to be otcetury to read htiiUmlt.

'' When evil in the >oul Tanquubei good, it n becaiue thg good
which is mingled with the evil, is greater than the good which it
■ubducs. For, as Proclua his well obHerved, ill the power which
i* deriT«d &om good.

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it uses the power of reason and its inventions for
the gratification of inordinate desires. E^h, like-
wise, imparts to the other what pertains to its own
nature; this indeed power, but ^Aa^ debility ; be-
cause evil of itself is not adapted to the possession
of either energy or power. For all power is good,
and all energy b an extension of power.

6. And how, indeed, is it possible to admit that
evil possesses power, if it is the province of all power
to preserve that in which it resides? But evil dissi-
pates everything of which it is the evlL Hence, evil
is of itself inefficacious and im)}otent ; and if, aisp,
as Plato says, it is involuntary, it will be without
will, and thus is deprived of the most primary triad
of good, viz. of will, power and energif. For good,
indeed, in its own nature, is accompanied by will,
and is powerful and efficacious ; but evil is without
will, and is debile and inefficacious. For neither is
that vrished for by anything which is corruptive of
that thing; nor is it the province of power, so far as
it is power, to corrupt ; nor of energy, not to have
its hypostasis according to power. But as things
that are evil desire what appears to them to be
good, and the evil whidi appears to them is the
object of their will, <»i account of its mixMure with
good ; so, likewise, power and efifecitive energy have
in evil an apparent subsistence, because evil has not
these essentially, nor so far as it is evil, but derives
them externally, in consequence of not having itself
a real subsistence, but being a deviation from sub-
sistence. It appears, therefore, (o.me, that this is

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163

shown by Socrates, in the Tliesetetus, to those who
are capable of apprehending his meaning, viz. that
evil is neither [absolutely] privation, nor contrary
to good. For privation is not able to effect anything,
nor, in short, is at all powerful ; nor of itself is a
contrary, nor has any power or energy. Hence, wo
denominate evil in a certain respect a subcontrary,
because itisnotof itself entirely a perfect privation,
but, together with habit, deriving from it power and
energy, is constituted in the part of contrariety, and
is neither perfect privation, nor contrary, but sub-
contrary to good. But the term parkypostasis in-
dicates the truth concerning it to those who do not
negligently attend to its meaning. It is evident,
therefore, from what has been said, what the nature
of evil is, and whence it is derived.

7. In the next place, let us speak of the differ-
ences of evil, and show what they are. It has,
therefore, been before observed by us, that of evil,
one kind is in souls, but another in bodies; and,
likewise, that evil in souls is twofold, this subsisting
in the irrational form of life, but ifiat in the rational
part. And we now say, that in the three following
things evil subsists, viz. in a partial soul, in the
image ' of soul, and in the body which ranks among
particulars. Hence, if the good of the rational
soul is derived from its conversion to intellect, —
for intellect is prior to it; — and the good of the ir-
ratioaal port is from ieaBoa,—ifbr the good ^every-
thing II derived Jrom that ichich is proximatebf bet-

' i. & the irralioiul, which f i the imige of the talioiul ynil.
M 2

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161.

ter than itself;— 'snA again, if the good of body is
a subsistence conformable to nature, — for nature
is tbe principle of motion and rest to it ; — if (his be
the case, it is necessary that the evil of the rational
part should be in a subsistence subcontrary to in-
tellect, but of the irrational part, in a deviation
from reason ; since the good of it consists in acUng
conformably to reason ; and the evil of body wilt
be a prsetematural subsistence. And these three
evils are inherent in the three natures, through their
being subject to debility from a. diminution in the
partial nature of their essence. For wholes, as we
have frequently said, possess their proper good
perpetually ; but evil exists in particulars and in-
dividuals, in which there is a deficiency of power,
through a diminution of essence, together with di-
vision and an attenuated union. In short, there is
one evil in souls, and another in bodies. And of
these, tliat which is in souls is twofold ; Mi's, indeed,
being a molestation of the soul arising Irom grief
or some other passion ; but that being turpitude,
as it is somewhere said by the Elean guest. But
the turpitude of the soul is indeed ignorance and a
privation of intellect, and its molestation from pa»-
sion arises from discord in the soul, and an aban-
donment of the life which ts according to reason.
And thus, evil will have a threefold subsistence;
but each of these likewise is twofold. For, with
respect to turpitude, one kind subsists about the
diuioetic, but another about the doxastic power;
because the knowledge of each is different; and in

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165

the one, tliere is a want of scieoc^ but in the other,
of art. With respect, however, to turpitude and
the molestations of the soul, one kind of these sub-
sbts ia its cognitions, and another in its impulses;
For appetite is not [in its own nature} conformable
to reason, — and there are many senses and preci-
pitate ima^nations,— so that appetites oppose those
whose life consists in action, and the phantasy in-
tervening is hostile to those who ^ve themselves
to the contemplative energy by destroying the pu-
rity and immateriality of the contemplations. The
prteternatural, likewise is twofold*. For the tur-
pitude which is in body is prsetematural ; since this
is the debility, the defect and malady of form, the
order and commensu ration of it being dissolved.

In so many ways, therefore, is evil to be divided ;
because the measures also of beings are in those
three principles, — nature, said and intellect. The
incommensurate, likewise, is either a privation of
the productive powers which are in nature, or of
those which are in soul, or of those which are in
intellect, and are generated by intellect. For that
which adorns anything primarily is better than the
thing adorned**. But I mean by this, every adorn-
ing nature which has a primary subsistence. And
such in bodies, indeed, is nature; in the irrational
forms of life, reas<m ; but in the rational forms, that
which is prior to them, and which is intellect; and

' Le. the pnetenutunl ukei place bolb in aoul and in body.

b This sentence in Morbelu ii, "Eunim wnani mgula nuHut
eti omanlit primi." But for "antantii," it is necawiry to retd

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[in intellectual forms], the good*. In the image!),
likewise, of the rational soul, the good which they
participate is either on account of the raUonal soul
[from which ifaey are suspended], or on account of
the soul which dwells on high**. But whatever the
natures are which are suspended from such a soul,
they either [subsist on account of such a soul, or]
on account of that principle which is external to
them, and from which good is imparted to the
beings to which it providentially attends °. But
frith respect to bodies, good to some of them is
derived from a partial soul, and to others, from that
soul which ranks as a whole.

Some one, however, may still doubt after what
mtmner evils can subsist, and whence they are de-
rived. Providence existing. For if evil exists,
how will the energy of Providence be solely di-
rected to good? Or, if the universe is replete
with the energies of Providence, how can evil sub-
sist among beings? Some, therefore, yield to one
of the reasons, viz. that all things are not from Pro-

* Tlie iTords wilhia ihe brackeu are iraoting in Moibcka. Hence,
after "in nUiimafiiiu avttm juod ante ipiaa," it ta requmte to add,
Md m inlrllediuJidut.

* In Morbeki, there is nothing more of this sentence than " IdoSi
tniltm aul propter earn jua funum animam" ; but after "out," it is
requisite to add, conronnahly lo the tbove version, pn^iUr ratiatia-
Inn ant, &c. But b; the soul which dwells on high, ProduB meini
a dame unil'

' This sentence in Moibeka is, " Quitainjue auttm tt a animi
dependevlli^tttvtproplfridguodextrinKcvsprinc^vnirAqvohonunt
m fHilmt pnoidclitr." But immediately after "laS," It is requisite
to add, confatmabty to tlie above tramUtion, aal irmpUr tattm nni-

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167

vidence if evil exists, and that evil is not, i( all
things are from Providence and the good. For this,
in the first place, perhaps, disturbs the mind, that
evil is in souls. For evil considered by itself is
unmingled with its contrary good, is most obscure,
and nothing else than darkness ; and if it subsisted
by itself, it might perhaps be an impediment to the
works of Providence. But, as wehivoe frequently
said, evil is not unmingled viith goodt and there is
no such thing as evil itself; since it is in a certain
respect, and not absolutely evil, through its partici-
pation of good. For, in short, it is not the same
thing to say, that God is the cause of all things,
and that he is alone the cause of all things [since
other causes co-operate with him]. For the former
assertion is true, but the latter not. For iDtellect
is the cause of the natures posterior to itself; soul,
of the beings which ore consequent to it; and nn-
ture, of bodies, and whatever is inherent in bodies.
Each (^ these, likewise, produces in a different way.
For God produces primarily, and according to tran-
scendent union ; intellect, according to an eternal
energy; soul, self-motively ; and nature, through
necessity. And neither is that which produces in-
tellectually the same with that which is prior to it,
uor with that which is secondary to it, so far as it
is secondary. If, therefore, all things are from
Providence, and no one of all things is evil, so far
as it is from, and is produced by Providence, why
is it wonderful that evil should have a place among
beings, .so far as it subsists from soul? And the

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same thing* indeed, will be evil to parUculars, but
good to wholes. It will, however, be in a greater
degree evil to particulars, because evil is derived
from them. For not energy alone, but also that
which ener^ses, possesses from Providence an ex-,
cellent condition of being. Hence, in a certain
respect good is iu tbem^ — I mean, in the evils
which exist in the soul. And thus it will be cre-
dible that Providence does not suffer any one of
these to be deprived of itself. Evil, therefore, must
be admitted to be twofold; one being within the
soul, and consisting either in improper imagina-
tions, or vicious consent, or base choice; but the
other subsisting externally, and becoming apparent
in various actions, which are the effects either of
anger or desire,

8. All such things, therefore, as these mani-
foldly possess good. For they are effected for the
avengement of other natures. The action, also,
is according to the desert of the agent; and that
which acts badly, does not suffer the same punish-
ment for every bad action, whatever it may be,
nor does it require the same punishment for each.
These deeds, therefore, are entirely good to thai which
sixers from them : and they are also good to that whick
is effective of them, so far as itfollffois or acts in con-
formity to wholes i but so far as it acts from itself,
the deeds are evil, and detrimental to itself, anddo
not give completion to the great conceptions <yf the
soul. This, ho>wever, is the beginning of salvation
to the patient. For in many persons, the meditated

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169

eril remBioing within the soul is concealed, but at
length ', as being base and improper, is benefited,
and its nature then becomes evident when it exists
in energy. This is manifested by tlie penitence
and remorse of the soul, reproaching itself, as it
were, for the evil deed. For the arts of physicians,
also, by opening ulcers, an^ thus making the pas-
sion and the inwardly concealed cause of the db-
ease evident, exhibit an image of the operations of
Providence, who admits both the base deeds and
depraved passions, in order that the latter being
changed from the conception which they had form-
ed, and from the habit which was caused and in-
flated by evils, may assume the principle of a better
period and life. But whatever passions are within
the soul, are accompanied by the good of the evil,
so far as they always lead the soul to what is proper.
For it is not possible for that which chooses things
of a worse nature to remain in such as are better,
but it soon tends to that which is dark and base;
And not actions only, but likewise without theses
the elections of the soul contain in themselves [re-
tributive] justice. For every election leads the
soul to that which is similar to its choice. If,
therefore, there is anything depraved and base
and alheisdcal in the soul, the transferring it to
that which is congenial to itself is soon attended
with good, with the desert which is from Provi-
dence, and with tlie law inherent in souls, which

* Tandem U omitted in this place in the nernon of Moibeka,
but eiidenlly ought to hsTG been ioseitcd.

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170

leads each of them to what is B{^ropriste. For
Providence foreknows the life of the soul, and
through this conjoins it to things similar to itself;
but this is the same as uniting it with that which it
deserves, or with that which is conformable to its
difference with respect to other souls; this, again,
unites it to what is imparted by Providence, and
tfais' [finally] to good. I^ indeed, it were fit that
souls which act unjustly should abide on high,
which it is not lawful to assert, their choice would
in no respect possess what is good; but beuig
alone evil, it would be entirely atheistical and nn-
jost. But if choice soon removes the elective soul
from things of a better nature, it possesses good
mingled w^tfa evih For every soul naturally de-
»res the supernal r^on. When soals, therefor^
descend into the realms of mortality, their choice
is directed to a degraded life; but it is necessary
diat eirerytbing should descend which does not [al-
ways] energise according to intellect, though the
lapse Is to some souls more, and to others less,
because the choice in them varies.

But after what manner is the evil that is in bodies
at the same time good ? JMay we not say, tliat this
to the whole is according to nature*, but to the
part is prsetematural. Evil, however, is in a greater
degree good to the whole than to the part, because
it contributes naturally to the universe ; but so far
as it is distributed into parts, it has fixtm thence

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171

the prseternatnra]. But the evil which is in bodies
is twofold, one kind existing as derormity, but
another as disease. I call, however, the deformity
of body everything which is not a preetematural
disease of it. For monsters are the turpitudes of
nature. And in nature, considered as a whole,
deformity subsists naturally', because in this it is
reason [t. e. a producing principle] and form ; but
in a partial nature, deformity is one reason [or
form], and that which is contrary to this, is to
such a nature prielematDraL But in nature as a
whole, all producing principles and all forms sul^
sbt naturally. And sometimes, indeed, from one
species or form, that which is geierated is one
thing ; for the form of man in nature may be said
to generate man in a more principal manner than
anything else. But sometimes many things are
generated from one form ; for there is one produc-
tive principle of figure in nature, but many different
kinds of figures proceed from it. And sometimes,
Irom many forms oiie thing is produced ; such as
are the mixtures of spedes about matter, that ap-
pear to be monsters to an individual nature, which
desires to obtain, and subsists according to one
form. Lastly, sometimes many things [of the same
species] proceed from many forms ; for in many
such things there is both equality and inequality.
All species or forms, therefore, are according to

* Id Morbcka, in thia plicCi after " hoc juidem lurpe leeundum
wifuRun fHom," it is necessuyt'' ii^i '" noluraKfer, confbmiably
to the above Uanslation. .■ •

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tiKture, both such as nre unmmgled, and such as-
are mingled, and proceed from those producing
powers which are in Nature herself, with all the
variety of which she is replete. To some bodies,
however, disease is according to nature; because
each of these is generated that which it is said to
be in a twofold respect, viz. both from a partial
and a total nature. But that which is corruptible
is so naturally with respect to nature considered as
a whole, but is prtetematural to a partial nature'.
For that into which the thing that is corrupted is
transmuted, possesses a form and reason from total
nature, contrary to the nature of the thing cor-
rupted. For so far as that which is corrupted is a
whole, so far the corruption of it is prtetematural ;
but so far as it is a portion of the universe, the
corrnptionof it is according to nature; since every
whole subsists according to the form or productive
principle which is in it. And thus corruption is pro-
duced from one thing, and the corruption is again
the cause of the generation of another thing.
' 9. Hence, the evil which is in bodies is not un-
mingled evil ; but the evil of these, so far as it is
from Providence, is natural ; and, in short, those
things that have a generation, have it on account
of good. Some one, however, may say. How is it
possible for that which is perfectly good to sufler

* This aeDtence in Morbeka is. " Cm-mptibile avttm nctindim
naha-amgvidemlotam, pntternaturamaulemiiarticiilarem"; but
immediately after " quidem ", it is necesMiy to insert ad, and also
inmiedisKl)' 'ftec " nulftn ".

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17S

that which is deprived of the nature of good to
remain ? For neither is it possible for evil to exist,
without having the appearance of its contrary, good;
because all things, and even evil itself, are for the
sake of good. To this we answer, that if all things
are for the sake of good, Divinity is not the cause
of evils. For evil, so far as evil, is not derived
from thence, but from other causes, which, as we
have before observed, generate not from power, but
from debility. On which account, as it appears to
me, Plato*, arranging all things about the King of

' WbM is bete asserted b; Froclus is to be found in the second
Epistleof Plato to Diouydus; and the wbole of the passage to which
he refers is as ToUows ; *■)/ ymf tn xara rii ixmin ).rya' tux ihmic
Kittiiiux^ '" rtfi rm w *fuT9v fifrmt, ffitmn in rw it mtnyfuH,
a Kin I, hxrtf 9 mriv i jtk h rrvxi"! r^'}, ' ^r^v""" f" V-- *''
ym^ IX"' "^ ^*' vutrtn fitiriXut wmn' tm, mu txufov IruA vstw^ ica/
HriM mrttt mratvMf vnf xaX^v. 3uwi^» it **^i tb ittfrt^a, kbj rpn> «p

^Xt9»utiL us rm AVTiif tuyytm, ww avJit trntrmt t^ti, -rw St &afi^u/t nfi
xai in uwn, niiif trrt* rwurtt rt in f^tTm ttv^rt it ^uxK faff- aXUjt

«m» im iiuuri ftakyii !■ I, rip t.w*. «3i(, » Tj -^uxv ,yy,y,,/i,n-
hr V ftn Til i^aiflttirirBUj rut xXn^uat nvatt etf/iHtttTi TUX"'

There ia an important diSerence between some parts of this pass-
age BB quoted b]* Proclus, and all [be printed edilions of it, wliicfa
has not been noticed by any of the editors of Plato's Works. For
Proclus (in Flat. Theol. p. 103.) for i> irr<';£iu[ ira/^ has ruxm
fuJf. But 1 hare no doubt that Proclus originally wrote i> nx"!
watij, and that roxm fn^f is an error of the transcriber. In the ■«>
cond place, in the sentence mXXm rtm n foit nirr urn, » rau ^iimv,
ii.T.X., which, from what Proclus says of it, was eiidently not con-
udered by him as interrogative, for iEs>.a» ■ in Proclus, it is requisite
to read, conformably to all the editions of Plato, tiuitn. With these

■ See this confirmed in the Treatise of Damasdus rifi A(x"-

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